Dialogue and Christian ethics: commending virtue in a pluralist society by Petzsch, Hugo Max David
Dialogue and Christian Ethics:
commending virtue in a pluralist society-
Hugo Max David Petzsch
submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
The University of Edinburgh
August 1995
si
This thesis has been composed by myself and does not
include any material which has been submitted for
another degree at this or any other university. All
sources of information have been acknowledged in the
footnotes and in the bibliography.
Abstract of Thesis
Dialogue and Christian Ethics:
commending virtue in a pluralist society
This thesis examines the challenges to Christian ethics
posed by the model of round table dialogue.
It opens with a case-study description of the round
table approach and then surveys some contemporary works
in the field of ethics in the light of Alasdair
Maclntyre's critique of modern moral discourse. This
review leads to a proposal indicating how the round
table dialogue may be a suitable model by which
Christian ethicists may engage with a range of other
moral perspectives.
The next three chapters explore different aspects of
work which may usefully contribute to an understanding
of the method and function of dialogue for ethical
discourse. These aspects include general and
specifically Christian reflection on dialogue, the
Harvard Negotiation Project and work from those engaged
in inter-faith dialogue. Consideration is then given
to contributions by the philosophers Gadamer and
Habermas on the extent to which absolutes operate
within thought and conversation. Thirdly, there is a
discussion of how a dialogical approach could affect
the methods of Christian ethics.
There are then reviews of two important and contrasting
areas of contemporary ethical confusion: euthanasia and
pornography, each discussed over two chapters. These
four chapters develop and attempt to apply what has
been learnt from the previous section.
Finally, there is an assessment of the extent to which
the round table model of dialogue may be used by
Christian ethicists and an identification of those
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I must observe that goodness is of a modest
nature, easily discouraged, and when much elbowed
in early life by unabashed vices, is apt to retire
into extreme privacy. (George Eliot)
In 1987 the Church of England's Board for Social
Responsibility published a report by a working group
which had been chaired by the Archbishop of York:
Changing Britain: social diversity and moral unity.
This report was intended to contribute to the
developing debate about Britain's future as a pluralist
society. In doing this the authors wanted to move
beyond consideration of individual problems to the
'most fundamental and intractable differences... those
2
which lie m the field of beliefs and values.' A
central assumption behind their work is the idea that
we may assume a common basis for all morality: 'the
content of different [moral] traditions may coincide to
a remarkable degree, even though the source of the
obligation felt and the commitment given may differ.'
The churches are seen as one of the providers and
stewards of these moral traditions but that does not
1Middlemarch, 1871-2, edited by David Campbell
(1991), i, p. 283.
3
~Changing Britain, para. 21, p. 8.
Ibid., para. 51, p.19.
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give them any special basis on which to contribute to
the debates, rather they appear to be excluded from
such a role: vit is foolish to imagine that the
churches in Britain could in some sense stand over
against the rest of British society, and address it as
4
if they did not share its problems.'
Changing Britain, however, is seriously flawed in that
it excessively circumscribes the role of the churches
in any discussion of values. The Christian churches
have highly developed traditions of moral discourse
matched with a concern to think and work for the
benefit of others. While it is good to read in the
report of a sensitivity to both past mistakes and the
possible confusions that theological language may
create, this should not lead the churches to adopt a
reactive role in the task of shaping a new moral
framework for pluralist Britain.
The authors of Changing Britain suggest koinonia as a
word which describes afresh the ideas they think could
form a common basis for morality:
Koinonia seeks to hold together the two basic
values of freedom and capacity for relationship in
a dynamic tension of individuals-in-community
which does justice to both. It would seem to
offer the challenge and the possibility of
individuals existing for, and finding their
4Ibid., para. 181, p. 64.
2
personal fulfilment in relationship with, one
another.
While it is admirable to talk of Koinonia, virtually
nobody else does and as the report acknowledges the
word, with its intended associations, would need to
find its way into common speech.^ This idea is too
general to provide a practical basis for a new common
morality. When engaging with pluralism greater clarity
is needed than the report shows. In particular there
is no method offered by which the general principle of
koinonia may be applied to the developing debate in
Britain.
The limitations of Changing Britain are a symptom of a
more general malaise. Most contemporary ethical
problems cannot be solved or even addressed adequately
by one interest group alone. In a pluralist society
there are many ethical traditions: some are secular
others are religious. It is no longer appropriate or
desirable that, even if there is one, the dominant
interest group should determine the moral point of view
on any issue on behalf of others. Nevertheless, that
is how things have been done until relatively recently
and it is this history in Britain from which the Church
of England's report Changing Britain wisely seeks to
c:
"lib id., para. 63, p. 23.
Ibid., para. 68, p. 24.
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distance itself. We need a new way of thinking about
how to develop ethical perspectives and of
communicating those insights within societies which now
have a fragmented and thus only a very limited form of
common moral vision. This will involve trying to work
with a consensus model in ethical debate, as in other
areas of common interest. What is not clear is how
this process may work and how individual traditions of
ethical thought may contribute constructively to the
debate.
i background to the ideas
My initial interest was to understand how contributions
from Christian ethics may be made to society's ongoing
moral debates. The practical background to this
interest developed when I was vicar of an city-centre
parish in Wellington, New Zealand. My predominantly
gathered congregation was made up of many individuals,
both women and men, who were involved at senior levels
in the government, diplomatic, trading and banking
concerns of the capital city. They wanted to apply
their faith in the workplace and tried to make
connections between what was demanded of them by their
faith and the situations they addressed at work.
However, they found this difficult particularly when
recommending the virtues of a course of action or point
4
of view because of its implicitly Christian character.
When an idea was challenged, for these people to say
that they thought it was an appropriate course of
action because it seemed a Christian thing to do, did
not help their cause. Christian morality needs to be
sensitively commended in modern pluralist societies
which may be both indifferent to or ignorant of it.
The original context of the ideas developed in this
thesis is that of the professional middle class and the
model of dialogue offered reflects that limited
background and social structure. While not ultimately
restricted to this context, the model of dialogue will
require sensitive moderation and development should it
be applied more widely. Even in societies which were
traditionally Christian, there are now competing moral
traditions and claims. Here too, a Christian
perspective needs to be presented in a way that
commends itself on its own merits.
In pursuing this issue, I use the metaphor of
discussion around a table. This idea came from
watching a television debate on the subject of
euthanasia. Television discussion programmes are
necessarily limited by time and the need to entertain
in the opportunity they afford for the detailed
exploration of ideas. However, there are at least two
areas in which these popular discussions reflect wider
5
difficulties in moral discourse. My example, drawn
from a New Zealand broadcasting channel and shown in
7
1988, wrll serve to illustrate the point.
There were ten participants and a chairman who was also
the presenter, involved in making programmes which
explored religious and moral issues. The group was
composed of two individuals representing the Christian
churches (one Roman Catholic and one evangelical
fundamentalist), along with a medical ethicist, two
doctors, a philosopher and others who were present on
the basis of direct involvement in the issue under
debate, as either carers or health care professionals.
The debate began with the chairman inviting the two
Christians to comment. Both did, stating rather than
arguing that euthanasia was not an acceptable option.
The discussion then broadened to include the other
participants. The issues were soon seen to be more
complex than either of the Christian speakers had
allowed. The two Christians found it difficult to re¬
enter the discussion after their opening contributions
and whenever the chairman tried to bring them in they
7
It is obviously not ideal to refer to an example
which is not available on video-tape or script for
reference. However, I have decided to use the
programme on the grounds that the two important
issues were very clearly covered in the discussion
and it is the particular example that set me
thinking along these lines. Similar patterns can be
seen in some British television discussions.
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had difficulty in convincing the others of the
relevance of their perspective to the matter under
discussion. In the end, the discussion stopped without
conclusion except to acknowledge that that the subject
was very complicated. The closest any participant or
viewer might have come to a conclusion is the idea that
moral decisions in this area might be a matter of
personal choice. This point is directly connected with
two important features of this discussion: that the
differing opinions appeared to be essentially
irreconcilable and secondly the relegation of the
religious point of view to the margin of the debate.
The conversation mainly focused on practical issues
which were connected with more abstract themes. One
example illustrates both of my concerns. One of the
Christian participants was caring for an elderly and
ill parent. He envisaged continuing with this for some
time and understood what he was doing as part of his
Christian responsibility. Not to do so would be to fail
in an obligation to care for another. His concern
focused on his own responsibility to offer care and
support. He did not think that the recipient of his
attention might be in a position which meant that she,
having both benefitted and appreciated it in the past,
might now choose to be without it. Any suggestion that
it might be kind to let his mother die was met with the
7
clear and confident remark that it was not his business
to take another's life. There was a reluctance to
acknowledge the suggestion that another might
legitimately be able to share responsibility for the
decision.
This participant's basis for his care was his Christian
faith. While that was clear in the discussion, it was
equally clear that this perspective was not shared by
all the other participants and even that those who did
share it did not necessarily find that it led to the
same conclusions. The issue of what might be the
kindest thing to do for his mother and the prohibition
on killing were both discussed. However, these
discussions, and especially that on killing, led to two
apparently immovable positions. One group regarded
killing as always unacceptable, on the basis of the Ten
Commandments and the biblical view of life as sacred
because God given, and the other arguing that to take a
human life is acceptable in some circumstances. As a
consequence of this difficulty and division in the
discussion, some of the participants without a
religious perspective became irritated with those who
held Christian points of view and yet appeared unable
to agree with one another. This led to a challenge to
the Christian perspective, in terms of its relevance to
the discussion and the suggestion that the issue would
8
be clearer without religious confusions muddying the
waters. The idea, from Changing Britain, of persons-
in-relation or koinonia was evident in the concerns
shared by the participants but it did not result in a
satisfactory outcome to the discussion.
This conversation, in all its unsatisfactory nature,
illustrates some of the common problems of moral debate
which will be explored in this thesis. Any development
from here must address the two main difficulties that
were part of the television discussion. These points
are: a) there exist a plurality of moral perspectives
representing differing cultural traditions and these
O
lead to some confusion in moral debate; and b) the
fact that religious perspectives are no longer commonly
accepted (even in traditionally Christian western
societies) and may have to struggle to demonstrate
relevance in order to be considered in the debates.
Here, the first of these points will be discussed
further, initially in the terms identified by Alasdair
Maclntyre. The debate provoked by Maclntyre's After
O
While we are now aware of this difficulty in
reaching conclusions in moral philosophy, the idea
that one system is self-sufficient is still present
in the work of some leading writers. Terry Eagleton
makes precisely this criticism of Iris Murdoch's
survey of moral philosophy in his review of her
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (The Guardian, 20
October 1992).
9
Virtue9 and its sequels provided valuable reflection on
the difficulties of moral discourse because of the
perceived incompatibility of various moral traditions.
Maclntyre's analysis provides a good starting point for
considering my concerns within a wider sphere.
ii Maclntyre's After Virtue
xWe... inhabit a culture in which an inability to
arrive at agreed rationally justifiable
conclusions on the nature of justice and practical
rationality coexists with appeals by contending
social groups to sets of rival and conflicting
convictions unsupported by rational
justification. Neither the voices of academic
philosophy, ... nor those of the partisan
subcultures, have been able to provide for
ordinary citizens a way of uniting conviction on
such matters with rational justification.
Disputed questions concerning justice and
practical rationality are thus treated in the
public realm, not as matter for rational enquiry,
but rather for the assertion and counterassertion
of alternative and incompatible sets of
premises.'1
Here we see Maclntyre's thesis in outline: he
attributes the contemporary moral confusion to the
difficulties in resolving moral discussion in societies
which include or draw upon several moral traditions.
The conclusions that worked in the past did so because
yPublished in 1981, second edition with postscript,
1985. The two following volumes are Whose Justice?
Which Rationality? (1988) and Maclntyre's Gifford
Lectures, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry
(1990) .
^Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, pp. 5-6.
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they were both developed and employed within the same
system and consequently were consistent with its
premises. Since Maclntyre's analysis, it is no longer
possible to work as if one moral framework is self-
sufficient .
He discusses the 'interminable' nature of contemporary
moral debate and analyses it in terms of three related
11 • • •
features. There is a 'conceptual incommensurability'
of rival points of view, whereby arguments which are
logically consistent may be found to be in conflict and
thus there is no rational or external way of assessing
their strength, one against another. Maclntyre's
second observation is that this difficulty is
compounded when these arguments are deliberately
expressed in impersonal language. He shows these two
features operating together in the example of abortion.
The arguments centre respectively on the unborn child's
right to life and a woman's right to determine what
happens to her body. Both arguments build upon
objective criteria and are concluded with the evasive,
but persuasive and pervasive language of 'rights', yet
either can be a vehicle for emotive personal opinions,
disguised under a superficial objectivity.
11After Virtue, pp. 8-10.
11
Maclntyre explores further this experience of ethical
stalemate in his third point by arguing that all
ethical theories developed and held sway within
particular world views 'in which they enjoyed a role
and function supplied by contexts of which they have
12
now been deprrved.' Drfferences could be resolved
and conclusions reached more readily in Plato's
academy, or the medieval chapter-house, because those
participating accepted a common world view, with a
consequent unified perspective on ethical issues.
Contemporary debate often uses concepts that are
specific to a philosophical system within which they
were originally developed and now employs them
sometimes without reference to that system and in
circumstances different to those in which the idea was
13
originally applied.
The main change from the coherent system to the present
confusion stems, in Maclntyre's eyes, from the
12Ibid., p.10.
1 "3
The Principle of Double Effect is now often applied
in medical ethics with only passing acknowledgement
of its scholastic background. The original problem
it addressed, that of killing in self-defence, is
far removed from its present application.
Discussion of some contemporary misapplications of
the principle of double effect may be found in:
James F. Keenan, 'The function of the Principle of
Double Effect', Theological Studies 54 (1993), pp.
294-315. The principle of double effect and its
specific use in euthanasia is examined in some
detail in chapter 6 below.
12
eighteenth century Enlightenment. A separation
developed between views of the nature and purpose of
humankind and any assessment of moral behaviour: 'once
the notion of essential human purposes or functions
disappears from morality, it begins to appear
implausible to treat moral judgements as factual
statements'.14 Thereafter, moral points of view rest
on a level with personal opinions. What we see as the
responsibility to exercise detachment in ethical
dilemmas (attempting to stand outwith the context of
any decision under review in order to understand it
better) is, according to Maclntyre, a means by which
such a review may become more difficult. Referring to
the Homeric world of The Iliad, he writes: 'All
questions of choice arise within the framework; the
15
framework itself therefore cannot be chosen.'
Maclntyre's analysis is very helpful but there are some
difficulties. It is not clear that any one moral
14Ibid., p.59.
15Ibid., p.126. It is precisely to the classical
world of Aristotle that Maclntyre turns for his
model of the virtues as the beginning of his
reconstruction of moral dialogue. The main point he
makes about Aristotle's view of the virtues is that
they stemmed from the philosopher's view of the end
of humankind. Maclntyre's view is that 'the whole
point of ethics - both as a theoretical and a
practical discipline - is to enable man to pass from
his present state to his true end.'(After Virtue, p.
13) Maclntyre's discussion of the virtues flows
from this conviction.
13
tradition was ever as pure as he maintains.
Philosophers in the past probably needed to engage in
some creative translation between systems of moral
reflection. Secondly, if things are as bleak as he
claims it is very difficult to see any way beyond the
present confusion.
These criticisms have been developed by Jeffrey Stout,
whose Ethics After Babel (1988) is in part a response
to Maclntyre's thesis, addressing particularly the
issue of the extent to which it is possible for there
to be discourse between moral traditions. Stout re¬
assesses the moral chaos which Maclntyre has identified
and comes up with different conclusions about its
effects. While agreeing in part with both the causes
and characteristics of the contemporary moral climate,
Stout takes issue with Maclntyre over the extent to
which it is possible to translate terms and concepts
between different moral traditions. In Stout's eyes,
while it is not easy, it is certainly possible to make
equations of value and meaning to the extent that
communication is possible between moral traditions of
1 C-\
widely differing provenance. The contemporary scene
16Stephen E. Fowl discusses the ideas of translation
in Maclntyre and Stout in: 'Could Horace talk with
the Hebrews? translatability and moral disagreement
in Maclntyre and Stout', Journal of religious
Ethics, 19 (1991), pp. 1-20.
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where many traditions find themselves considered
alongside one another in attempts to address varying
ethical problems is just the way things are. Stout does
not think it is worth lamenting this nor trying to
change it by developing a new ethical common language,
rather we must live with it and find ways of overcoming
the difficulties. Stout concludes that a degree of
common sense must inform our ethical reflection in
terms of what it is possible to achieve. We must be
prepared to gather moral insight from a range of
sources, developing perspectives by weaving together
compatible strands of traditionally incompatible
schools of moral thought.
Stout also comments on the role of religious ethics in
contemporary moral discourse, the second area of my
concern identified in the television discussion
programme. He attributes the marginalisation of
religious ethics largely to the limitations of its
representatives:
Theologians, when addressing the faithful, usually
assume the answer to be obvious or give an answer
that could serve as motivation only to the
faithful. The same theologians, when addressing a
general audience on a specific moral problem,
typically search for common assumptions in a way
that blurs any distinctive contributions of their
religious traditions.
17Ethics After Babel, p. 124.
15
Stout offers three reasons why religious ethics should
not be ignored and deserve consideration within wider
moral discourse. First, Stout claims that it is not
possible to properly understand even modern secular
moral discourse without reference to the traditions of
religious ethics which have influenced them. Second,
there is much to be learnt from the religious
traditions of ethics even if one does not accept their
theistic premises and conclusions. Finally, however
secular moral discourse has now become, religious ideas
still influence the thought and actions of individuals.
In trying to understand the people, the philosopher
must understand the religious ethics which have
18
motivated them.
I hope to show that more can be claimed for religious
ethics, but Stout has reinforced my initial concerns.
In terms matching the example with which my reflections
began, he asks of religious ethics:
How, then, might theology rejoin the conversation
under such circumstances? How can it initiate a
dialogue not only with its own tradition but also





Having outlined two determining aspects of
contemporary moral discourse which are addressed in
this thesis, I want to return to the idea of round-
table discussion mentioned above. This is intended as
a metaphor which will provide a means of exploring the
possibilities of developing an alternative way of
entering and sustaining moral discourse in pluralist
societies. Such a table would have positions of equal
importance for all those who wish to take part in the
debate. There would be no prior positions of
authority. This is in direct contrast to situations
where particular groups have positions of influence as
of right and which may be used to sway or influence
opinion, such as the Church of England's episcopal
representation in the House of Lords. Equally
important is the idea that all who wish to take part in
the spirit of the developed principles are called to
the discussion: not only may no group take priority,
any may in principle participate. This point should
ensure that there exists for ethical reflection a wider
frame of discourse and values than may emerge if
individual cultures are left alone to select the
participants. In particular this provision of all
being called to participate encourages contributions
form the secular point of view within religious
17
traditions and from the religious point of view within
2 0
secular cultures.
However, while any may join there must be guidelines
agreed between the participants to ensure that the
process remains open to its initial purpose. It is
essential that contributors begin with both a
willingness to contribute to the process and through it
to the debate about the issue in hand and from a
position of respect for the opinions and points of view
on
. .
For a discussion of the threat to religious
participation in the public square, see Ian S.
Markham, Plurality and Christian Ethics (1994), pp.
117-123. Markham draws his main metaphor of the
public square as the place for contemporary decision
making from the work of Richard J. Neuhaus, whose
The Naked Public Square (1984) outlines the concerns
of conducting business and decision making in a
secular context. Markham's argument is that it is
possible for there to be commitment to particular
positions and points of view within a pluralist
society. This provides for Christian participation
in the public square and indeed he argues it is only
the rational theist's world-view that is best suited
to protect the freedom of such debate. He reviews
recent trends in British and North American
Christian ethical reflection and finds that where
one, the British, laments the end of the unified
view possible within Christendom and ideally would
like to return to such a position, North America has
embraced pluralism and sees it as a strength which
can facilitate political and economic decision
making. Central to Markham's argument is the
rehabilitation of the idea of tolerance.
18
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of the other participants. The establishment of a
common base for the conversation will be very important
and will be one of the first tasks of the gathering.
This common basis will provide a position from which to
assess the differing perspectives offered. In the
case of euthanasia, for example, the common basis of
all positions might be care of the patient. In
discussion the participants must be prepared to take
account both of the views of others and open to
acknowledging that their own perspective may be
enhanced by the opinions of others. At every stage,
each step needs to be understood as part of a mutually
adopted process which can only work and be sustained
with the support of all participants. Along with these
points there needs to be a commitment to develop and
work with a shared outcome, the nature of which may not
91 .... .
A willingness, either implicit or explicit, to allow
value to the perspectives of others in the moral
arena is essential in developing a morality for
pluralist societies. For example, Paul Kurtz, the
author of Forbidden Fruit (1988) subtitled xthe
ethics of humanism', writes in an interesting and
informal fashion about contemporary moral issues.
However, his working perspective is opposed to a
religious framework for ethics and his thesis is an
attempt to provide a purely humanist ethic. He has
developed this approach in his Eupraxophy: living
without religion (1989). It is difficult to imagine
that he can contribute to a discussion which sets
out to be deliberately inclusive from that premise.
Kai Nielsen's Ethics Without God (1972, revised and
expanded 1990), which strongly advocates the idea
that ethics needs to separate itself from the
concerns of theology obviously comes into this same
category.
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be clear at the outset of the discussion. While this
approach may not result in conclusions which satisfy
all parties Lo Lhe discussion, it may be that such
conclusions that are reached command respect, if not
full agreement.
Here it is important to identify briefly a central
issue in the development of this model: that of moral
absolutes. Where a participant employs moral
absolutes, then it is important to recognise the
possibility of disagreement. This will arise from
competing claims and positions which need to be
recognised and accepted as part of the negotiation
process by all participants. Those who hold to moral
absolutes are likely to be clear about the consequences
of such opinions. Within the context of the dialogical
process of ethical reflection that is being tentatively
outlined here these consequences will become subject to
negotiation along with the moral absolutes. Those who
question the existence of moral absolutes must engage
with others holding them.
Having set out an initial model of what the metaphor
might involve, before it has been developed and refined
through application, it is also appropriate to indicate
specifically why it appears desirable. The
anticipated advantages of the proposed scheme are
20
several. It may enable the parties to any moral
disagreement to find a way of clearly identifying the
issues around which decisions must be made. There is
the opportunity, as with every conversation, of
beginning afresh. Thus, it may be possible to
understand what has already been said in a new light.
There is the possibility of talking around and
negotiating in the face of difficulties. All
participants have a chance to learn from the encounter
and to develop their own positions in response to both
what they have learnt from the other points of view and
from the impact of the obstacle on their own point of
view. By this means, the model may provide a way of
avoiding Maclntyre's 'interminable incommensurability'.
There are three other areas where an approach to ethics
in terms of dialogue could be helpful. One is the
sense in which understanding the process of ethical
reflection as a conversation also provides an
analytical tool. In this sense the confusion that is
part of contemporary moral discourse may be
disentangled through the identification of the
different strands. Through this process, patterns that
have led to confusion and stalemate may be discerned
and traced so that their influence might be better
taken account of in future encounters.
21
Another, the first of two clear applications of the
ethics of dialogue, is the contribution it may make to
the developing idea of moral communities.
Maclntyre's famous plea at the end of the first edition
of After Virtue called for vthe construction of local
forms of community within which civility and
intellectual and moral life can be sustained through
2 2
the new dark ages which are already upon us.' Since
then the idea has had wider currency and was developed
slightly by Jonathan Sacks and much more by Robin
2 2
Gill. Each of these proposals for the development of
communities of virtue pays insufficient attention to
the manner in which the virtue discerned and nurtured
may be communicated either between such communities or
from such communities into the wider world.
Maclntyre's initial image of the medieval monasteries
stewarding knowledge through the dark ages carries with
it the idea of the considerable converse that went on
between monks of the same and differing orders. If
such communities are again to be the hope of
civilisation they will need to be skilled in
22After Virtue, p. 263.
2 3
Jonathan Sacks, The Persistence of Faith, the Reith
Lectures for 1990 (1991); see especially chapter 6,
vA Community of Communities' . Robin Gill, Moral
Communities, the Prideaux Lectures at the University
of Exeter in 1992 (1992) .
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communicating that which they develop and foster,
iv the thesis in outline
Three concerns should be mentioned here before
describing briefly the structure of the argument which
will be developed in the thesis. There is a danger
that parts of this thesis will seem like a survey of
texts and ideas drawn from other works. Reviews of
other work have been necessary to inform the developing
argument. This is particularly true in the early
chapters which try to set out examples of work in
fields other than ethics which have a bearing on the
development of a set of principles of dialogue. It has
also been necessary in the two case studies, of
euthanasia and pornography, where especially in the
latter there is a need to be very clear both what is
actually being considered and secondly what is being
said about it. In the discussion of euthanasia, which
is a much better documented topic, I assume a degree of
background knowledge and have chosen four individual
instances or arguments which give particular glimpses
into the problem. There has been a tension throughout
the preparation of this thesis between providing both
sufficient evidence of material on which to base my
argument and adequate background information to render
discussions of the ethical topics intelligible.
23
This difficulty connects directly with my next concern,
which is that the discussion has been developed
entirely within a mono-cultural pattern. In my SPG
year reading report I looked at patterns and influences
in medical ethics in Judaism and Islam, as well as in
the Christian and western secular traditions. It would
have been good to continue this interest by developing
positions around the table which represented these
traditions. However, this was not feasible. It would
have made the treatment of any topic either too large
to be practical or too superficial.
It will be evident already that the writing of this
thesis has been something of a journey in which I have
been exploring and developing an idea in response to
limitations in moral discourse. In presenting my
response to the problem, I am also presenting the
manner in which the enquiry has been conducted. In
identifying the practice of ordinary conversation or
dialogue, where we work to communicate across various
barriers and around obstacles, as providing a way
forward, I set out to examine the evidence. Without
consciously following any of the principles of
liberation theology, I realised as the process
developed that there are some parallels between the
approach gradually developed here and the ideas and
practice of liberation theology, although these have
24
not been explored because again to do so would risk
24
treating important material superficially. The
process initiated in this thesis but not completed in
it, aims at learning by engaging in dialogue. I have
tried to show in the two case studies how the process
might develop further in terms of testing the
principles offered and refining them in the light of
experience. The process is not complete and the
conclusion will identify those aspects of the argument
which need further discussion or which need to tested
out in wider circumstances or contexts more varied than
has been possible here.
In the next three chapters I will explore three main
areas of thought from which it is possible to draw
lessons and ideas which can be used to develop and
refine a model of ethical discourse based on principles
of dialogue. These chapters will be followed by
sustained discussion, each of two chapters, of two
major contemporary ethical issues: euthanasia and
pornography. Finally there will be an attempt to
2 4 . ■
There is a limited parallel m the idea of the
method developing through application to actual
situations. Paulo Freire, in his Pedagogy of the
Oppressed, translated by Myra Bergman Ramos
(Harmondsworth, 1972), discusses dialogue in terms
of the concerns of those whose right to speak and
act has been denied them. See especially chapter 3
of Pedagogy of the Oppressed (pp. 60-95) and
Appendix 1 of this thesis, on Power and Dialogue.
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assess what has been learnt about the feasibility of
developing an ethics of dialogue.
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Chapter 2
Dialogue as a Basis for Ethical Reflection
If dialogue is to provide a new way of coming to terms
with some of the difficulties causing contemporary
moral confusion, then it is necessary to think clearly
about what is understood by dialogue and in what sense
it might function in the area of moral discourse. In
this chapter I will identify some characteristics of
dialogue which may help in this task. These will be
drawn from a range of sources. General reflection on
dialogue will move to consideration of two texts, each
quite different but both addressing the issue of the
importance of dialogue. In their different ways both
books provide some useful guidelines for this project.
This will be followed by a discussion of some
principles drawn from inter-faith dialogue.
i towards dialogue
A dialogue can be simply two or more people
communicating - usually though not exclusively by
speaking. In drama as in life, they need not be
agreeing, seeking agreement or indeed even effectively
addressing each other. It matters only that they are
in the same place at the same time and speaking in one
another's presence. Another form is represented, for
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example, in Plato's The Republic and other works, where
the dialogue is a highly structured series of
arguments, discussing the validity of various points of
view, assessing them in terms of the concerns,
interests and problems of the participants and their
society. Somewhere between these two models is the
experience of most of us. In conversation we discuss
issues of common concern and develop different opinions
about the options before us through a mixture of our
personal experience and the common received wisdom of
our group. It is this last type of dialogue, of the
three mentioned, that may hold possibilities for
contemporary moral debate.
What might we look for in dialogue, to make a
difference in moral discourse? Good dialogue involves
at least a two-fold process whereby the participants
expect both to learn about their own point of view and
that of the other participants. There is no point in
entering a dialogue if we are not interested to learn
about the other's position: not just what it might be,
but how it is arrived at and how it might be sustained.
Along with this interest in the other's point of view
there needs to be a willingness to allow one's own
opinions to come under similar scrutiny. This is a key
feature of the process, whereby we might come to
understand our own position better. In this way, even
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with the simplest idea of effective dialogue, the
process is recognised as being one of mutual learning.
These observations make it clear that the process must
be based on an initial sense of mutual respect among
the participants for the positions they represent.
This is essential if there is to be the degree of
mutual clarification and learning that is necessary for
the dialogue to go well, challenging assumptions,
eliminating confusions and developing a sense of trust
in the process as a whole.
If any party enters the dialogue without these
expectations then the process is hampered at the
outset. When dialogue opens assumptions must be
questioned and the purposes of participation clarified.
This process of mutual clarification often happens
naturally. If the process of dialogue is to work, then
it is essential that both or all parties are fully
committed to the enterprise. This means being prepared
to accept that the process itself may have valuable
outcomes quite different from those hoped for in terms
of one party's initial position. The experience of
dialogue may lead the participants to see or understand
new perspectives as a result of their collaborative
efforts. It becomes a learning process resulting from
the sharing of perspectives which is necessary for
mutual understanding.
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At this point two difficulties may be identified. The
first is that while is it relatively easy to discuss
dialogue in principle and its general value, it is very
difficult to effect it in some circumstances. There
are some situations in which dialogue seems virtually
impossible. The second point is that people are often
only prepared to participate in discussion when they
are clear about their own point of view. They will
speak when they are sure what it is they are going to
contribute: that is they wish to speak from a position
not only of some personal clarity but one that is the
result of some consideration. This means that when
they speak they do so from a position of having
reached an opinion on the matter under discussion.
However tentative this position may be, it is always
more difficult to get people to review a position fully
when they have moved most of the way towards making up
their mind. The best form of dialogue takes place when
people have not made up their minds on a topic and are
still open to considering several possible
alternatives. Then a genuine exploration of
possibilities can ensue.
Two further ideas are valuable in the process of
dialogue. It matters that there is a common commitment
to rationality in all aspects of the discussion. This
applies not only to conclusions but also to ways of
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arguing. It is only possible to question and challenge
what is said in discussion if all participants accept
the idea that reason is the basis for all points held
and conclusions suggested. There will inevitably be
perspectives held passionately and strong arguments
used but these can and must still be rational otherwise
there is no means of engaging with them in discussion
as part of a process of mutual clarification. The
second point is recognising that all conclusions
reached will be to differing extents relative to the
particular dialogues from which they emerged. They may
not be capable of application beyond the circles within
which they were originally conceived. This contingent
nature of conclusions is likely to pose particular
problems to those participants representing traditions
which have made universal claims for their points of
view.
* * *
There are other approaches to dialogue which could help
us further define a model which may be of use to
ethics. In the following discussion of two selected
books, knowledge of the immediate background and
intentions of the writers helps us understand some of
the shortcomings of the texts when considered for our
purposes. Neither book is aimed at the discussion of
31
ethical or moral problems and it is essential that this
is borne in mind as we consider what they offer in this
field by way of reviewing seriously the limitations of
each text. I have used these books precisely because
they do not comment on the field of ethics or even
relate to it directly and because they represent very
different approaches. They are drawn from the world in
which any proposed dialogical method for ethics will
have to function.
1
Reuel L. Howe's The Miracle of Dialogue is written m
an obvious spirit of optimism and with the hope that
through sensitive listening and attention we can
understand each other better and thus work together
more effectively. It is written by a Christian and
addressing Christians, where a common commitment to a
particular ideal of co-operative living can be assumed.
Roger Fisher and William Ury's text, also North
American in origin, was written some eighteen years
later and reflects a very different climate and
context. Their work, Getting to Yes, describes the
work on 'principled negotiation' which has been
developed by the authors and others as part of the work
of the Harvard Negotiation Project, based at the
"'"Published in New York in 1963 .
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Harvard Law School. International projects which have
benefitted from the work of this body using techniques
described in Getting to Yes include the Middle East
peace negotiations at Camp David in September 1978.
Getting to Yes aims to help people achieve agreement
precisely where that looks difficult. A major emphasis
of the work is on issues and concerns in the commercial
world. Almost all of the examples employed stem from
the negotiation of financial or legal contracts. This
perspective is reflected in the phraseology of the book
which uses financial figures of speech to describe the
advantages of different approaches, such as: xAn
apology may be one of the least costly and most
-3
rewarding investments you can make.'
Getting to Yes is specifically aimed at those who need
to negotiate settlements in situations which broadly
speaking involve some direct form of loss or gain on
the part of the negotiators. A further aspect of the
approach employed by Fisher and Ury is clear from the
subtitle: negotiating agreement without giving in.
Dwelling on these obvious emphases could lead to
underestimating how much there is in common between the
2 ....
Published m Britain m 1982 and reprinted seven
times to 1987, the book has enjoyed widespread
popularity and has been influential in national and
international contexts.
^Getting to Yes, p. 33.
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two broad approaches of this text and Howe and thus
denying the value of some of Fisher and Ury's more
pragmatic approach for developing a pattern of dialogue
in ethics.
Fisher and Ury's approach is directly practical and it
is clearly outlined at each point. They propose a
method of negotiation which is built on four primary
points. Before developing these points the authors
make a general observation which is echoed in at least
two of the points. They are keen that individuals
participating in a negotiation should not have to
bargain over positions or status. However attractive
it might be to try to resolve disputes or disagreements
this way, the difficulties are obvious. If in a
dialogue there appear to be strong differences of
opinion that look like being irresolvable, then a
temptation might be for one party to decide that since
they cannot win their point they might collude with the
idea of being the weaker or less senior party in the
discussion and thus allow the other to win, thereby
gaining for themselves a degree of self-respect in the
face of defeat. The attraction of such an approach is
that a decision is reached and there is the hope that
the positions tacitly agreed upon may be of use again
at some later stage. The drawbacks are more obvious.
They involve the discussion reaching a false or
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temporary conclusion because of the way the parties
colluded with one side winning, rather than following
through and overcoming the difficulties of the
discussion process. This in turn has unfortunate
consequences because however attractive a strong leader
or a compromise of one's own position may seem after an
over-long discussion, the conclusion will not command
real or lasting respect and may soon give rise to
resentment in the 'weaker' party.
Fisher and Ury's first point is to 'separate the people
from the problem'. By this they mean that it is
important to acknowledge that all discussions are made
up of a two-fold agenda of personalities and issues for
discussion and given that that is the case then it is
essential to distinguish clearly between the two. In
doing this they recommend addressing the problems
connected with the individuals first. This may be done
by recognising the importance of various factors:
trying to see the other's point of view, recognising
the important role that emotion can play in any
discussion and being open to the possibilities in the
discussion both around one's own point and those of
others. These points need emphasising in Fisher and
Ury's context in a way that does not apply in contexts
that are more centred on the value of the individual.
The second point developed by Fisher and Ury is 'focus
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on interests not positions'. Here they extend by
application some of their initial observations on the
problem of bargaining for positions and indicate how to
make the move towards concerns and away from
personalities. It is important to focus on the interest
and concerns of the participants, identifying them and
getting the individuals to explain and enlarge on their
perception of the common issues or problems.
Developing this approach a stage further takes Fisher
and Ury on to the idea of 'inventing options for mutual
gain'. This is more than just trying to keep everyone
happy by making sure they get something at the end.
Rather it is an attempt to look at the problem afresh
and see how through methods as diverse as brainstorming
and seeking expert advice the participants may move to
positions from which they may identify shared
interests. They may then move on to making decisions
which take them as close as possible to the desired
outcome. The final of the four points makes clear
Fisher and Ury's concern to facilitate the process by
'insisting on objective criteria', points independent
of emotional weight, which need to be identified or
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developed and then sustained through the discussion.4
Howe identified some of these same concerns in The
Miracle of Dialogue and further discerned two sets of
ideas which are helpful to this discussion. The first
is his notion of the 'dialogical person' and secondly
there is his concern to list some of the changes
produced by dialogue. The 'dialogical person' is
R
integrated, open and disciplined. What is meant by
this three-fold description is that, firstly,
individuals are fully aware of themselves and what is
motivating them both generally and in their
participation in discussion. At its best this means
that an individual will contribute openly to the
discussion and develop points as they arise rather than
having a hidden agenda of which they themselves may be
only partly aware. A person who is open to new ideas
and perceptions, rather than one who has both made up
his own mind about what he thinks and what he values in
the thought of others, can make a very valuable
contribution to dialogue. Openness in one's own
4The second half of Getting to Yes is entitled vYes,
but...' and explores how difficulties might be
overcome using the four broad working principles
outlined above. However, the situations and tactics
envisaged - dirty tricks and deliberate non-
cooperation - are beyond the sphere of the dialogues
envisaged as part of the process of ethical
reflection, and therefore are not considered here.
c;
The Miracle of Dialogue, pp. 69-83.
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position can be releasing for others in discussion.
When they see another participant prepared to be
relatively unguarded in considering their own position,
it can evoke in them a sense of confidence to do the
same in regard to their own ideas and points of view.
This two-fold openness is crucial to the development of
effective dialogue. Without it the process is easily
frustrated at an early stage and it is not possible to
develop the trust that is essential. Neither of these
two first aspects of the 'dialogical person' would
amount to much without the third characteristic,
discipline. A disciplined approach is essential for
the individual participant and for the members of the
group as a whole. The participants must accept common
responsibility for the task they have set themselves
and work at that within the parameters established to
help the dialogue. They must be committed together to
a good and fruitful outcome for the whole enterprise,
not just for their own point of view. As individuals
within the enterprise they must exercise discipline in
two important areas in addition to those just mentioned
above (that is, being integrated and open): discretion
and courage. Discretion is required at the very simple
level of resisting the temptation to control the
dialogue and win approval through a mixture of
overawing and silencing by continual domination.
Courage is required because in any enterprise where
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trust needs to be built up, risks must be taken in that
process. Individual participants need to be prepared
to risk exposing themselves and their points of view to
criticism. This courage is required throughout the
dialogue because there will always be occasions when a
group may be moving towards a conclusion in a
particular area and that direction may need challenging
in terms of the thinking of the overall group.
Sometimes points of conscience might arise and the
dialogue needs then to take account of that issue for
whoever has the courage to raise it.
Howe identifies two benefits of dialogue which are
enjoyed as a result of changes produced by the
process. They are the satisfaction that can be the
product of good dialogue and, as important, the sense
of new relationship achieved between the participants.^
In outlining these changes, Howe describes four such
7 . ...
features. The first is that the activity itself
creates within us the ability to do it successfully.
That is we achieve the ability to usefully participate
in dialogue through the experience of being part of
such a dialogue: the characteristics of the 'dialogical




point being made is simple enough, that doing creates
the disposition. How realistic is this? Given what
has been said about both the difficulties of the
process and the extent to which we can identify some of
the potential obstacles as stemming from the
participants, is it credible to think that we can
overcome them simply by getting on with the process of
dialogue? It takes more than knowledge of what is
wrong to effect a change in behaviour. There has to be
some clear change in understanding to facilitate a
change in practice.
Secondly, the process of dialogue is capable of
completely changing the way we understand what it is we
have experienced. This is meant not in terms of what
happens within the dialogue but rather that by seeing
our previous experiences through other eyes we may come
to value them differently because what they may mean
for us changes. This can happen in a number of ways
where experiences can be almost reversed in their
impact on the individual. Thus within religious belief,
doubt can change from being a burden and a seemingly
intractable obstacle to faith into becoming a new
beginning where the difficulties are seen as how things
are and the basis of a fresh appreciation of what it
can mean to believe.
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Not only may dialogue open up new ways of understanding
the previous experience of participants but it may also
through a connected process create new options in the
future. Where the process has been effective and the
participants have contributed and listened with a
degree of openness and worked together at the resultant
possibilities before them, then the dialogue can lead
to new avenues or openings. These may not have been
envisaged by any participant before the process began.
They are possibilities which have arisen from the
process itself and could not realistically have been
conceived of before the dialogue.
Howe's final point is that dialogue may reveal the
comprehensive related character of truth. That is, in
the process of discussion the participants may become
aware of the extent to which their individual concerns
and approaches have masked the fact that others have
similar or at least not competing concerns expressed
differently. This point represents most clearly the
optimism which characterises his approach. Maclntyre's
analysis of confusion in moral argument stems from his
perception of our frustration at precisely this point.
We are not all trying to work towards the same point or
outcome, within differing but complementary frameworks.
There may be points or even perspectives held in common
but the present difficulties in moral discussions stem
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from precisely a lack of awareness of how much is not
held in common by participants in moral discussions.
Howe's concern with dialogue stems from his Christian
faith. His concern is to see people in a range of
situations improve their ability to get on with those
around them. He wrote in a spirit of optimism. His
thesis is that, given the importance of dialogue, we
must learn to improve our skills in it and pay
particular attention to any hindrance of dialogue. He
argues for dialogue as a means towards solving problems
which hinder our capacity for enjoying life in its
fullness.
An obvious question to put to his work is, how well
does it cater for the problems that dialogue can so
easily run into? Howe certainly discusses the
importance of overcoming obstacles to fruitful dialogue
but not in a manner that conveys the tenacity of so
many real life situations. Howe gives the impression
that with effort and understanding almost every problem
of confused communication can be solved. This does
not take sufficient account of our fallen nature.
There are situations which seem to defy the best will
in the world and where misunderstandings are rife.
Identifying a problem takes us some way towards a
solution but more than that is required to get beyond
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it. The hope of first identifying a problem and then
assuming that the goodwill of both parties will be
sufficient to overcome it, ignores important
difficulties. Some misunderstandings arise from
genuine confusions, some from disingenuous confusions
and others both wilful, if not conscious, and those
which are purely wilful. One of the early
conversations in Genesis illustrates how easy it can be
to say something other than the truth in response to a
O
straight-forward question. Sometimes we find conflicts
or disagreements which appear to be beyond solution
precisely because the participants need the conflict
more than they desire its resolution. Howe's thesis is
offered from within a specifically Christian framework
and it is fair to criticise him from a theological
point of view. Here he has simply not taken sufficient
account of our sinful nature. As in Eden,
disagreements arise in our conversations and
relationships with others because of that side of our
natures which can be selfish, deceitful and fearful.
It is in precisely this area where Fisher and Ury's
Getting to Yes is valuable in spite of its limitations.
It is written from a highly pragmatic point of view
O
See Genesis 3.8-13. Sissela Bok's Lying: moral
choice in public and private life (1978) provides a
sustained treatment of the wider issue of lying.
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beginning from the very premise that reaching agreement
in dialogue can be difficult precisely because of
confusions and misunderstandings. The fact that
agreement is both necessary but elusive is their reason
for writing. Underpinning their whole discussion of
'principled negotiation' are two points which are
valuable for our discussion of dialogue in relation to
ethics.
The first is the notion that no discussion takes place
in a vacuum or free from other experiences on the part
of the participants. Every negotiation or series of
discussions leading to a particular agreed conclusion
occurs within a context of the pressures which impinge
on that particular decision and what has gone before,
for both the negotiators and for that particular
project or problem under discussion. This is likely to
have a direct and discernible influence both on the
process of discussions and on the nature of the final
decisions. The key negotiators are not always free at
a personal or a political level to reach any agreement.
Fisher and Ury's second point, this time made
explicitly, is the importance of insisting upon
objective criteria in every negotiation. Here is a
clear instance of the need for rational criteria behind
each point of any debate. If achieved this may
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facilitate discussion particularly when there may be an
emotional involvement in the outcome. In conversation
it is easy to be swayed by well presented emotive
points or considerations and to confuse them with
objective criteria in a way that makes a satisfactory
outcome more difficult to achieve. A common example in
Fisher and Ury's discussion is the issue of trust. In
disagreements it is relatively straight forward for one
party to put forward a point of view that may be
questionable, but of course is not presented as such;
and when the other party does make some attempt to
verify it in discussion the response of the first party
may well be to say something like: 'don't you trust
what I am saying?' To question such a remark appears
to jeopardise the discussion, but it must be done to
reject the unfair connection between a questionable
statement and the emotive challenge of the individual's
integrity. The two issues can and must be separated.
This can be done by pointing out that trust is not at
issue, rather what is at issue is a fair or true
presentation of specific facts or the giving of clear
and objective assurances.
There is a temptation to use arguments in discussion
which have their power because of particular points of
view held rather than because of any objective
weighting they may hold in the discussion in general.
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However, positions must always be capable of being
justified or explained in rational terms. This makes
them accessible to criticism and development by other
participants. A commitment to the use of rational
premises in all aspects of dialogue heightens the
ability of all participants to recognise and draw
attention to those occasions on which they are not
used. Not to use rational bases for contributions
effectively puts what one says beyond criticism and
thus is to make pronouncements rather than to engage in
dialogue.
ii dialogue - the inter-faith dimension
These general considerations about the role and
characteristics of dialogue have been useful in both
affirming and developing some ideas which may be
applied to ethical discussion. In the second part of
this chapter I want to look at an area where dialogue
is central to the process and see if there are lessons
to be learnt from the inter-faith movement which may be
adapted or developed for use within the ethical arena.
As before, I am not claiming that there are direct
parallels between the type of dialogue employed by the
inter-faith movement and that required for ethical
discourse. The point of this review is to see if an
area of contemporary Christian theology, which has
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begun to reflect on the process of dialogue, has any-
useful insights that we might learn from.
Hans Rung has drawn our attention to the importance of
inter-faith dialogue in a particularly vivid way and
one which illustrates the urgency of the task by
pointing to the consequences if it is ignored. In his
Global Responsibility: in search of a new world ethic
(1991) he sets out clearly a three stage programme of
concern: no survival without a world ethic; no world
peace without religious peace; no religious peace
without religious dialogue. While I do not propose to
examine Rung's thesis here (indeed Global
Responsibility is referred to as an introduction to his
concerns and interest in this area) it serves to
illustrate both the importance of inter-faith dialogue
as part of the widening ethical enterprise and
indicates that here is a general area which may well be
worth exploring in our consideration of the virtues and
value of dialogue in general. Developing the idea of
dialogue as a model for ethical reflection, it is
sensible to look at the work of those who have tried to
increase understanding and tolerance between religions.
In reviewing this work, as with dialogue in general
discussed above, it is soon clear that there are some
areas where current practice and the reflection on it
may usefully inform the development of dialogue as a
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possible basis for ethical reflection. One significant
difference is that in the inter-faith process
participants can be assumed to be working within the
framework of some understanding of the role of God in
human life and common assumptions may be made about
God's concerns for humankind. This is not so in
general ethical discussion where participants may be
drawn from a range of perspectives including those
which are entirely secular. There will be brief
discussion of an area where the common concern among
religions for the well being of humankind has found
coherent expression alongside secular concerns. This
is the growing inter-faith work which has contributed
to the human rights movement in the second half of this
century.
In pursuing a discussion of the inter-faith movement it
seemed sensible to try and look at two different and
complementary approaches. They are drawn from either
side of the Atlantic and one represents a practical
approach grounded in the historical experience of the
movement and of dialogue while the other addresses more
philosophical issues such as the practice and goals of
dialogue, yet clearly based on different active
experiences of dialogue. The first approach is
provided by both an overview of the history of the
inter-faith process that celebrated its centenary in
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1993 and an accompanying collection of documents
produced by inter-faith bodies and other conferences
10
over the last few decades. One particular dialogue
is followed in some depth through the joint accounts of
the Jewish-Christian Manor House Group11 which met for
almost ten years from 1984. On the other hand the more
abstract approach is considered in the work of Leonard
Swidler and some of his North American colleagues in
Death or Dialogue? and Swidler's own After the
1 2 ...
Absolute. The discussion which follows is not
rigorously divided into two streams considering each
area. My concern is not to give a complete picture of
the work of the inter-faith movement. Rather I want to
see if there are points we may learn from in developing
ideas of dialogue for application in the area of
ethics.
Q
Marcus Braybrooke, Pilgrimage of Hope: one hundred
years of global inter-faith dialogue (1992)
10Marcus Braybrooke, editor, Stepping Stones to a
Global Ethic (1992)
1:LTony Bayfield and Marcus Braybrooke, editors,
Dialogue with a Difference: the Manor House Group
experience (1992) [hereafter cited as Dialogue with
a Difference] .
12
Leonard Swidler, After the Absolute: the dialogical
future of religious reflection (1990), and Leonard
Swidler, John B. Cobb Jr, Paul F. Knitter, Monica K.
Hellwig, Death or Dialogue?: from the age of
monologue to the age of dialogue (1990), [hereafter
cited as Death or Dialogue?].
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The first such area is Norman Solomon's observations on
the Christian-Jewish Manor House dialogue. He
identifies a third partner in the dialogue:
What was meant to be a dialogue between Christians
and Jews as Christians and Jews is again revealed
as a tripartite dialogue in which the third
partner is the modern world-view. Unless the
third partner is recognised, an element of falsity
remains in the dialogue. Traditional postures are
adopted, minds do not meet.
It is fair to use such concrete imagery when outlining
the idea because once identified, the concept is one
readily understood and has some discernible
characteristics. These are present equally for both
sides in any contemporary dialogue and are determined
by or are the world within which the dialogue is
happening. In terms of discussion between Christianity
and Judaism, the trend towards secularism, however it
is understood, is an important feature of the dialogue
as is the common experience, albeit from different
perspectives, of the Holocaust or Shoah. Traditional
patterns of Christianity and Judaism enter into
dialogue with all the ambiguities and confusions of
faith in the present century as well as their
particular difficulties over such a central issue as
the Holocaust. Solomon does not develop his useful
perception of the third partner in dialogue, so here it
1^Normon Solomon, 'The Third Presence: reflections on
the dialogue', in Dialogue with a Difference, pp.
147-162 (pp. 150-151).
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is helpful to look at Leonard Swidler's scheme which
categorises the modern world view.
Swidler has spent a lifetime of academic research both
engaging in inter-faith dialogue and reflecting on that
process and those factors which facilitate and
constrain it. He has identified six factors which are
signs of a significant shift in the way traditional
14
western thought perceives the truth or conclusions.
These six points identified by Swidler may reflect
Solomon's idea of the third partner or presence in
contemporary Jewish-Christian dialogue. While
individually they are not original, together they
amount to a concise reflection on important changes in
the way we understand things.
The first of Swidler's concerns is historicism, the
fact that any idea or concept is determined by its
particular historical context. Intentionality is the
second concern, which addresses the issue of perceiving
things in terms of our own questions and again in terms
of those answers which we are looking for. That is,
because we need or want to do something, any questions
we ask are influenced by that priority: few enquiries
are free of this reason for asking. The third concern
After the Absolute, pp. 7-14.
51
of Swidler's has its origins in the sociology of
knowledge, which is closely connected to the first
point of historicism, and draws our attention to the
fact that language is bound by its context or the
standpoint of the speaker. Similarly, in the fourth
point, Swidler is concerned with the limits of language
which he identifies as the problem that any description
can only be partial. Irrespective of any biases on the
part of the givers of particular descriptions, the
point of view they hold is limited in itself by their
position in every sense and is thus only partial. The
fifth concern is that of hermeneutics, and this is
precisely the area to be explored in the next chapter
on the work of Gadamer and Habermas. The subject and
object inform one another in any interchange.
Swidler's sixth issue is that of dialogue: we learn now
through more than merely being open and receptive to
new information, but rather through discussion, the
give and take of inquiry and exchange.
Swidler argues that these six major changes in
epistemology have been and continue to be a significant
and formative influence on our thought:
Whereas our Western notion of truth was largely
absolute, static, and exclusive up to the past
century, it has become de-absolutized, dynamic and
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inclusive -ma word, relational.
Beyond his conclusion, the most useful point is that
made about 'intentionality', which has obvious
relevance in the area of ethical reflection. The others
are either familiar, such as the issue of historical
context and that about hermeneutics, or not
sufficiently substantial in their own right to merit
consideration independent of the whole analysis.
Together they hold up a summary of individual yet
related changes which undoubtedly affect the way in
which we may speak to one another, debate and reach
common conclusions about what has been discussed.
Having identified some strands in the theory of inter-
faith dialogue that are immediately interesting to our
purpose, I now propose to look at the field in general
and again will highlight some other aspects of the work
which may be useful to an evolving ethics of dialogue.
Norman Solomon again provides one of the most
interesting of such examples, drawing on the work of J.
1 r
L. Austin. Austin has identified three categories of
speech as used within ordinary dialogue which have
15Ibid., p. 7.
How to do Things with Words (1955), found in
Dialogue with a Difference, p. 160.
53
obvious implications for understanding and assessing
the processes of dialogue. There is locutionary
speech, which at its simplest level is the uttering of
the sentence or statement. Following from that, the
second category Austin identifies is illocutionary,
that is the intended effect at which the statement is
directed. This may be different from that obviously
implied by a literal understanding of the words used.
The example given is talk about the weather, which may
be designed to put the hearer at ease rather than to
inform. The third category is perlocutionary, where
some unintended consequences of the statement or
conversation may be detected through the hearer
becoming anxious, apologetic or evasive. What is being
described here is the process whereby the making of a
statement or the experience of dialogue itself can be
such that although the words used are straightforward
and may be about common-place events, the hearer finds
himself in an extreme state as a result of the
conversation alone. Two examples might be a person who
is trying to escape from the scene of a crime they have
just committed finding himself in casual conversation
with a policeman, who suspects nothing and is passing
the time of day; or someone who by chance finds herself
in conversation over a perfectly routine office matter
with a fellow worker whom she admires passionately from
a distance. In both cases the hearer finds the
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exchange charged to a very high degree while the
initiator of the conversation can be unaware of any
special significance in the interchange, unless the
former individuals begin to show what they feel.
The illocutionary speech is a more straight forward
version of the same phenomenon. In this case where the
statement or conversation may have an intended effect
or deliberately convey a message or feeling different
from the literal meaning of the words. The message may
be consonant with the words, in the sense that it may
express a feeling that is compatible with the literal
meaning of what is said: a compliment may be paid to an
individual about their style of dress or health. Good,
albeit perhaps superficial things are said and the
consequence is a good feeling on the part of the
hearer. On the other hand apparent compliments may be
paid in such a way that the opposite is both implied by
the speaker and understood by the hearer: in effect an
insult or at least a challenge may be given under the
guise of a compliment. Both of the derivative stages of
the conversation, the illocutionary and the
perlocutionary, may be features of inter-faith dialogue
and identifiable in that context. Part of the
illocutionary text of such a dialogue is the desire on
the part of the participants to be friendly towards one
another, as in Solomon's example, in the very act of
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coming together to speak. One of the continual
problems in inter-faith dialogue involving Christians
17
is the issue of the uniqueness of Christ. If we look
at this example, using Austin's analysis of acts of
speech, we can understand how the desire by Christians
to engage straightforwardly in dialogue can be
undermined by the power of this claim and even its
possible offence in the minds of the other dialogue
partners. Any illocutionary goodwill is potentially
undermined by the perlocutionary aspect of the
knowledge of the idea of the uniqueness of Christ.
The inter-faith process thinks of dialogue in terms of
the growth towards one another of different groups.
The differences are what divide in the first instance,
and the process of dialogue that is set up must be such
as to facilitate the development of trust and openness
that will lead to a deeper relationship between the
participants. Braybrooke in his history of the inter-
faith movement talks of the need to 'learn to enter
another world that may seem alien and which has
18
different presuppositions'. As part of the response
to this task and that of being prepared to have one's
17 ... . .
For some other specifrc issues of contention m
Jewish Christian dialogue see Braybrooke's
Pilgrimage of Hope, pp. 214-216.
18Pilgrimage of Hope, p. 310.
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own presuppositions questioned, several writers have
proposed differing lists and points to note in the
preparation for and practice of dialogue. Some of the
lists of prerequisites and procedures are determined by
the expected outcome of the dialogue or the emphasis
that dialogue should have: one such is Paul Knitter's
which will be discussed below in the context of a
concern for dialogue centering around social justice.
Other lists deal with general points. Swidler has set
out the main basic points to help with inter-faith
19
dialogue. The topics mentioned are mostly familiar
and can be summarised as follows: 1. participants
should use their creative imaginations and a
sensitivity towards others; 2. all intending to be
involved should participate in the planning of the
process; 3. the most difficult points of difference
should not be tackled until trust has been able to
develop; 4. total sincerity and honesty are required of
all participants; 5. there should be a properly mutual
comparison of ideals only with ideals and the same
should be true of practices, that is, ideals may not be
compared with the other sides practices because of the
obvious and unhelpful disparity; 6. self-defining is
important; 7. there should be no fixed assumptions
1 9
This list is compiled from two near identical ones
which were published in 1990 in Death or Dialoge?
pp. 64-66, and in After the Absolute, pp. 42-46.
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about where authentic differences lie; 8. it is
important to speak together on a basis of mutual
equality; 9. it is essential to be critical of oneself
and one's tradition; 10. a correct understanding of
dialogue as a process of mutual learning, exchange and
challenge is essential. It is interesting to notice
that there are two points from my initial suggestions
of what is necessary for dialogue which are missing
from this list. They are the importance of ensuring a
commitment to a rational basis for dialogue and a
recognition of the relative nature of any conclusions.
Both might reasonably be expected to play a role in
inter-faith dialogue, especially the former. The other
four points I identified all find explicit expression
in Swidler's list.
In addition to the lists there are some interesting
general points which can be remembered when engaging in
inter-faith dialogue. John B. Cobb, Jr mentions the
importance of two issues which are refreshingly
realistic: the possibility of confrontation and the
positive role which it can play in dialogue, and the
importance of the desire to persuade the other of one's
2 0 .
own point of view. The role of confrontation is
clear enough, as of course are the possible abuses
^In Death or Dialogue?, pp. 8,9, and 117.
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which might ensue. The emphasis on the importance of
persuasion is interesting in that in some respects it
might be better avoided. A positive reading would
suggest that it is necessary to have a degree of
conviction about an idea if one is to communicate it
successfully to others, especially in the field of
religious beliefs. In one sense it should not be
possible to hold belief as a matter of disinterested
opinion. Of course a line must be drawn here that
distinguishes between the suggested responsibility of
both sides to put their points of view as persuasively
as possible and the proselytization of one set of
participants by another. This concern takes us on
neatly to a wider issue, that of the concern about the
extent to which dialogue may be abused as
21
evangelization. Other groups m dialogue with
Christians tend to be wary of the Christians' agenda
for mission and at the same time some conservative
Christians regard dialogue as a betrayal of the
21
Braybrooke provides an example from the work of the
Roman Catholic Pontifical Council for Inter-
Religious Dialogue (which is how it has been known
since 1989, before which it was the Secretariat for
Non-Christians). Under the direction of an early
secretary, Father Humbertclaude, there was always a
specific tension between dialogue and
evangelization. At its worst, dialogue was regarded
as gentle preparation for evangelism. Braybrooke
notices this as a problem for more than the Roman




One area where there has been effective co-operation
between different faith groups and also secular groups
is that of human rights. In answer to some of the
questions raised by Hans Rung in his Global
Responsibility, Braybrooke gathered and introduced a
collection of documents on human rights issues with an
international flavour and explained how the religious
groups have been deeply involved in precisely this
2 2 • •
process. That this is arguably the area m which
inter-faith dialogue has shown the most obvious success
so far. Some advocates of inter-faith dialogue see
human rights and social injustice as the appropriate
starting point and focus for their labours. Paul
Knitter, one of the contributors to Death or Dialogue?,
sees the natural focus for dialogue as being around
various forms of oppression and 'needed liberation'.
He specifically identifies four areas of concern
requiring liberation: physical suffering; socio¬
economic oppression; nuclear oppression/holocaust; and
24
ecological disaster. Knitter develops his emphasis
7 7 ...
Ibid., p. 261 and see also: Tony Bayfield, 'Mission
- A Jewish Perspective', Theology, XCVI (1993), pp.
180-190.
Stepping Stones to a Global Ethic (1992) .
7 A
Death or Dialogue?, pp. 27-30.
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in the approach to dialogue by suggesting two
preconditions for success. The first is that no group
or individual should enter the dialogue with any claim
to having the final word on any issue and, more
innovatively, each dialogue should be founded on a
'conversion' shared by all participants. The
particular form the conversion should take is towards
Knitter's emphasis on issues of social injustice. It
is obviously a problem to accept this suggestion
straightforwardly; to so predicate the aim must limit
the freedom of the dialogue. That concern may however
be balanced against the advantage of having a clear
focus for dialogue.
While Knitter sees dialogue focusing on social concerns
as both method and aim, for other writers including
Braybrooke it is a beginning. The common strands in
the scriptures of several religions which support this
emphasis make it a valid beginning and to go on from
there requires, in Braybrooke's eyes at least, some
study of the ideas of human nature behind the texts and
then the attempt to relate such understandings to
25
present problems in an inter-faith context.
2 5
Stepping Stones to a Global Ethic, p. 16. See also
Alan Race's contribution, 'Precarious and Necessary
Prophetic Witness', in the Manor House collection,
Dialogue with a Difference, pp. 133-144 (especially
p. 142) .
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Acknowledging that this approach to inter-faith
dialogue has some specific strengths and demonstrable
achievements to its credit, it also has limitations.
The one of not being fully open, in terms of having a
set agenda, has been mentioned. Another concern is
that while the issue of human rights enables the
religious groups to look beyond their theological
differences and to agree on specific injustices and
particular rights, it does not necessarily help with
the development of a common theological outlook in
precisely those areas which give the same religious
groups their identity. The participating groups may
find agreement about those social concerns which
present themselves but they may do this in such a way
as to establish a new religious perspective that
consequently generates its own vocabulary and outlook
and becomes as inaccessible to the rest of society as
the initial religious traditions might have been before
dialogue began.
At this point it may be useful for clarification before
concluding to return to the purpose of dialogue within
the inter-faith movement. One aspect of their outlook
which is reassuring is the fact that the goals seem
realistic. Several writers express their hopes for
inter-faith dialogue in terms which take account of
what might actually be achieved and have the candour to
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assess what has already been achieved in equally sober
terms. As Braybrooke puts it in one case, describing
Jewish-Christian dialogue:
[It] is a matter of simply learning to be nice to
each other, trying a little to understand what the
other is doing, co-operating in social endeavour.
Dialogue does not necessarily produce agreement
and, if it is a search for truth, there is no
desire for easy compromise. Sometimes it makes
clear where essential differences lie.
If we cannot look for agreement between faiths, how may
we understand the work of the inter-faith dialogue
process? In this context Monika K. Hellwig identifies
three goals of dialogue between representatives of
different faith traditions: 1. to gain a friendly
understanding of each other; 2. to enrich and round-out
one's appreciation of one's own faith tradition; 3. to
establish a more solid foundation for community life
2 7
and action among persons of various traditions.
Again it is clear what is expected. Given the degrees
of misunderstanding and animosity that existed between
people of different faith groups in the past, it is an
achievement to move towards a position of friendly
enquiry and mutual respect. The move on to closer co¬
operation and understanding may well follow, but at
present the goals are realistically limited. Cobb
26Pilgrimage of Hope, p. 311.
2 7
Death or Dialogue?, p. 43.
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makes the point that while dialogue may not produce
even all that is hoped for at the present, it is
capable of helping discern those issues which are of
primary or secondary importance for work between
2 8
faiths. At this stage we come upon ideas of inter-
faith dialogue which while laudable are open to the
criticism of being somewhat self-centred. Braybrooke,
introducing the Manor House conversations says:
This is a life process - not religious
'negotiation' nor an attempt to find some
accommodating compromise. Rather, dialogue is a
spur to one's own theological rethinking.
A consequence of dialogue should be the rethinking of
one's own position but that is not a sufficient aim in
itself. Swidler quotes from the first encyclical of
Pope Paul VI:
Dialogue is demanded nowadays.... It is demanded by
the dynamic course of action which is changing the
face of modern society. It is demanded by the
pluralism of society, and by the maturity man has
reached in this day and age. Be he religious or
not, his secular education has enabled him to
think and speak, and to conduct a dialogue with
dignity.
If this hope and challenge are to be realised through
the work of inter-faith dialogue then more must be
28Ibid., p.3.
7 Q
Dialogue with a Difference, p. 12.
28Ecclesiam suam, no. 78, found in Death or Dialogue?,
p. 77.
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expected of the process than a re-educating of the
participants. That may be a praiseworthy and necessary
consequence and even, paradoxically, a precondition of
dialogue, but it is disappointing if it is to be the
goal.
iii principles of dialogue
This chapter began with an outline of the various
features I identified as necessary for round table
dialogue: a degree of respect for the positions
represented by other participants, which might lead in
time to a wider sense of trust in the process as a
whole; this will be fostered by the work of mutual
clarification, seeking rational bases for arguments;
and by a commitment to mutual learning based on an
element of reciprocity. A willingness to be open-
minded both in relation to how the dialogue might
develop and its conclusions is essential. There is
also the importance of acknowledging the relative
nature of all conclusions. The discussions of the work
of both Fisher and Ury, although from a very different
context and with a different purpose in mind, has shown
both useful parallel concerns and some interesting
discrepancies. The idea of mutual respect leading to
trust found expression in Fisher and Ury's notion of
not bargaining over positions. The focus should be on
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the issue to be discussed not the respective power of
the participants. This concern echoes that of the
commitment to mutual clarification, which in turn is
another broader way of expressing Fisher and Ury's
concern to open up the negotiation process by looking
afresh at what is being discussed so that, in their
terms, options may be invented for mutual gain. Fisher
and Ury have no concerns that obviously link with my
point about the relative nature of conclusions, which
is understandable given the very practical nature of
the negotiation process which they describe. They do
however reflect a concern with identifying rational
criteria for discussion. This is reflected in their
two related points of separating the people from the
problems under discussion and their clear insistence on
objective criteria. They add one point which is
valuable and missing from my criteria: the importance
of context. They emphasise that no discussion takes
place in a vacuum.
This last point is given further valuable attention in
two parts of the discussion of material from the work
of those committed to inter-faith dialogue. Solomon's
notion of a third partner in every dialogue being the
modern world view is given flesh by Swidler's list of
six features which influence all contemporary
discussion. The message is clear: we cannot afford to
66
ignore the context of any dialogue. Factors may
impinge from a range of sources which influence the
opinions and contributions of participants. This is
not a threat to dialogue. Rather, for the process to
be useful especially in the area of ethics, there must
be an informed commitment to identifying and responding
appropriately to external influences during dialogue.
In this way the proposal is open to the continually
developing opinions and experience which inform our
contemporary moral reflection.
Howe's work, like Fisher and Ury in being drawn from an
area other than ethics, also had some useful points but
generally was less precise about what would constitute
the necessary preconditions for dialogue. The
dialogical person is to be characterised by an open
manner which should influence their participation in
dialogue. Knitter, from the the inter-faith
conversations, reinforces this idea of the importance
of openness as a necessary prerequisite of good
dialogue.
In addition to these points which have been shown to
connect with or develop those that I had already
identified, this review of other perspectives on the
process of dialogue has revealed a series of useful
individual perspectives which confirm my view of the
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complexity and potential richness of dialogue as a
method of ethical reflection. Cobb's observations on
the bexiefiLs of both being prepared to recognise the
possibility of confrontation and also the importance of
the desire to persuade both obvious applications within
dialogue that aims to discuss ethical issues. If
points are to be held with conviction then it is likely
that even those committed to dialogue as I have been
describing it will find their tempers running high.
Confrontation which can be destructive may also be
cathartic if handled responsibly. In this latter
sense, if sufficient trust is present, it may help
clarify where some difficulties lie and also indicate
sometimes appropriate frustration with participants who
are not adhering to the agreed process. A willingness
to persuade others of the value of one's point of view
is not a threat to good dialogue if this commitment is
held sensitively within the process I am trying to
describe. Indeed it takes a degree of trust in the
process and in the other participants for an individual
to own the extent to which they feel committed to a
particular perspective. When declared this commitment
can be very helpful to all concerned because to
understand the manner in which ideas are held is as
much a part of understanding the dynamics of any
particular dialogue as is an intellectual grasp of the
issues being discussed.
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Austin's points about the complexities of the effects
of different forms of speech, especially his idea of
perlocutionary speech, connects with this same area.
It is one thing to be clear about what has been said.
We need to be equally clear that we communicate so much
more than the straight forward message of the words we
use in our communicating. We are used to identifying
the importance of a range of bodily gestures and facial
expressions along with tones of voice when we attempt
to follow speech. Austin reminds us that we must
attempt to be aware of the ways in which we cannot
fully control the effect of our words upon another. We
must be prepared to take that into account in proposing
a model of ethical reflection that draws its imagery
from the richness and complexity of human conversation.
Howe's point about the comprehensive related character
of truth, which as we have noticed challenges
Maclntyre's perspective, is worth noticing even if in
disagreement. I suspect that it is a common assumption
behind many attempts to reconcile differing points of
view and one that fails to take seriously the
difficulties in working with positions that cannot be
readily brought together.
These surveys have provided valuable material for the
development of a model of round table dialogue in
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ethical reflection. There are, however, serious
limitations in using either the inter-faith dialogue
process or that of principled negotiation as models on
which to base an exploratory dialogical method in
ethics. One model can assume an understanding of faith
and its demands in the participants while the other is
essentially a sophisticated system for bartering and
trading. Although both models have intrinsic merits
neither readily adapt to the needs of ethical
reflection. However, both practical considerations and
philosophical concerns have been clarified through the
direct experience of those who engage in the work which
has been considered here.
Four of the five points I identified at the beginning
of the chapter have been affirmed and expanded. These
are now: mutual respect, leading to the development of
a wider sense of trust in the process as a whole; based
on mutual clarification with a commitment to exploring
the rational bases of all aspects of participation;
mutual learning through a common commitment to
reciprocity; and the importance of being open minded
in the widest sense. In addition to these four points
another became clearly important: that of the context
of any discussion. Furthermore, the work of those
engaged in inter-faith dialogue in particular offered
some extra interesting reflections on difficulties and
70
opportunities posed by dialogue in general. Of my
initial proposals, the one which still needs
considerable furlher discussion is that which suggests
we should be aware of the relative nature of
conclusions. This idea has important implications in




Dialogue - a philosophical view
For the egoism which enters into our theories does
not affect their sincerity; rather, the more our
egoism is satisfied, the more robust is our
belief. (George Eliot)
In this chapter I will develop the exploration begun in
the previous chapter into possible sources of
reflection on the processes of dialogue that may help
my consideration of dialogue as a method of ethical
enquiry. My particular concern is to discuss the issue
of the relative nature of conclusions and how this
might influence ethical dialogue.
Again, I will be drawing on material that has its
origin somewhere other than in ethics, where at present
there is little work on patterns of dialogue as
conceived of here. This approach has the advantage of
establishing the proposal on a wide base of academic
and practical experience.
The idea of the relative nature of conclusions is
connected to that of the idea of objectivity in
perception and analysis. Thus the introductory section
^Middlemarch, 1871-2, edited by David Campbell
(1991), ii, p. 83.
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of this chapter looks briefly at the limitations
acknowledged in our attempts to be objective,
particularly as identified by some historians. This
leads into a consideration of the philosophical aspects
of dialogue and its limitations set out by two German
academics, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jiirgen Habermas.
Their work is especially valuable in this context
because of the attention they both give to the issue of
the relative nature of both individual perspectives and
conclusions. David Tracy is a theologian who has
applied some of their thought in the area of systematic
theology. His contribution will be examined briefly
before presenting an outline of the model of dialogue
as developed by the end of this chapter.
i objectivity
Historians are aware of the problem of being objective
in historical analysis and in any assessments made
about the past. One of the central concerns of
historians since von Ranke (1795-1886) is to reduce as
far as is possible the subjective element in historical
writing: that is, that element which is obviously
influenced by the concerns of the present or of an age
other than that about which the historian is writing.
He must also be aware that the sources he uses from the
period about which he is writing may themselves be
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biased in a way that is not immediately clear from the
sources themselves.
This is an area of concern at two levels. Evidence
gathered from the past by the historian is likely to be
selected from sources in response to his specific
questions. It is perfectly possible for a writer to
draw up his scheme of how an issue may best be
described and analysed in terms of assumptions that
interest and operate at the time of writing rather than
those which may have pertained at the time of the
events being considered. David Tracy, in discussing
this point, uses the example of the way in which the
French Revolution has been understood to be about a
whole range of different things depending on the
2
sympathies of the various authors and their audiences.
This means that a historian's analysis of a period in
history reflects the concerns of his own time at least
as much as those of the period he is considering. The
evidence has been selected in accordance with questions
formulated in response to the issues of the day rather
than those of the period under formal review.
Furthermore, evidence itself may not be neutral. When
a historian relies on a contemporary account he is
David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: hermeneutics,
religion, hope (1987), see especially chapters 1 and
4 .
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aware that the author of that account will perceive the
events described through a particular perspective. The
bias may be clear or it may have to be discerned by
careful comparison of the account with any others which
might be available. An obvious factor capable of
influencing any account is the political position and
social background and sympathies of the observer. The
same is true of what can appear to be straightforward
evidence from something like a census. The figures
need to be considered in the context of the initial
concern to acquire the information and what assumptions
may have operated on the part of the census collectors
about what information was to be included and what
mrght legitimately be omitted.
This brief outline of the difficulties which a
historian must be aware of, makes it clear that
concerns about objectivity go well beyond the
discernible biases that are to be found in evidence and
in the construction of answers or analyses.
Individuals, whether historians or witnesses, are
i . ... . .
For discussion of the topic of objectivity as it is
considered by some historians, see: E.H. Carr, What
is History? (1961, Penguin edition 1964) pp. 119-
123; W.H. Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of
History (1951, third revised edition 1967) chapter 5
vCan History be Objective?', pp. 93-116; and John
Passmore, vThe Objectivity of History', in The
Philosophy of History (1974), edited by Patrick
Gardiner, pp. 145-160.
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capable of rendering only partial accounts of any
event. However objective we want to be, it is not
possible for us to give a full and complete account of
an event that is absolutely free of our own prejudices
and concerns. We may take an example of a car crash
observed by three individuals all present at the scene
of the accident and all watching as events unfolded.
The fact that all three were standing in different
positions around the junction means that the physical
vantage point of each will result in them giving
different accounts of how they saw the event. They
may differ in specifics but could agree in the overall
picture. This assumes all have equally clear although
different vantage points: the story gets more
complicated when all see the same event but from
positions which do not afford equally clear views. It
becomes more complicated still when the various
individuals start to describe what they have seen in
terms of their own experience. Then, a range of
further subjective factors start to play a part in the
retelling of the event.
Nevertheless, objectivity remains a goal for historians
and others whose writings aspire to a degree of
detachment. They do not delude themselves into
assuming that objectivity can be achieved. That it is
unattainable does not mean that it is not important to
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aim at it. Limitations may be acknowledged and the
most objective writing valued. Historians acknowledge
this lack of ability to create a full and perfect
picture of events and their experience is paralleled in
other disciplines. In ethics may it mean that some of
the traditional absolutes, that is the fixed points,
might be less than certain? If this is true, could
that be because they are human constructs? If human
constructs, then might they not be subject to the same
demands that are made of other points put forward in
debate? In other words might these traditional,
absolute points of ethical dialogue be subject to
rigorous critical examination in terms of their
rational criteria? In exploring this idea the work of
two contemporary German thinkers is very valuable.
ii Gadamer's Truth and Method
Gadamer's work offers some helpful insights into the
nature of language, especially as used in conversation.
The value of his writings for our purposes is two-fold.
In the first instance there is his seminal work, Truth
and Method 4 and connected with it there is the debate
4First published in Germany in 1960, now available in
the fifth German edition, 1986. The revised English
translation is that of Joel Weinsheimer and Donald
G. Marshall (1989), which is hereafter referred to
as Truth and Method.
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which its publication generated with another leading
German philosopher, Jiirgen Habermas. No attempt will
be made to present a complete summary of their work or
even of every aspect of their debate. My concern here
is to identify themes in their work and scholarly
dispute which may contribute to our task in considering
an ethical method based on the idea of dialogue.
Gadamer's autobiographical essay, Philosophical
Apprenticeships, illustrates an idea which is an
important theme in his work. In that book he describes
his own intellectual pilgrimage in terms of his work
with other philosophers. There is a thread connecting
each of the different perspectives which made sense to
him at each stage. However, he presents the ideas of
each of his teachers as complete in themselves. He
tried to see through the eyes of their philosophical
system as he worked with each of them. This approach
has the effect of enhancing his idea, developed in
Truth and Method, that each of our positions can be
thought of as complete in themselves and as a
consequence none is objective. Rather each such
position is a construct of the individual who maintains
it and consequently subject to a range of interests and
The background to the work of Gadamer and Habermas
is explained in: 'The Crisis of Understanding', by
Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy in their
Understanding and Social Inquiry (1977), pp. 1-13.
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influences.
In Truth and Method, Gadamer reviews the principles of
hermeneutics in order to broaden our understanding of
what it is we may assume in certain situations. In
particular he is concerned to explore the question,
with reference to such disciplines or 'experiences' as
philosophy, art and history, of 'how far the truth
claim of such modes of experience outside science can
be philosophically legitimated'.6 This quest has
obvious implications for moral philosophy, both in
terms of the conclusions reached and as importantly in
terms of the starting points of any ethical discussion.
Gadamer explains his concern:
If there is any practical consequence of the
present investigation, it certainly has nothing to
do with an unscientific 'commitment'; instead it
is concerned with the 'scientific' integrity of
acknowledging the commitment involved in all
understanding. My real concern was and is
philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to
do, but what happens to us over and above our
wanting and doing.
Here we have an indication of the first of two areas
where Gadamer's work is relevant to ethics. There is
the epistemological issue of understanding what level
of experience may be rationally or philosophically
verified. This theme will recur in Habermas's debate
6Truth and Method, p.xxii.
Ibid., p.xxviii.
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with Gadamer and here it is enough to have noticed it.
The second issue in Gadamer's writing which is valuable
to this inquiry is the concern he has with conversation
and to this we now turn.
His interest in conversation stems from his concern
with the use and development of language. In
particular the sense in which we use conversation as a
means for both communicating our own ideas and for
understanding those of others. Gadamer gives a fairly
straightforward description of conversation, from which
he develops his observations:
Conversation is a process of coming to an
understanding. Thus it belongs to every true
conversation that each person opens himself to the
other, truly accepts his point of view as valid
and transposes himself into the other to such an
extent that he understands not the particular
individual but what he says. What is to be
grasped is the substantive rightness of his
opinion.
Gadamer is presenting the ideal. It is worth noticing
the extent to which his criteria match and develop
those identified in the previous chapter. Elsewhere he
gives accounts of conversations which are not so




are different from those described here. Gadamer
talks of the description we use of conversation, often
noticing that we 'conduct' conversations, whereas in
fact a more accurate description would be to describe
the experience as something we 'fall into', which is
an English form of speech used to describe how we come
to be talking to someone. The phrase 'to fall into'
conversation usually refers to the manner in which we
came to be talking. It refers to the unplanned nature
of how we happened to begin the conversation, and is
not a description of either the outcome or the process
by which any outcome was reached. Gadamer claims that
a true conversation has a 'spirit of its own', by which
he means that if it is a genuine meeting of two
individuals concerned to exchange views without a pre¬
set agenda, then there can be no telling quite what the
outcome or final positions reached will be. If the
concern is in the meeting itself, not in the end of the
conversation, then we cannot know the outcome before
the event. For this to be the case the individual
seeking an experience of dialogue must acknowledge
that:
There is no higher principle than holding oneself
open in conversation. But this means: Always
Q
For example see his descriptions of Platonic
dialogues and other conversations where
interrogation is a significant part of the method of
inquiry: Truth and Method, pp. 362-379.
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recognise in advance the possible correctness,
even the superiority of the conversation partner's
position.
Again, this is idealistic in the sense that it often
requires more than openness and goodwill to effect
communication. Gadamer's counter to that idealism will
now be considered.
Gadamer further observes that 'In situations where
coming to an understanding is disrupted or impeded, we
first become conscious of the conditions of all
11
understanding'. People trying to communicate without
a common language is an obvious example of such
difficulty in conversation which illustrates the
relative nature of so much human communication and the
particular world-view out of which we speak. A
favourite analogy of Gadamer's in this context is that
12
of the role of the translator. It is the
translator's task to facilitate the conversation. A
concern in translation is not just transposing words
from one language to another. There must be a
sensitivity to the inferences of those words in the new
language as well as in the old where particular
"^Gadamer, Philosophical Apprenticeships (1985), p.
189.
Y]:Truth and Method, p. 3 84.
This is the image used by Maclntyre, Whose Justice?
Which Rationality?, chapter 19, 'Tradition and
Translation', pp. 370-388.
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associations gather around phrases and ideas in one
language and do not necessarily cross over to another:
'Here the translator must translate the meaning to be
understood into the context in which the other speaker
11 ■
lives.' As the translator's task may highlight the
difficulties so too it can indicate the level of
proficiency in language which may be achieved. Once a
sufficiently high degree of proficiency is reached in a
language there is no need to translate. An individual
comes to think in the language being employed. This
goes beyond the use of words or phrases to the thought
concepts, assumptions and life-patterns associated with
those who speak the given language as natives.
These issues lead to Gadamer's concern with the nature
of language itself. Its purpose in Gadamer's eyes is
very clear: 'it must be emphasized that language has
its true being only in dialogue, in coming to an
14
understanding.' Language is the means by which we not
only exchange views and opinions, it is also the means
by which we acquire and understand our own experience
of the world and our relationships within it. As we
learn a language we learn not only about words but
about the ways those words are associated and the
weighting they have in different contexts. In this way
Truth and Method, p. 384.
Truth and Method, p. 446. Gadamer's italics.
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we build up a picture of the way things are for
ourselves and those who see things the same way as we
do, and in time we come to have an idea of how others
may also experience things differently.
Gadamer discusses an exception to these ideas about
language which illustrates his point. Scientific or
mathematical notation is often thought of as a form of
language. However, it does not meet Gadamer's criteria
because such notation, in the form of symbols or
abbreviated words, is not language in the sense he has
described it but rather derives from a prior agreement
about the use of symbols designed to avoid any confused
misinterpretation. That prior agreement was reached
through the use of language and consequently is
derivative. It is not a linguistic medium itself.
While such notation may be used to convey information,
it requires prior agreement as to what parameters of
meaning may be attached to each symbol. In most cases
the clarity of such notation requires that very little
flexibilty be available to each character or symbol in
order to reduce opportunities for misunderstanding.
Furthermore the nature of language as defined by
Gadamer is that it provides the means of reaching
understanding through dialogue. Any such system of
notation cannot of its nature be part of a dialogue
because it does not contain within itself the means of
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facilitating such a discussion: the symbols stand for
agreed concepts and are used within a particular
framework which presupposes a particular end, for
example the balancing of a scientific equation.
Symbols and other developed forms of 'artificial
communication' can be very useful in conveying
information but cannot facilitate dialogue precisely
because of their virtue and character as symbolic
1 C
notation. Thus the very clarity of such notation,
which protects it from the confusions of normal
dialogue, also denies it the potential richness
possessed by normal language.
Having identified patterns of dialogue discussed by
Gadamer which confirm and extend some of the
reflections in the last chapter, we turn to that other
area of Gadamer's work mentioned above: his concern
with the assessment of truth claims. This is part of
his concern with the objective nature of language and
the limitations that may impose on the conclusions we
can reach through its use. Here the idea of a
connection between Gadamer's work and the use of
dialogue as a model for ethical reflection becomes
clearer. We have already looked at the historians'
1 C
...
Gadamer's discussion of this topic can be found m
Truth and Method, pp. 414-415 and 446-448.
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concern with the elusive ideal of objectivity. This may
be taken further in thinking about language. Talking
of textual criticism and interpretation, Gadamer states
that: 'To try to escape from one's own concepts in
interpretation is not only impossible but manifestly
absurd.'1^ We are so used to making certain
assumptions, based on our experience and perception of
the world around us that we cannot perceive or assess
anything with complete impartiality. Gadamer returns
to his example of speaking in languages other than
one's native tongue to develop this point further.
However fluent we may become in a second language,
developing all the skills referred to above in terms of
thinking in its concepts and patterns of word
association, we never completely lose the world-view or
assumptions of our mother-tongue. Gadamer talks of a
'language view' as a way of expressing that pattern of
thought and associations which goes with being fluent
in a language at the most advanced level. We may
acquire new languages at such a level of linguistic and
ideological fluency that we can dispense with the
services of an interpreter, but we cannot ever wholly
leave behind the concerns, word association and thought
patterns, in short the language view, of our first
language. Here, as for the historian, the concern
becomes how to proceed while taking account of the
16Truth and Method, p. 3 97.
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inevitable limitations of our condition. At this stage
we are drawn to consider the important dialogue that
developed between Gadamer and Habermas, addressing the
issue of understanding truth claims and meanings from
different perspectives but with interesting if
divergent conclusions. Gadamer saw the difficulties
and Habermas, placing hope in a will to freedom, saw a
way out of the seemingly intractable limitations of any
cultural tradition. In addition to the critical
reaction to both men's writings, the dialogue between
them has also attracted criticism which we will
consider.
iii Gadamer and Habermas in dialogue
Habermas is a German social theorist with a background
in philosophy as well as sociology. After the
publication of Gadamer's Truth and Method they engaged
in an exchange and that discussion helps to clarify and
expand some of the points of interest in Gadamer's
work, particularly the concern with assessing truth
claims and meanings. Before addressing these issues, a
brief review of Habermas's work is helpful:
The single purpose of the work is to anticipate
and to justify a better world and society - one
that affords greater opportunities for happiness,
peace, and community. Since Habermas is also a
rationalist the better society is the more
rational society, in short, a society that is
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geared to collective needs rather than to
arbitrary power.
Habermas approaches this task through several themes,
some of which again relate to our concern. As a social
theorist Habermas has a direct interest in the extent
to which the moral point of view is relative:
According to my conception, the philosopher ought
to explain the moral point of view, and as far as
possible justify the claim to universality of this
explanation, showing why it does not merely
reflect the moral intuitions of the average, male,
middle-class member of a modern western society.
Habermas argues that social theory has a valuable role
to play in the discernment of moral perceptions:
In short, one should not place excessive demands
on moral theory, but leave something over for
social theory, and the major part for the
participants themselves - whether it be their
moral discources or their good sense.
As with Gadamer, the whole range of his work is too
broad to encompass in summary here but there are
certain relevant themes. One such is the 'lifeworld'
(Lebenswelt), an aspect of ourselves which is
dependent upon but distinct from the conscious
worldview (Weltanshauungen) :




Jiirgen Habermas, VA Philosophical-Political
Profile', New Left Review, 151 (1985), p. 84.
19Ibid., p. 91.
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Communicative action takes place within a
lifeworld that remains at the backs of
participants in communication. It is present to
them only in the prereflective form of taken-for-
granted background assumptions and naively
mastered skills.
However limiting this sounds, Habermas finds that there
is in fact room for manoeuver and change:
The cultural tradition must interpret the
lifeworld in such a way that action orientated to
success can be freed from the imperatives of an
understanding that is to be communicatively
renewed over and over again.
Thus, the critical faculty which we may employ provides
the means by which the lifeworld itself is capable of
being made more rational. In this way the power of the
given context of the object is eroded. Habermas's
point is that even with the cultural constraints of any
tradition, text, or an institution there is always the
possibility, with an increasingly rational lifeworld,
to identify and exercise a critical position in
relation to the object under consideration. The
question remains of how we can come to an understanding
of the critical tools and approaches that might be used
in this quest. Here Habermas approaches Gadamer's
concern to find ways of evaluating and understanding
meanings.
Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (1984),
i, p. 335.
^Ibid. , i, p . 72 .
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In considering the debate that developed between
22
Gadamer and Habermas, I am following the discussion
as it has been analysed by two writers. Paul Ricoeur
2 3
provides a good discussion of the debate and Michael
Pusey explores the influence upon Habermas's work of
the discussion with Gadamer.
Pusey has identified five areas in which Habermas
developed his thought as a consequence of the debate
with Gadamer: two are directly relevant to our concerns
here. One is the attention to linguistic analysis.
As a result of Gadamer's work, Habermas became so
convinced of the power and influence of language that
he attempted to restate and pursue his own enquiries in
sociology and social theory within a linguistic
paradigm.
The most important of the concepts that are shared and
developed through the debate is that of 'horizons', a
2 - •
Following the publication of Truth and Method m
1960, Habermas published a long review article, 'A
Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method', which can be
found in Understanding Social Inquiry, edited by
Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, pp. 335-
363, which gives details of the publication of the
original German article. Gadamer responded with an
article 'On the Scope and function of Hermeneutical
Method', Continuum, 8 (1970), pp. 77-95.
2 2
'Ethics and Culture: Habermas and Gadamer m
dialogue', Philosophy Today, 17 (1973), pp. 153-165.
Hereafter, this article will be referred to as:
Ricoeur, 'Ethics and Culture'.
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metaphor employed first by Gadamer. An individual's
horizon is the limit of their understanding in any
particular area and every situation requiring thought
and perception has such a limit to that knowledge and
experience. As the horizon of the interpreter meets
that of the person or object under consideration a
'fusion of horizons' takes place which is the best
moment for any process of translation or understanding.
In the 'fusion of horizons' there is a necessary moment
of doubt about both the self and that considered, which
opens to one another both that which seeks to interpret
and that which is to be interpreted.
A second element of the process of understanding
offered by the model of interpreting through the idea
of horizons is that to understand the proposition of
another we have to make an effort to experience his
point of view as he himself does. Here the 'fusion of
horizons' is what enables us to be involved in an
attempt at understanding that is broader than an
intellectual enquiry and deeper than a private
communion between two individuals. In such a meeting
we may find ourselves able to take on the points of the
other party, because we move from private
understandings of any particular positions or tradition
into the increasingly public reasons for holding a
particular point of view. As the process of
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understanding develops, our attempt at understanding
moves to a rational consideration of those points
behind any given position or text. We can only address
and in turn consider those points which are capable of
rational communication:
In its cognitive, moral, and evaluative components
the cultural tradition must permit a feedback
connection with specialized forms of argumentation
to such an extent that the corresponding learning
processes can be socially institutionalized. In
this way cultural subsystems can arise - for
science, law and morality, music, art and
literature - in which traditions take shape that
are supported by arguments rendered fluid through
permanent criticism ~]?ut at the same time
professionally secured.
Ricoeur's consideration of the debate goes further than
Pusey in that he develops both positions: it merits
attention in its own right. Ricoeur works at a
solution to the issues that divide his two fellow
philosophers.
He sees the discussion between Gadamer and Habermas as
important because: 'This debate... offers privileged
access to the unsolved problem of the origin of
2 5 .
values'. He sets the debate m its philosophical
context by identifying the tension between two
traditional positions: they are, that values 'are
2 4
Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, i,
pp. 71-2.
2 ^
Ricoeur, 'Ethics and Culture', p. 155.
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discovered, not created' and on the other hand that
'values are the work of freedom'. Values may be
either always in existence and it becomes part of our
work to discern them, or they are to be stated and
refined by us afresh as a responsibility consequent
upon our freedom. As Ricoeur puts it: 'If values are
not our work but precede us, why do they not suppress
our freedom? And if they are our work, why are they
2 7
not arbitrary choices?'
As I mentioned, hermeneutics is used by Gadamer to
address the issue of values because of the concern to
establish the truth claims or level of meaning of any
assessment made in areas distinct from the natural
sciences. These are deemed to have a language of
reflection and assessment which is independent to a
greater degree than that of the non-scientific or
traditional arts disciplines. Gadamer identifies three
areas of reflection where this problem of assessing
truth claims is acute: aesthetics, historical writing
and reflection and language. Of these the third is
considered the most important because it is employed in
both of the other disciplines. It is the primary means
of communication. In accepting this perception we are




move from understanding ourselves within traditions and
are constrained by those same traditions to the view
that we can never be free of them:
Our consciousness never has the freedom to bring
itself face to face with the past by an act of
sovereign independence. It is rather a question
of becoming conscious of the action which affects
us and of accepting that the past which is a part
of our experience keeps us from taking it totally
in charge, of accepting in some way its truth.
We are bound, in our perceptions as in our discourse,
by the inability to develop a critical assessment of
our position both in itself and in relation to other
options. Ricoeur addresses this issue by proposing the
necessity of a degree of what he calls 'critical
distance' and we will return to consider that idea
below.
Habermas on the other hand identifies three 'interests'
which govern all human activity. Of these the most
important is the third, our interest in emancipation,
and it dominates the two which precede it, our
instrumental interest and our practical interest or
that in communication. This interest in emancipation
has a critical aspect to it in the sense that it
addresses the issues of our freedom of perception in a




unmasking hidden systematic distortions.' This
according to Ricoeur is where the argument between
Gadamer and Habermas is joined. On the one hand we are
unable to make independent critical assessments of non-
scientific truth claims and on the other we have an
over-riding concern to establish our freedom in all
things. Ricoeur sees the conflict being between
Gadamer's 'hermeneutic of traditions' and Habermas's
'critique of ideologies'. A solution, or a move
towards a reconciliation, might be achieved by applying
the insights of one side to the problems of the other.
For Ricoeur it involves establishing sufficient
distance to enable the individual to perceive
critically what is happening. He argues that this is
possible and that we know this from our own experience.
It is true that 'a value becomes valuable beyond the
2 0
historical-cultural circumstances of its birth.' An
idea, a text or an institution, may have a power and
worth independent of its initial circumstances and it
will go on to acquire other new associations different
from those original ones which were determined by
either its genesis or previous context.
Ricoeur challenges Habermas's notion that our interest




argues that without some specific concern to address,
such an interest is in danger of being without
direction and consequently without point and value.
Ricoeur attaches the interest in emancipation to the
task of communication to give it a focus and in that
way attempts a joint solution:
How is it still possible to preserve the
difference between the 'good life' constantly
professed by philosophers and the purely
quantitive growth of material goods which appears
to be the sole law of the industrial system? It
seems to me that only the conjunction between the
critique of ideologies, animated by our interests
in emancipation, and the reinterpretation of the
heritages of the past, animated by our interest in
communication, may yet give a concrete content to
this effort.
Concluding his review of the debate with a marriage of
the two critical concerns, that is satisfying in its
tidiness more than in its obvious practical
application, Ricoeur states that:
The ethical life is a perpetual transaction
between the project of freedom and its ethical





iv beyond the Gadamer-Habermas debate
David Tracy, an American theologian, has made
interesting use of the work of Gadamer and Habermas.
His Plurality and Ambiguity: hermeneutics, religion,
hope (1987) is an exploration of the problems of
interpretation and our necessary limitations in that
task. His study is preliminary to a larger work
focussing on the implications of these contemporary
models of interpretation for Christianity. Plurality
and Ambiguity is to an extent derivative and covers
ground already familiar through our review of both
Gadamer and Habermas. However, Tracy has a different
end in view to those of the writers he draws upon and
his application of some of the material is fresh
because he approaches it with his own concerns. He
also has the ability in places to express Gadamer and
Habermas's thought concisely and clearly. His work is
of interest here because he applies the insights of
critical hermeneutics to the general area of Christian
theology. My concern in following Tracy is to see how
these insights might in turn be applied to the task of
ethical reflection, especially that of Christian
ethics.
Tracy, echoing Gadamer, defines his task in terms of
interpretation:
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Interpretation seems a minor matter, but it is
not. Every time we act, deliberate, judge,
understand, or even experience, we are
interpreting. To understand at all is to
interpret. To act well is to interpret a
situation demanding some action and to interpret a
correct strategy for that action. To experience
in other than a purely passive sense (a sense less
than human) is to interpret; and to be
'experienced' is to have become a good
interpreter. Interpretation is thus a question as
unavoidable, finally, as experience,
understanding, deliberation, judgement, decision,
and action. To be human is to act reflectively,
to decide deliberately, to understand
intelligently, to experience fully. Whether we
know it or OQt, to be human is to be a skilled
interpreter.
While we might challenge Tracy's last and rather
optimistic statement, because clearly too many humans
are not sufficiently competent interpreters of their
own or other people's experience, we can affirm his
point that it is an activity which pervades every
aspect of life. The way we understand our experience
is not a purely cerebral activity but one that must be
undertaken frequently, by all, and often takes place
unconsciously. The broad character of this task was
demonstrated by Gadamer and Habermas in their
investigations into language.
Drawing on Gadamer, the task of interpreting can be
broken down fairly simply into three aspects, each of
which require consideration. There is the item, be it
T "3
Plurality and Ambiguity, p. 9.
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which require consideration. There is the item, be it
tradition, culture, text or another individual needing
to be interpreted; then follows the individual wanting
to assess or understand the object of his enquiries.
Thirdly, there is the interaction between the two
parties: the sense that both have some form of impact
on the other that means as a result of the
consideration undertaken neither is quite as it was
before the interpretation took place.
Interpretive methods remain an issue and Tracy suggests
adopting the model of the 'conversation' as a means of
pursuing the inquiry. He outlines both what it is and
what it is not:
Conversation itself is another kind of
game...where we learn to give in to the movement
required by questions worth exploring. The
movement in conversation is questioning itself.
Neither my present opinions on the question nor
the text's original response to the question, but
the question itself, must control every
conversation. A conversation is a rare
phenomenon, even for Socrates. It is not a
confrontation. It is not a debate. It is not an
exam. It is the questioning itself. It is a
willingness to follow the question wherever it may
go. It is dia-logue...a game with some hard
rules: say only what you mean; say it as
accurately as you can; listen to and respect what
the other says, however different or other; be
willing to correct or defend your opinions if
challenged by the conversation partner; be willing
to argue if necessary, to confront if demanded, to
endure necessary conflict* to change your mind if
the evidence suggests it.
~1 A
Plurality and Ambiguity, pp. 18-19.
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Here Tracy shows a clear view of both the requirements
of conversation and within that a real sense of the
possible difficulties that may emerge in any attempt at
a genuine discussion. He even suggests a re-opening
of the Gadamer -Habermas debate on the truth claims of
art, myth and religion on the basis of his new model of
the conversation which he considers to be potentially
more effective in following human patterns of
communication than the model used, that of explicit
argument.
Tracy has set himself the task of applying the model of
conversation to the ambiguities and plurality within
the Christian tradition. In Plurality and Ambiguity
however he limits himself to some general
considerations of the religious enterprise. He
acknowledges that the task of interpreting the
religious texts and traditions is a complex one. He
argues that the religions are even more complex than
other areas considered by the advocates of modern
hermeneutics - art, historical writing and philosophy.
Here he makes some observations that will certainly
need to be addressed in any application of the
hermeneutic method to ethical thought. Claiming that
the interpretation of the religions is difficult, he
"^Ibid., p. 118, note 28.
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goes on:
For religions do claim, after all, that Ultimate
Reality has revealed itself and that there is a
way of liberation for any human being. But even
this startling possibility can only be understood
by us if we risk interpreting it. It is possible
that some interpreters may have encountered the
power of Ultimate Reality. They may have
experienced, therefore, religious enlightenment
and emancipation. But these claims can be
interpreted only by the same kinds of human beings
as before: finite and contingent members of
particular societies and cultures. They demand
our best efforts at rigorous, critical, and
genuine conversation. They demand retrieval,
critique, and suspicion.
At least one of the reasons why Tracy believes this
task to be so important is the need to address the
concerns of those who dismiss religious claims or
refuse to take them with any degree of intellectual
seriousness because 'the history of religions also
includes such an appalling litany of murder,
inquisitions, holy wars, obscurantisms and
17 . • ■
exclusivisms.' A similar point is behind part of
the present enterprise: given the disregard in which
their tradition is sometimes held, how can Christian
ethicists contribute to the wider ethical debates in
such a way as to be heard? Tracy takes seriously the
predominantly ethical charges made against Christianity
and goes on to acknowledge that no-one who tries to




clean hands. Further however:
If interpreters of religion come with any pretence
to purity, they should not be listened to. If
religious thinkers will not combat the
obscurantisms, exclusivisms, and the moral
fanaticisms within their own religious tradition,
how can the rest of us take them seriously as
providing new strategies of resistance?
Working in this area, Tracy needs to demonstrate that
he takes full account of the problems of pluralism,
especially within religious and ethical dialogue, in
the same way as the study of language leads us to
understand the degree of pluralism in society and in
history. Going on from there, it is obvious that we
must consider 'competing visions of the good life, how
can we decide on the most relatively adequate one for
3 9
responsible action?' A drawback, whenever there are
many completing alternatives, is to pretend that it is
a virtue to live with them all. There may be some
truth in that point of view but it can also be the lazy
way out of considering which alternative represents
the most adequate choice in any given set of
circumstances. Tracy condemns such an approach, noting
that there are circumstances in which 'pluralism
demands suspicion' for it can mask 'a genial confusion
in which one tries to enjoy the pleasures of difference
without ever committing oneself to any particular
^Ibid., pp. 85-85.
Ibid., p. 65 .
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vision of resistance or hope.'40 Here, as in his
discussion of conversation as a model of understanding,
Tracy is not naive in his expectations. He demands of
a true pluralist outlook certain characteristics which
will ensure that it amounts to more than a commitment
to both openness and possibilities:
There must be criteria to assess the coherence or
incoherence of any possibility with what we
otherwise know or, more likely, believe to be the
case. There must be ethical political criteria on
what the religious option will mean for both the
individual and society.
Tracy even talks of the need to employ a vhermeneutics
of suspicion', a term which he borrows from Gadamer,
when the issue under discussion involves problems that
4 2
stem from something more complicated than error.
This takes us back to the criteria of rationalism.
v towards a dialogical model in ethical reflection
Having indicated something of the range of thought
about dialogue at the philosophical level, it is
necessary to relate this material directly to the task
of developing a model of ethical reflection based on
dialogue. This chapter opened with the concern, from
40Ibid., p. 90.
Ibid., p. 91.
Plurality and Ambiguity, p.73. See also p. 132, n.
29 .
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the previous chapter, about the relative nature of
conclusions. In following that issue, three avenues
were pursued. The first was the concern among
historians about objectivity in writing and assessing
evidence. This led into a consideration of the work of
two philosophers who have addressed the issue
thoroughly in terms of discussions about language and
meaning. The work of Gadamer and Habermas not only
helped in the issue of the relative nature of
conclusions but added to our understanding of the
nature and constraints of dialogue in general. The
third and final avenue considered was a work by a
theologian where some of the ideas developed by Gadamer
and Habermas were applied to Christian theology. Each
of these areas of study is independent and yet reflects
a similar concern to review the objectivity of truth
claims. Now I want to make explicit the connections
between these areas and the idea of dialogue as a model
for ethical reflection.
Changing the order of the review within this chapter,
the first area to be considered now is that of the
material from Gadamer and Habermas. Gadamer's
reflections confirmed from a philosophical perspective
our general ideas about the necessary preconditions to
good dialogue, such as openness, reciprocity, respect
and trust. In addition, when he spoke of the spirit of
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the conversation, he was employing a helpful metaphor
for understanding the necessarily open nature of any
dialogue that matches these criteria. This idea helps
us to realise clearly the open nature of the enterprise
when we talk of trying to develop a model of dialogue
for ethics. We are not talking about a system which
enables us to anticipate a certain outcome by always
following predetermined ethical rules or principles.
We may attempt to regulate the process by trying to
establish appropriate procedures but that will not
allow us to know the outcome in advance. Gadamer's
second valuable contribution in this area is his use of
the image of the translator who works with language,
rendering concepts and feelings which are not directly
equivalent in different languages. This image is very
helpful when trying to understand some of the
complexities and confusions which emerge in trying to
communicate difficult matters.
Thus in proposing a model for ethical reflection which
is based on dialogue we have identified, and found
confirmation of, certain necessary criteria from a
range of disciplines. The initial suggestion of a
round table as a metaphor for understanding the spirit
of the dialogue is another way of expressing Fisher and
Ury's idea about the participants not having to bargain
over positions. There is neither head nor foot to the
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table: all positions are ideally of equal importance as
the dialogue opens.
The material about the nature and manner of dialogue
provides an understanding of the necessary disposition
and process. Within the model of dialogue that I am
suggesting for ethics, all of this has been the prelude
to the delicate task of creating an environment in
which to address the central issue of contemporary
moral disagreement. This is the area identified by
Maclntyre and to which I want to apply reflections from
the thought of Gadamer and Habermas.
As has been shown, Gadamer and Habermas have a common
concern with the process of communication and the
extent to which that process cannot be free and
unimpaired by traditions and individual perceptions.
Maclntyre's view of contemporary moral confusion
centres on the inability to resolve moral conflicts:
competing positions are informed by or derived from
differing and incompatible traditions of moral
reflection. This is the context into which I want to
try to introduce dialogue as a method of ethical
reflection. In particular, the work of Gadamer and
Habermas may help in providing a means by which the
proposed dialogical model might engage with the problem
of competing moral convictions.
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The concern of historians to acknowledge the
difficulties in establishing objective evidence and
accounts of the past was our first step towards
acknowledging difficulty in establishing fixed points.
This is the recognition that that which may appear to
be a straightforward opinion or conclusion is in fact
made up of many possibilities for misunderstanding.
Some are innocent and unconscious, others are wilful
and conscious. These concerns have been acknowledged
in the early non-philosophical material on dialogue.
The debate between Gadamer and Habermas provides a
possible way around the difficulties, based on more
than good-will and optimism.
We cannot be clear about the extent to which our
opinions and accounts of events are objective. It
follows that our use of language is similarly
constrained by our experience which informs our
worldview. Consequently to what extent may we rely
upon our truth claims? They too must be influenced by
our limitations in those spheres which so closely
determine our philosophical construction of reality and
our necessary and consequent interpretations of it.
Ethical perspectives and conclusions are subject to
these limitations. This is a liberating perspective in
the sense that it means that some of the absolute
points claimed in moral discourse may legitimately be
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challenged. They are subject to scrutiny in terms of
their rational criteria and may not claim any special
extenuating circumstances in their origin which puts
them above either examination or criticism. This has
particular and obvious relevance for religious truth
claims.
Here Tracy indicated a manner in which such traditions
might similarly be subject to scrutiny and self-
examination in the light of the work of Gadamer and
Habermas. Tracy reinforces their analytical approach
specifically in relation to the critical examination of
religious truth claims. Tracy's work is driven by a
twofold concern. He sees the need for repentance in
those areas where the tradition has fallen short of
its aims and also the importance of apologetics where
the tradition needs to commend itself afresh. Tracy
proposes the model of conversation as a means of
pursuing this process. The model he outlines is too
loose to adapt directly for ethical reflection because
it deliberately places emphasis on an informal approach
to the process of critical reflection. This may work
well in the context he envisages for it which is
critical reflection within a tradition, where the very
informality may help the process. However in ethical
reflection with participants drawn from a range of
moral, religious and cultural traditions there is need
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for a formal structure which will help to hold the
delicate process of common reflection.
Ricoeur identified the Gadamer-Habermas debate as one
essentially about values. There is a tension between
the idea that values are discovered rather than created
and the opposing view that values are the work of
freedom. As Ricoeur noticed, this applies directly to
ethical reflection. Gadamer's perspective is that we
are unable to make independent or objective critical
assessment because of the many cultural and personal
influences on our perspective and in our use of
language. Habermas counters this with the claim that
we have an over-riding 'interest' to establish our
freedom. Thus, no matter how culturally and personally
constrained we are, our drive to freedom works within
us to provide the rational tools by which we may
attempt sufficient of an understanding of these
constraints to be able to take them into account and
develop a self-critical perspective. In ethical
reflection there will be perspectives held by various
participants in the debate which appear to be
intractable but in this scheme may be subject to
critical rational reflection.
This chapter has been concerned with ideas which have a
clear bearing on the proposal of dialogue as a method
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of ethical reflection. It is my intention to examine
the application of these ideas, along with the general
conditions of dialogue outlined previously, in relation
to Christian ethics. This exploration will assess the
proposal outlined so far in relation to a particular
moral tradition with a clear basis in religious faith.
I want to see how the proposal is capable of working in
such a context, with conflicting faith claims as part
of the background to moral discourse. Secondly, I will
consider the extent to which this model of ethical
reflection may both challenge and equip Christian
ethics to participate fluently in ethical discussions
within a pluralist society.
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Chapter 4
Dialogue And Christian Ethics
Dialogue is at the heart of Incarnation.
(Maggie Ross)1
The three preceding chapters establish in different
ways that the skills of dialogue are necessary in a
pluralist society. In this chapter I will examine the
extent to which Christian ethics is compatible with and
may in turn contribute to the process of dialogue. As
part of this task we will consider some contemporary
examples of Christian ethical reflection and attempt to
understand their contribution in terms of the proposed
round table dialogue. There will then be a wider
review of the tradition of Christian ethics provided
through H. Richard Niebuhr's five models of
understanding the relationship between Christ and
culture. This will lead into a discussion of work by
Lesslie Newbigin which has interesting parallels with
aspects of the debate between Gadamer and Habermas.
The fourth and final section of this chapter will look
directly at the opportunities and challenges for
Christian ethics in adopting the round table model of
dialogue as a method of ethical reflection. This
1 Pillars of Flame (1987), p. lxvii.
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chapter is preparatory to two extended case studies in
which the Christian contribution will be a main focus
of attention.
The argument of this chapter, and by extension that of
the thesis, is that Christian ethics not only can but
should contribute to round table dialogue. There are
obstacles to this process and some of them come from
within the Christian tradition in the form of absolute
points of reference that have traditionally formed part
of the Christian world view. This chapter will look
specifically at these problems and try to make clear
the connections between the thoughts on dialogue
outlined above and strands of Christian ethical
reflection which may connect with or benefit from this
work. Although the discussion here will relate quite
specifically to only one religion, Christianity, the
conclusions drawn may well have relevance and
application in relation to other moral traditions with
religious premises.
i some contemporary examples of Christian ethics
In the introductory chapter I attempted to give a
flavour of modern moral discourse. Here my concern is
to do the same for current Christian concerns in
ethics. I will also indicate how these approaches,
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with their respective strengths and weaknesses, match
the developing criteria of dialogue as a method for
ethical reflection. This is obviously a potentially
huge task and has therefore to be made manageable.
Four texts will be considered, representing in
different ways the areas of debate: the broadly
popular, Frank Wright's Exploration into Goodness
(1988); the theoretical, Stephen E. Fowl and L. Gregory
Jones's Reading in Communion: scripture and ethics in
Christian life (1991) and Don Cupitt's The New
Christian Ethics (1988); and the specific and
practical approach of Stanley Hauerwas in Suffering
2
Presence (1988). Each has been chosen because they
deliberately set out to address issues of morality in a
way that is specifically related to how Christian
ethics can contribute to the wider discussion.
9 . . .
This choice is limited but I try to show the range
of current work. The popular work of Frank Wright
is representative of a strand of liberal apologetic,
while Fowl and Jones write in the tradition of
academic reflection. This is true in a different
sense of both Cupitt and Hauerwas who as well as
being academics have a wider popularity. Perhaps
the Vatican's Veritatis Splendor (1993) should also
have been included, but I omitted it for two
reasons. First, it does not represent a
contemporary approach except in the sense that it
was published recently; it argues from traditional
Roman Catholic premises and one such example of the
these, the Principle of Double Effect, will be
considered at length in chapter 6 below. Secondly,
Veritatis Splendor is already part of a large debate
to which it would not be possible to give proper
consideration in the space available.
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There are two main strands in contemporary Christian
ethical thinking. One concerns itself with the
exploration of historical theories and often attempts
to provide a modern rendering of an old theory.3 The
other approach is that inspired by a timely combination
of liberation theology and situation ethics. The
latter places an emphasis on discerning the right
course of action in any given situation by attending to
the specific requirements and constraints of that
situation alongside the attempt to be motivated in that
assessment by the guiding principle of discerning the
most loving thing to do. Liberation theology has
developed in practical situations with an emphasis upon
the the principle of 'learning by doing'. Theory is
developed in response to what is met and experienced.
The perspective and applications of liberation theology
have given situation ethics a direction which otherwise
might have become lost in a blur of well-intentioned
antinomianism. When employed in a rigorous fashion this
approach can be most illuminating. A good example is
provided by the work of Stanley Hauerwas, whose
starting point in Suffering Presence is a range of
particular socio-medical problems which he then
addresses in a stimulating fashion.
-J
Helen Oppenheimer's The Hope of Happiness (1983),
for example, despite its subtitle, 'a sketch for a
Christian Humanism', might also be described as a
re-interpretation of natural law theory.
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In Exploration of Goodness, Frank Wright's focus is the
common attraction of goodness. He has specifically-
chosen the topic of goodness over holiness, 'because
whatever the intimate connection between the two,
goodness has the power to strike deep down into the
popular mind and transcends any ecclesiastical
boundaries'.4 While not describing itself as an
ethical text, the work is concerned with right action
in relation to God, towards oneself and among one's
fellows. The main theological argument is that in
drawing nearer to God and thus increasingly losing
one's sense of self, the individual is set free from
self-interest to perform virtuous acts.
In spite of Wright's intention to establish his
argument in an open way, it becomes clear that
Christian faith is that which for the author holds
together certain of life's paradoxes. Faith is the
motivation of goodness or the reason for a lack of
self-interest in the face of suffering. If one did not
share the author's Christian point of view, it is not
clear that the book would be more than a collection of
interesting anecdotes interwoven with reflections on
the difficulty of understanding what makes for good
behaviour, however clear it may be to recognise when
present. The reason for considering Exploration into
4
Exploration into Goodness, p. 1
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Goodness, a declared concern to establish an inclusive
approach to the idea of virtue, is not supported by the
text. Wright's work fails in precisely the area the
author intended it to address because his approach does
not take sufficient account of the difficulties in
engaging with the wider debates about the nature of
goodness. There is in his approach no attempt to enter
dialogue, with the possibly unintended result that his
text does not appear open to others who share his
concern if they do not also share his presuppositions.
Maclntyre, Sacks and Gill have each spoken of the
importance of the community in developing and
sustaining moral traditions. There is a clear need to
develop and nurture moral identities, which should be
done in a way that encourages the followers of each
tradition to relate constructively to other traditions.
Unless this happens we will not emerge from Maclntyre's
new dark ages. It is against this background that the
idea of developing dialogue as a method of ethical
reflection is so important. The need for this is clear
when it is still possible to read books about Christian
ethics that do not explore how the ethical principles
that they are discussing and investigating connect at
all with the world beyond the Church. Some writers
appear to see the focus of Christian ethics as the
Christian community and do not direct their thought to
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how those they encourage to think morally might in turn
influence the wider moral debates in society. While
this way of thinking reflects closely one of Niebuhr's
five patterns of the relationship between Christianity
and culture discussed below, it is not adequate in
facilitating common moral reflection in a pluralist
society.
Sometimes a point may be reinforced by an example of
how something should not be done. Fowl and Jones, in
Reading in Communion, argue for the importance of re¬
integrating an informed or critical reading of
scripture with Christian reflection on ethical
behaviour. Their focus is the individual Christian and
their study is initially very interesting in the ideas
they employ to broaden the traditional perspectives of
personal ethics. However, where their work is
ultimately disappointing is its lack of consideration
of the responsibility of Christian ethics in the social
role. Although some consideration is given to what may
be learnt by Christian ethics from secular moral
philosophers, no consideration is given to how the
reflection Fowl and Jones advocate may in turn be
communicated to the wider forum of ethical reflection
5
beyond the Christian community.
See especially chapter 5, 'Listening to the voices
of outsiders'.
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While it is good and valuable that the authors should
be drawing on the insights of secular thought in the
task of Christian ethics it is disappointing that the
link only goes one way. Fowl and Jones are obviously
prepared to employ several of the characteristics of
dialogue as identified for ethical reflection when
drawing on the thought of non-Christian writers but
their concern does not extend to communicating the
message they develop back into the main stream of
contemporary moral reflection. Christian ethicists
should be prepared to attempt this. Both Wright and
Fowl and Jones in different ways and probably without
intending it are in danger of making Christian ethical
reflection an internal concern of the Christian
community. It matters that Christians engage in
ethical reflection. It matters too that their work is
undertaken in a way that acknowledges that Christian
ethics always has a wider scope and concern than the
community which initially develops it. The next two
texts to be considered both address this wider concern.
Don Cupitt's The New Christian Ethics is more
substantial than either of the two previous texts
considered in this section. Cupitt is concerned with
the demands of Christian morality. This exploration is
set within the author's wider quest for an
intellectually honest and contemporary theology. My
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interest here is to look only at his moral philosophy
as set out in the text under discussion. While
recognising that Christian ethics cannot be separated
from theology, criticism of Cupitt's general
theological system will be mentioned only when that is
an integral part of his ethics.
Cupitt's concern to develop a modern Christian ethic is
based on his reassessment of our understanding of the
nature of God and further on the close relationship
between particular views of God and the Christian's
moral responsibility in relation to that God. In Life
Lines (1986), Cupitt clearly identified a number of
different religious points of view showing how each in
different ways led to a range of emphases on aspects of
the nature of God. Cupitt has been consistent in his
writings in trying to identify images of God consequent
upon particular theological concepts or ideas which in
various ways contradict the New Testament image offered
by Jesus. Therefore, it is not surprising to find
early in The New Christian Ethics the statement that
vit will only be because the old almighty God has gone
that Christian ethics can at last come of age'.^
Cupitt's new task is expressed in terms familiar to us
from the debate between Gadamer and Habermas:
°The New Christian Ethics, p. 15.
119
Only through the death of that God does Christian
ethics at last acquire the duty and the authority
to create value ex nihilo, which marks it as truly
Christian and enables it to redeem our life.
The old system of Christian ethics in contrast to which
Cupitt sets out his ideas is described by him as
punitive, stultifying and schizophrenic. He claims
that in the influential writings of St Augustine the
point of doing good was not in order to benefit the
other (the recipient of the good deed), but rather the
action acquired merit in proportion as it was
undertaken to enhance the agent's relationship with
O
God. However, as part of the schizophrenia, at the
same time the individual was not to excel in anything
except devotion to God and ambition must always be
9 ...
disclaimed. Part of the business of living was not to
offend God and creation was seen as providing a
collection of traps for the unsuspecting pilgrim. 'You
were moral if in your conduct you enacted culture's
victory over nature.'1® Cupitt sees the three
classical ethical theories, deontological, teleological
and mythical as depending upon 'a cosmic moral order
and scheme of things that pressurizes us in the right
direction'.11 Tn short, there was little real freedom
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120
of moral precepts dependent upon an image of God which
was antithetical to the individual's creative and free
response to the challenges of life.
The task of the new ethics 'coincides with the task of
12
the traditional theology of redemption' . However,
there are now no objective moral criteria: 'Thus
Christian ethics will not now begin with moral
principles that have supposedly come down to us from
above. It will begin where any ethic must begin, with
12
the will to live'. Echoing Habermas's interest m
freedom, effort must now be directed towards creating
or attributing value, rather than discerning among the
clouds perfect moral precepts which we must find and
then follow more closely.
The fully-redeemed human life, the best life any
of us could aim for, is the life that is ethically
creative. That's the life that saves the world:
it creates value where previously there was no
value an$A it makes meaning by minting new
metaphors.
Ascribing value is the moral task and this is broken
down into two distinct areas: the individual and the
social. Tn terms of the individual, the task is to
let go of old notions of the self as independent and





We are transient and most fully human when, as social
beings, we are structuring our lives in such a way that
it is given over to others in 'service of a supremely
1 £
good and perfect lord' . Becoming such a self is seen
as a difficult and permanent moral task: to be finished
1
is to be dead. The moral self is not a being in
isolation as it matters for the task that we
communicate, both the quest of valuing and the values
thus arrived at, however transitionally. These
communications take place in bodies similar to
Maclntyre's schools of virtue; it is through
'membership of a sub-group, a moral community dedicated
17
to the pursuit of the virtues'.
There are wide implications of this moral task. We
must, Cupitt says, look to our language to see those
groups and individuals whom we despise or quietly do
down: women, homosexuals and others. 'Life is
valuation and the ethical task is to maintain and
1 P>
advance the general worthwhileness of life.' More
specifically:
Your life-task is to create a bit more value
(which equals a bit more reality) for us all, by
inducing us all to speak a bit more kindly of






having a Qkad time and is the victim of
prejudice.'
We may want to shy away from the responsibility of
valuing, but Cupitt points out that all human life is
in every moment concerned to make 'micro-evaluations'
upon which we continually act. The new values must,
however, be inclusive as well as being clear. The old
values did people down, creating losers in society.
The new values must affirm human experience in a way
that encourages all citizens both in themselves and in
their moral task. In a separate article describing
this overall approach, Cupitt concludes of his ethics
that 'because it emphasises the struggle to revalue the
2 0
devalued it can I believe call itself Christian.'
Greater consideration has been given to Cupitt here
than to either Wright or Fowl and Jones because Cupitt
makes explicit the connections between secular moral
philosophy and the Christian enterprise. He does this
in a way that clearly indicates areas of mutual
concern. In particular, the relation to the need to
find solutions to contemporary problems and the
accumulated wisdom of the tradition which in several
cases cannot elucidate the task.
Ibid., p. 155.
'The Value of Life', Modern Churchman, new series,
32 (1990), pp. 39-45 (p. 45).
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It might be asked how fair is Cupitt's picture of
historical Christian ethics and in response one would
have to acknowledge an element of caricature. The
essential picture of the predicament is not unfair,
especially where he portrays the tensions placed upon
the individual: ambition is unacceptable, even when
that is expressed as a passion for sanctity, and
further the tension encouraged between our intellectual
and physical natures. Cupitt's approach seeks a
harmony between our nature and our ideals, so that we
are encouraged by the congruity rather than taxed by a
dualist conflict between the physical and the spiritual
or ethical sides of our nature. However this task may
be frustrated because Cupitt is weak when it comes to
that aspect of human nature which reflects our fallen
state. This is in part because he sees some historical
human failures in virtue as attributable to a moral
world view which has been dominated by fear and
manipulation rather than the free expression of the
individual's will. Such a view takes insufficient
account of our continuing ability as humans to make
less than the best of some situations, however free we
may be from negative external constraints. In
fairness, Cupitt does not expect the new moral task of
ascribing and affirming value to be straightforward:
he describes it as requiring 'self-discipline' and
'minute care in one's relations with other people'(64).
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The overall task of ethics is clear enough in ascribing
and affirming value, but how is one to discern between
the competing values ascribed in any particular case:
for example, that of the artificial prolongation of
life? How may we be helped to decide between the
'right to die' and the 'right to life', especially as
there is to be no system?
The way to salvation is by actively striving to
push up our values, and ennobling everything that
is currently rated too low. But for this work of
redemption, we don't need a system. We don't want
conscience, rules or guilt. We need freedom,
creativity and vigorous emotions. 1
Cupitt is working to establish the ethical autonomy of
the individual within the community of all working for
good. We find an energetic commitment to explore
beyond the frameworks from which we have irretrievably
moved. His suggestion needs clarification in
particular situations to avoid and limit some
inevitable conflicts and confusions. In The New
Christian Ethics, Cupitt articulates part of the
concern of this thesis without the necessary model of
dialogue. The six identified principles which help in
applying dialogue as a method of ethical reflection
could provide Cupitt with the framework he does not
want but needs to successfully apply his proposal. The
business of ascribing value could be helped by drawing
? 1
The New Christian Ethics, p. 167.
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directly on some of the insights from the Gadamer-
Habermas debate, in particular the reflections on the
difficulties in the task.
In Stanley Hauerwas's essays Suffering Presence he
addresses issues where medical, Christian and social
concerns overlap. Where Wright, Fowl and Jones and
Cupitt have each addressed the general field of moral
debate, in these studies Hauerwas approaches particular
issues: suicide, brain death, the plight of the
handicapped and the retarded. His starting point is
clearly that of Christian faith and in these essays he
tackles issues which concern all society. He is not
anxious about his specifically Christian perspective
and consequently, although this does not always follow,
in his ethics he is also a good apologist.
Hauerwas's method is interesting. He sets a particular
bioethical predicament or process over against one or
more specific theological ideas in such a way as to
illumine both the problem and the idea. An example
from Suffering Presence is that of whether or not
children known before or at birth to have some form of
serious defect should be assisted or allowed to
continue living, given that all they and their families
can expect is years of suffering. Hauerwas asks the
question, who is to be protected from the suffering
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the child, his or her family or society? Suffering is
part of the human condition and Hauerwas affirms a view
of life as it is over against a sanitised version:
vSuffering... is not something you eliminate, but rather
2 2
something with which you must learn to live.'
Suffering is not only an unavoidable part of life but
an essential element of living that at best offers an
opportunity for growth. Whatever, suffering in itself,
especially given the lack of clarity about who is being
protected from it, is clearly not grounds sufficient to
justify the death of an unborn or newborn infant.
Thus, Hauerwas shows how the idea of the value and the
uniqueness of each human life may be obscured by the
concerns of the moment. The sacredness of life is
affirmed against the convenience of eliminating
particular forms of suffering or sources of discomfort.
In this, as in the other topics he discusses, Hauerwas
shows how problems arise because of the sometimes
unacknowledged influence of general underlying
assumptions. The effect of these influences can be to
create serious misunderstandings in our communication,
especially fear of differences and of dependency.
Hauerwas does not use the model of dialogue in his
analysis but he employs the characteristics we have
identified. He looks to trust and a rational basis for
2 2
Suffering- Presence, p. 24.
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all perspectives and to reciprocity in his dealings
with the concerns of other disciplines. Further, he
takes account of the particular context of his
criticism. As with the previous texts we have
considered, it is important to acknowledge that they
were not written to address the concerns we bring to
them in this study. Hauerwas does not set out an
explicit model of dialogue even where he appears to use
criteria similar to those identified as necessary for
dialogue as a means of ethical reflection.
This brief review cannot pretend to be complete, even
as a treatment of the texts discussed. What I hope to
have shown is something of the diversity of approach in
Christian ethics even among those authors where there
is a commitment to exploring connections between their
writing and the wider moral debates. In Wright, an
exploration of a promising topic languished because of
an inability to keep the openness declared at the
outset and simultaneously the lack of any clear
conceptual framework. Fowl and Jones, in spite of an
awareness of the issues in the wider process of moral
reflection, end up like Wright in danger only of
talking to themselves and other members of their
'community'. Cupitt, although honest and open in his
proposal of a new ethic for Christians, was weak in key
areas and could have been clearer in order for his
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work to have a wider application both within and beyond
his intended audience. Furthermore, it is not clear
that his description of his ethics as 'Christian' is as
apt as he claims. The specific context of faith as a
relationship with the divine, which impinges upon
behaviour and consequently ethics, needs to be
described more forcefully. Most promising was
Hauerwas, both generally and for my purpose here.
Although not referring explicitly to a dialogical
model, he had obviously employed several of the general
principles of dialogue in his work. In assembling his
argument he drew on other work in a way that respected
its initial context. He established parallels between
ideas from medical, theological and ethical thought
resulting in perspectives that could win approval from
a range of concerned parties in the debates to which he
contributed.
This review has demonstrated two things. There is a
need for those involved in Christian ethics to develop
a clear and coherent approach to engaging with other
moral traditions in order to participate effectively in
the wider process of ethical reflection in a pluralist
society. However valuable it is to reflect on the
particular perspectives of one moral tradition it is
essential that ways be discovered for these to be
connected with the wider debate. It is clear from the
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concerns of the writers considered here, especially
Hauerwas, that there is a sense of the importance of
this task already. Secondly, it is equally clear that
in different ways, again particularly in Hauerwas but
also in Cupitt, there are ideas emerging which indicate
that a model of ethical reflection based on dialogue
would be welcome. Some of the patterns and attitudes
identified in this study as necessary for good dialogue
are already present in some writers' work. One issue
is not addressed: the sense in which the clear
commitment to Christian faith might present an obstacle
to the open nature of dialogue. This concern still
needs to be addressed and the reflections of Gadamer
and Habermas can help in this task.
ii dialogue and Niebuhr's five models
Before examining Niebuhr's five patterns of
understanding the relationship between Christianity and
culture, two questions may be asked about Christian
ethics and the process of dialogue. Why should
Christian ethicists have an interest in dialogue and
secondly, what might be the benefit of such an approach
in a specifically religious context?
In pluralist societies the need for dialogue is clear.
Christian ethics embraces several established
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traditions of moral discourse and a continuing
commitment to moral reflection as a response to the
call of faith as experienced by individual Christians
and as an expression of concern for all people within
society. How the individual behaves and how
communities treat their members and others are both
matters of importance for Christian ethicists. If any
discussion in a pluralist society is to be fruitful, it
requires a system which can hold together diverse
points of view: the proposed model of round table
dialogue with its six identified points. Participation
in as rich and as diverse a form as possible within a
framework which can hold the discussion and allow it
to develop is essential. Christian ethicists would want
to participate and acquire the skills necessary to
contribute well. Beyond participation, we turn to the
second question: what might be the fruits of the
anticipated round table dialogue? These lie in two
areas. The first is provided by the process itself,
where any individual moral tradition which wishes to
contribute to the discussion must be prepared to commit
itself to the principles of the discussion as these
have been outlined. In particular there must be a
commitment to learning through discussion with others
and with that a clear and honest recognition that one's
own position does not contain any points of absolute or
non-negotiable truth. In short, all participants must
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recognise the importance of being committed to the
process of dialogue. Not to be so committed is to
preclude oneself from participation.
The second form of anticipated benefit lies not so much
in the conclusions which may be reached, but in the way
in which these conclusions and the process by which
they may have been reached are viewed by the
participants and by those beyond the group. Put
bluntly, ethical reflection based on the principles of
dialogue may allow greater freedom to come to terms
with points of view radically at variance with one's
own initial position and yet which one might understand
and perhaps sympathise with as a specific result of the
process of dialogue. It is not expected that an ethics
of dialogue will provide conclusions in every intricate
moral conflict which has up until now eluded
conciliation. Rather, it is hoped that through the
process of dialogue presently disagreeing parties may
come to a new understanding of both their own positions
and those of their partners in dialogue. Ideally
through this they may have a fresh perspective on the
issues under discussion and thereby come to a tolerance
of positions opposed to their own. Part of the point
of using dialogue as a form of ethical reflection is to
give an informed basis to moral tolerance in a
pluralist society which may in turn lead to
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participants finding a moral consensus on issues that
previously divided them.
From this brief outline it will be clear that dialogue
might pose problems for some positions within Christian
ethics. Difficulties might arise from both the way in
which Christian ethics have traditionally been
disseminated and from the fixed points that it is
assumed to work from. In the first stage of what
follows attention will be given to the ways in which
Christian ethics has been promulgated and the contexts
of those processes, drawing particularly on the work of
H. Richard Niebuhr. In the following section, there
will be an attempt to look at some of the supposedly
fixed points in the Christian tradition which might
make dialogue difficult in terms of the requirement to
be open. In this latter exercise our thoughts will
begin with some of the ideas of Lesslie Newbigin, who
has worked and written in the area of inter-faith
dialogue and proclamation, as expressed in his Truth to
Tell: the gospel as public truth (1991) .
It can be misleading to talk of Christian ethics if
what is understood by that is a single and coherent
point of view. Over its two thousand year history the
Christian community has developed several moral
traditions in response to new intellectual developments
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and to social and political changes. These traditions,
while sharing a similar origin in an attempt to respond
faithfully to the world around them, have developed
patterns which sometimes lead to opposing conclusions
on particular topics or issues. H. Richard Niebuhr, in
Christ and Culture (1951), identified five broad ways
in which the Christian community has related to the
culture of the world over the centuries. These models
of relationship between the Christian communities and
their environment are directly important for ethics
because the way the Church perceives the world
determines both how the Christian should relate to
others and consequently the way in which ethical
discourse is developed and promulgated.
Niebuhr's five models may be understood as paradigms of
dialogue or ways of conducting the conversation from a
Christian point of view when engaging with those who
represent the culture in which the conversation is
taking place. In the previous two chapters I have
reflected on the theory of dialogue with its challenges
and difficulties. Here I hope to show how some of
these patterns of dialogue are reflected in the models
which Niebuhr has identified. There is no suggestion
that he understood the five patterns of Christianity's
relationship to culture in the sense that I am
exploring it here but neither does what I propose
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misuse his work. I am simply demonstrating that his
five ways of understanding the relationship between
Christianity and culture provide a model which
illustrates common Christian approaches to dialogue.
Christ against culture is Niebuhr's first category.
This position emphasises the opposition between Christ
and the culture of any historical period. The figure
and message of Christ is understood by Christians to
challenge the prevailing view in any society:
The counterpart of loyalty to Christ and the
brothers is, however, the rejection of cultural
society; a clear line of separation is drawn
between the brotherhood of the children of God and
the world.
History is written in terms of articulated antagonisms
and the establishment of distance. The early monastic
movement is a good example of this pattern which is
always present in Christianity. Most forms of
fundamentalism are examples of this perspective where
the Christian vocation is understood to set up a
tension between the believer and the world. In
dialogue this model would be represented by an approach
which stated the Christian position on a topic and then
expected either agreement or rejection. If the latter
were to result that would not be the sign to begin a
23Christ and Culture, pp. 47-48.
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new phase of negotiation. Rejection would be accepted
as a statement that there was nothing further to say
until the non-Christian partner to the dialogue changed
his mind. Acceptance or rejection could equally be
taken as vindication of the authenticity of the view
put forward. It was accepted because it was correct:
it was rejected because it represented the truth which
the other party could not bring themselves to accept.
This position or outlook is incompatible with dialogue
as I have been outlining it because it does not see any
need to overcome the distance between participants
where disagreement is sustained. Although this view
has a very respectable pedigree in the history of the
Church, it is not a model which may be constructively
applied in a pluralist culture.
The second model, the Christ of culture, is also based
on polarities, except that where the last view focused
on opposition this one focuses on the recognition of a
fundamental agreement between Christ and culture. The
figure of Christ is seen as the apogee of human
cultural history and the best in each culture is
identified with his life and teachings. Where the
previous model sought to exclude any sense of sin from
the Christian view and community, this model is rather
too weak in its appraisal of the role of sin in the
world. This view is not sufficiently critical and does
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not provide a way of understanding conflicts that arise
in dialogue as in other circumstances. There are
issues that are likely to be divisive and these need to
be confronted honestly. The model of dialogue I have
set out provides a way of approaching this issue which
is more sophisticated than seeing our own position
reflected in that of our participants. At its worst
this model of relating can appear to be putting a
Christian gloss over all things. It is a view which
does not take sufficiently seriously the potential
differences between Christian and non-Christian and
which in minimising these differences does not do
justice to the understandings and integrity of the
other participants in dialogue.
The remaining three models each attempt in different
ways to mediate between the two polarities of Christ
and culture. The first is that of Christ above
culture. In this view Christ 'is the fulfilment of
cultural aspirations and the restorer of the
24
institutions of true society.' He is portrayed as
being continuous with but ultimately transcending
culture. Were this model to be translated into a
pattern of participation in dialogue it would be
represented by an approach which tried to show the
Christian way as a superior development of the best
24Ibid., p. 42.
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points and solutions that could be arrived at. Those
advocating it or employing it could follow many of the
preliminary points of dialogue, such as mutual
respect, clarification and learning; they could
acknowledge the importance of the context of the
discussion. Where I suspect they might have difficulty
is in being open-minded in relation to the value of the
Christian contribution and in being prepared to accept
the relative nature of conclusions. This may not
matter if they are aware of their perspective and are
prepared to participate honestly around the table
acknowledging that they hold a particular view which
may be challenged by other participants.
Christ and culture in paradox is the fourth model and
the second of the attempts to mediate. This idea has a
hint of dualism about it in the sense that it sees the
individual as having to carve out a life between two
competing forces. Here there is tension between two
moralities which are ultimately incompatible. The
Christian view will be vindicated in the next world and
yet the secular morality holds sway now because all our
structures here have divine authority and are capable
of mediating God's revelation. In dialogue this view
might lead to a level of participation that took all
aspects of the process seriously but whose advocates
would never be able to commit themselves fully to any
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conclusions which did not accord with their
understanding of the higher morality.
The final position, Christ the transformer of culture,
is essentially conversionist. As with the first and
fourth positions this one takes seriously the reality
of our fallen nature and sees everything in need of
redemption through Christ's influence in the
individual, our social institutions and the world.
However, these institutions are to be engaged with, not
rejected as in the first model along with the general
development of culture, both of which are objects of
concern for the Christian who seeks to influence them
through involvement at personal and social levels.
This point of view has obvious difficulties for
participation in dialogue. Holding it would not,
however, preclude an individual from entering the
process if one was both prepared to declare one's view
openly and at the same time regard it as subject to the
same conditions and constraints as others under
discussion. Of the five models of ethical relationship
identified by Niebuhr, this last comes closest to
describing the purpose behind the proposed round table
dialogue, which is to participate in the process of
common ethical reflection from a Christian perspective
yet acknowledging and respecting the positions of the
other participants. What Niebuhr does not do directly,
139
although it might be seen to be part of his argument by
implication, is pay more than passing attention to the
historical context of the different models of the
relationship between Christ and culture as he
identifies them. In each section he does identify
individuals or movements who are representative of the
model he is discussing and in that way the models are
located historically. However, if more had been made
of the particular historical context within which each
model developed, this would have contributed an
interesting and useful dimension to the discussion
here. This might have shown not only the dominant
ideas about society and how Christians could relate to
it but also the ways in which the Church had
communicated or propagated its ethical teaching in each
phase. This latter material would be directly relevant
to our task here. I have tried to show something of
this by commenting on each position as if it were an
approach adopted in dialogue but it is not possible to
explore the parallel further here.
One such idea that is very much in keeping with
Niebuhr's fifth model of the transformation or
conversion of culture although not mentioned by him, is
that of 'middle axioms'. This idea also provides a
means of addressing if not overcoming the difficulty of
how to relate to the demands of the tradition and those
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of whatever contemporary situation is being considered.
The idea of middle axioms provides a good example of a
way of commending Christian ethical principles in a
secular context. Middle axioms is the term used to
denote the idea that Christian ethics can best function
by suggesting general guidelines clearly derived from
Biblical principles which will in turn assist those
directly involved in resolving a presenting ethical
dilemma when used along with their own specialist
knowledge. The term itself has been variously
2 S
attacked, but the following explanation overcomes any
confusion which may be caused by the name itself:
It is...the duty of the Church in our day and
place to guide the individual, within... limits of
its competence.., what to do with his vote and in
what directions to exercise his influence. The
requisite principles for the implementing of this
duty are fully available to us in the New
Testament. No new principles are necessary or are
permissible, but only the application of the
dominical and apostolic teaching to a situation
different from that in which our Lord and His
first disciples were ever called upon to
stand....It is clear, however, that the carrying
out of such a task will involve the formulation,
in each case, of certain secondary and more
specialised principles to the particular field of
action in which guidance is needed. 'Middle
axioms' they have been called....They are not such
as to be appropriate to every time and place and
situation, but they are offered as legitimate and
necessary applications of the Christian rule of
2 6
See Ronald Preston, 'Middle Axioms' m New
Dictionary of Christian Ethics, edited by John
Macquarrie & James Childress (1986), p. 382. This
article provides some useful background to the idea
as well as a bibliography.
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faith and life to the special circumstances in
which we now stand.
The idea of middle axioms has been criticised not only
for its name, but more substantially on precisely that
ground in which it also makes its worthwhile
contribution in spite of the criticism. In attempting
to mediate between the biblical principles and the
specific aspects of whatever case is under
consideration, inevitably any such axioms derived will
be temporary and relate to the specific issue in
question. Although they may have the virtue of being
neither too vague for action nor inflexible when other
related instances occur, they will of necessity have
the fault of applying in only a limited sense. There
may be another weakness in them as well if Robin Gill
is right in identifying them as a form of natural law
2 7
theory. In that the idea requires a degree of
discernment on the part of the individual when seeking
to apply the axioms, we must assume that we are thought
capable of detecting a sense of how things ought to be
in the world from the perceived natural order of
things.
Nevertheless, middle axioms show both that Christian
2^From: God's Will for Church and Nation, Church of
Scotland Report 1946, pp. 44-45; found in Robin
Gill, A Textbook of Christian Ethics (1985), p. 62.
27Ibid., p. 62.
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ethics has already developed a model of reflection
which requires it to give full consideration to the
specific requirements of particular moral problems and
that these must be engaged with through axioms derived
from Biblical general principles. The theory of middle
axioms acknowledges from a Christian point of view
that, for practical reasons, there may need to be an
acceptable distance between the suggestions we put
forward for application in the ethical sphere and the
beliefs we hold. The extent to which this is tenable
within the parameters of dialogue as I am trying to
describe it will form part of the discussion in the
next section.
iii Newbigin and the fixed points of faith in dialogue
Niebuhr's analysis does not make detailed reference to
the use of scripture by representatives of his five
models. If this issue were pursued, it is likely that
those who exemplify the model of Christ against culture
would have an understanding of scripture close to that
held by many fundamentalist groups today. They would
be inclined to think in terms of definite fixed points
in the Christian revelation which would be taken
account of in presenting a Christian point of view in
ethical discussion. It is also likely that Niebuhr's
other models, with the possible exception of the Christ
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of culture where all that is best in the culture is
seen as being of Christ or at least entirely compatible
with him, could be similar in the sense that those who
advocate the different ways of relating to culture may
do so from various specifically selected readings of
2 8
scripture. As a faith tradition with a public
commitment to ethical reflection Christianity has to
find a way of engaging in dialogue that is honest to
its faith claims and at the same time respects the
common commitments to dialogue. The Gadamer-Habermas
debate indicated a possible way forward in this area.
We may do this by acknowledging the relative nature of
all truth claims and at the same time affirming the
importance of the task of critical self-reflection as a
means of providing us with the freedom to escape the
limits of our subjectivity. Tracy began the task of
translating these ideas into theological experience but
they still need to be connected with ethical
perspectives. Lesslie Newbigin has reflected along
similar lines in relation to scripture and that takes
us closer to the application of this material to
Christian ethical reflection.
2 8
For a discussion of biblical interpretation in
relation to Christian ethics in a post-modern
context, see J. I. H. McDonald, Biblical
Interpretation and Christian Ethics (1993),
especially chapter 8.
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In Truth to Tell, Newbigin attempts to rescue the
gospel from two captivities which may ensnare it in the
present intellectual climate. Both concern us here,
although one is of more immediate interest. The gospel
is often presented or commonly understood as something
which must be taken in one of two ways. It should
either be accepted as it is found, in which case
difficulties arise in trying to apply its teaching to
some present issues, or individuals are unable to take
it seriously without some critical reading. On the
other hand there is the view that the whole text is
understood subjectively and consequently it is very
difficult for any message derived from it to be
delivered with any force or conviction. In addressing
this two-fold limitation of the gospel, Newbigin
identifies approaches to the message of the gospel and
issues concerning its proclamation which bear on our
concern in trying to develop an approach to ethics
based on round table dialogue.
Drawing on the argument of the scientist Michael
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9 9
Polanyi , Newbigin is concerned to apply Polanyi's
reflections on the false objectivity of science to the
issues and concerns of theology. Newbigin wants to
find a way of communicating truth which is of common
value and important, but this is a task which needs to
be worked at as a common enterprise if it is to have
more than local or historical significance. Newbigin's
argument shows clear parallels with the review of the
work of Gadamer and Habermas. He shares the concern
that there are no absolute points of knowledge, that we
cannot know objectively, independent of our own
experience and preconceptions. At the same time there
is in the second part of Polanyi's argument as
recounted by Newbigin, the notion that while it is not
possible to know objectively we may still apprehend
facts in a subjective manner but not so as to prevent
us using what we know. The key here is the notion of
personal responsibility. A false objectivity may
9 Q
Polanyi's Personal Knowledge: towards a post-
critical philosophy (1958, second impression with
corrections 1962) challenges the tradition within
the natural sciences that there is objective
knowledge to be had or known. The assumption being
challenged here has usually gone hand in hand with
another, namely the non-scientific disciplines are
based on subjective premises. Here one of Gadamer's
motivating interests is affirmed from an unlikely
perspective, that of a similar investigation into
the truth claims of the natural sciences on lines
not dissimilar to his critique of those of
philosophy, art and history. My concern here is to
follow Newbigin's argument and therefore there is no
discussion of Polanyi independent of Newbigin's
presentation.
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enable us to pretend that the supposed facts have a
life and value independent of those we choose to give
them. Similarly, subjectivism can be a way of avoiding
taking responsibility for what, in spite of the
difficulties of knowing, may be perceived and acted
upon up to a certain point. The implications of
knowing, or in turn of not being able to know, are
obviously considerable."^
Newbigin offers a way out of this dilemma which has
parallels with and complements the solution Ricoeur
offered in his review of the Gadamer-Habermas debate.
Newbigin's solution is worked out in practical terms
and is concerned with the particular issue of
proclaiming the gospel in a society which suffers from
the two-fold captivity which he has identified.
Newbigin challenges the theological habit of asserting
supposedly self-evident truths and requires individuals
to take responsibility for engaging with the
complicated and difficult task of discerning what may
actually be known and proclaimed when such truths are
understood critically in the terms he outlines.
Newbigin clearly states his position:
I am trying to talk about the gospel - good news
30Lesslie Newbigin, Truth to Tell, pp. 50-52.
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about something which happened and which, in that
sense, does not change. The way of telling it, of
understanding it, however, does change. It
changes within the time span of the New
Testament.
Elsewhere Newbigin makes it clear that: 'God's
32
revelation m Jesus Christ is the starting point.'
He then develops his idea that proclamation is a
learning process rather than one in which those with
the facts tell those without them how things are. 'We
are learning as we go. That is the only way we affirm
that the gospel is not just "true for us" but true for
all.' The task of proclamation is not only an
individual task, it is set within the context of the
purpose of the Church and as such is intimately
connected with the tradition of proclamation:
The Church must always understand itself to be on
pilgrimage, in via. It takes the tradition with
which it is entrusted as the guide for the
exploration of new realities, and the exploration
of new realities in turn modifies and emends the
tradition.
Newbigin is clear that the process of critical
reflection developed in disciplines other than theology
Ibid., p. 12.
Ibid., p. 37. This obviously would present
difficulties in dialogue with Jews, among others,
but has the virtue of being a clear point, honestly
admitted and with which other participants may
engage.
Ibid., p. 35.
"^4Ibid. , p . 54 .
148
needs to be applied in the area of Christian thought.
His adaptation of Polanyi's work on the contingent
nature of reality and the consequent relative nature of
conclusions has parallels with similar work by Gadamer
and Habermas. Newbigin's reflections confirm that
acknowledging the value of and seeking to apply these
insights need not pose a threat to the traditional
basis of religious thought as interpreted in the
Christian tradition.
iv dialogue and Christian ethics
Having shown why it is necessary for Christian ethics
to contribute to dialogue and identifying ways in which
this has been attempted, Newbigin's work made direct
connections between the issues identified in the
previous chapters and the problems of dealing with
religious points of view in the process of round table
discussion. Now it is appropriate to explore these
connections.
Of the six criteria identified in the two previous
chapters, it is clear that Christian participants could
assent to several of them right away. It is possible
for them to work with others on the basis of mutual
respect, leading to trust; of a commitment to mutual
clarification, based on a common concern to accept only
149
rational premises within dialogue; to mutual learning,
leading to a sense of reciprocity. Equally there
should be no problem in acknowledging a concern to
take account of the context of all contributions, both
historically and within the dialogue itself. There may
be some concern over the sixth principle, that of the
relative nature of conclusions, stemming from the
contingent nature of reality. Although the bases of
this principle have been explored thoroughly in both
the discussion of the debate between Gadamer and
Habermas and in Newbigin's application to the
proclamation of the gospel of similar ideas from
Polanyi, there may still be some concern over how this
principle might work in practice. The fourth principle
and one where there is certainly concern is that of the
commitment to being open-minded in the sense of not
entering the dialogue with a fixed sense of what would
constitute an acceptable outcome.
It is possible to be a participant in round table
dialogue as a Christian because to have a declared
allegiance to a particular moral tradition is a
qualification for being at the table. Such open
allegiance is at one level simply a statement of where
a participant's moral identity and initial priorities
lie. It is possible for the Christian ethicist to be
committed to the process because it is directly
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concerned to address and facilitate the good of
humankind. A Christian ethicist might feel a
responsibility to be part of the process because of its
declared aims.
At the table, there could be reservations on the part
of the other participants about how the Christian will
approach the task. The others may wonder about the
commitment to the principle of open-mindedness on the
part of those representing religious moral traditions.
The reservations of both parties may centre around
different approaches to the same issues: the ability to
be a free participant in discussion and to identify
wholly with the open ended nature of the discussion.
It is clear from Newbigin's writing that Christianity
may contribute to dialogue where it is understood that
there are no absolutes and see individuals and
communities as having particular responsibilities for
discerning what may and what may not be known. When
transferred to the realm of moral discourse this means
that it is possible for the Christian ethicist to be
fully engaged in dialogue, fully present and without
intending either offence or deception because the
'fixed points' of Christian faith are sufficiently far
back from the table. Put another way, this means that
particular beliefs about God need not overtly influence
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the discussion. Furthermore, the Christian's
particular reasons for being there, a concern for
humankind as God's creation, need not interfere with
the intended openness of the process. Obviously such a
commitment of faith would exercise influence as a
motivator and as such would be subject to rational
criticism as a legitimate element of the dialogue. For
the process of dialogue to work it matters that the
participants accept one another as capable of being
fully committed to the venture. It also matters that
the participants individually feel themselves capable
of working at the process with integrity. Christians
can participate as Christian ethicists, honest about
both their allegiance and their commitment to the
process. The other participants can be convinced that
Christians are capable of participating fully and with
integrity. There may be more to any participant than
that which is declared at the table but in the case of
the Christian ethicist it is not concealed.
There are two further areas of concern. Can dialogue
be reconciled with the responsibility to proclaim the
gospel and is that letting the world set the agenda?
Should there be negotiation or proclamation? This is a
false juxtaposition because the proclamation of the
gospel can take many forms. It is possible to
represent or commend the gospel through participation
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in common ventures for the benefit of all. If this is
accepted, the discussion may then focus on ways of
representing or commending the gospel that best declare
its strengths, and there is no concern about whether or
not the responsibility to proclaim is being avoided.
This concern could arise from an approach based on
Niebuhr's fifth model, the conversionist approach to
culture. So long as the concern to convert was
expressed only through the integrity and fairness with
which the principles of negotiation were applied in the
dialogue, that would not threaten the enterprise. Any
attempt to openly convert would be challenged by other
participants and subject to critical rational
examination.
Secondly, there may be a concern that this model for
common ethical reflection allows the other groups to
set the agenda and determine how Christians ought to be
acting in certain situations. Certainly round table
dialogue is a significant change from the idea that the
Christian community determines what is or is not
acceptable behaviour both for its own members and, as
happened throughout Christendom, for the rest of
society. New skills need to be learned. The
reflection about secular thought and its implications
for Christian ethics that was evident in Reading in
Communion, by Fowl and Jones, can thus be applied,
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focusing the skill and wisdom of the Christian
traditions of moral discourse. Christian ethics is in
a position for its practitioners to choose between
pursuing internal reflection on the life the faithful
ought to live or to develop that reflection in the
wider context of pluralist societies, learning new
skills in order to enrich those discussions which are
already taking place.
In identifying these various concerns I hope to have
prepared the way to see how dialogue might work as a
method of ethical reflection. The next four chapters
will be devoted to two case studies, on euthanasia and
pornography. In considering the issues involved in
these areas of contemporary debate, I hope to show how
Christian ethics may use the model of dialogue as a
method of ethical reflection and how in turn our




Euthanasia: a case study in ethical confusion
With what strift and pains we come into the World
we remember not; but 'tis commonly found no easy
matter to get out of it. Many have studied to
exasperate the ways of Death, but fewer hours have
been spent to soften that necessity.
(Sir Thomas Browne)
It is necessary by way of introduction to the second
half of this thesis and to this first of two chapters
on euthanasia, to explain how I will develop my
argument. The first half of this thesis has offered a
way of understanding round table dialogue as a model
for ethical reflection. The proposal still needs to be
tested against actual areas of ethical disagreement.
Several options were considered in deciding on the
method chosen. A wide ranging discussion of euthanasia
would not lend itself well to the purpose of exploring
dialogue as a model for ethical reflection. Here it is
necessary to have in some form 'voices' of
participants. The second idea was to invite some
informed individuals to come together and to conduct a
discussion of euthanasia. This might have provided
1Christian Morals, 1716, in Religio Medici, Letter
to a Friend etc and Christian Morals, edited by W.A.
Greenhill (1950), p. 199.
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good material to comment on. However there would be
obvious variables and limitations. Another idea was to
identify published opinions in the euthanasia debate
and to bring them metaphorically round a table and
2
develop their points m relation to one another. This
is the approach that has been adopted in the discussion
of pornography below but it was not thought the best
way of proceeding in relation to euthanasia where the
resources for discussion and analysis are so much
better. Both of these options, the recorded discussion
and the discussion developed from published opinions,
are somewhat artificial. However in the discussion of
pornography, where this second method has been used, it
provided the best way of developing the positions and
applying some of the principles of round table
dialogue.
Why choose euthanasia? Medical ethics is no more
exempt from moral conflict than other forms of moral
philosophy. Hauerwas has gone so far as to say:
'Medical ethics'...does not so much solve our
9 .
Two obvious 'voices' might have been provided by the
contrasting approaches represented in Death Without
Dignity: euthanasia in perspective, edited by Nigel
M. de S. Cameron (1990), a publication of Rutherford
House, Edinburgh, which advocates a conservative
evangelical position within the Christian tradition
and the opposite perspective offered in Your
Ultimate Choice: the right to die with dignity,
edited by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society (1992) .
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difficulties as it reflects the moral anarchy of
our times, for it is by no means clear how the
practice of medicine can be sustained in a morally
fragmented society.
There are many areas within medical ethics which
reflect competing opinions. Among them, euthanasia has
particular appeal because it is an issue about which
there are divided opinions even among adherents of the
same moral tradition. The differences of opinion are
not simply between those of secular and religious
points of view. There are interesting variations in
both camps, reflecting different emphases within a
range of moral traditions. Similarly, euthanasia is of
interest because decisions about the end of life in
fact stem from whatever view of life is held. Jack
Dominion makes precisely this point: 'Ultimately, the
philosophical debate will focus on the nature of man.'4
In exploring euthanasia through the idea of the round
table dialogue I have chosen to examine two actual
cases and then to go on to analyse two well defined
contributions to the debate. These two 'voices' are
quite distinct and although both are essentially
secular and in favour of euthanasia they represent
different aspects of the present public concern about
Suffering Presence, pp. 1-2.
4'Euthanasia', in Concise Dictionary of Christian
Ethics, edited by Bernhard Stoeckle (1979), pp. 89-
90 (p. 90).
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euthanasia. Ludovic Kennedy has written and broadcast
on the topic at the popular and proselytising level.
Ronald Dworkin's approach is that of the analytical
academic, although in the text considered here he is
deliberately seeking to offer a solution to the linked
legal and philosophical difficulties that surround both
euthanasia and abortion. I have chosen this way of
approaching euthanasia because within a brief space it
gives us access to four substantial expressions of the
difficulties, bearing in mind Hauerwas's caution: 'that
there is no ethically neutral way to describe a moral
5
problem.'
In considering euthanasia I want to use the model of
round table dialogue to identify what is happening in
each proposal, how the arguments are being constructed
and what influences are at play behind the positions
adopted. If we think of the ethical consideration of
euthanasia as a conversation or dialogue, then in
listening to it we may detect important themes or
experiences operating implicitly within the
transactions. We can try to step back a bit and
examine these. There may be sub-themes operating too:
ideas which were developed in one context and which are
now being applied in another with slightly different
meanings or values placed on them. Here we need to be
5
Suffering Presence, p. 114.
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prepared to look afresh at the old ideas, looking at
the truths behind them and re-applying them within the
present debate, but with their meanings more clearly
defined. As part of this commitment to analysis, the
second chapter on euthanasia will look in detail at one
major theme, an ethical theory which has been
identified through the discussions in this chapter as
exercising a strong if not always acknowledged
influence in the dialogue.
i euthanasia: an introduction
Round table dialogue is not a substitute for
information and thus, with a view to understanding some
of the origins of the present confusion and possible
ways beyond it, it is worth trying to set out as simply
as possible what may be involved in euthanasia.
Consideration of euthanasia as a modern ethical issue
must take account of the historical context which still
influences the debate. Euthanasia has come to the fore
particularly this century as an ethical issue as
medical technology has found the means of preserving
life beyond the limits previously possible. Combined
with a deep, traditional commitment from medical
practitioners to save or sustain life, people are now
kept alive longer and in conditions that they might not
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have chosen for themselves. The euthanasia debate is
the consideration of the arguments around this dilemma.
'Euthanasia' comes from the Greek for 'a good death'
and is now taken to have a much more specific meaning,
still within the idea of dying well. It now applies to
the notion of hastening death where the patient
remaining alive would be subjected to unnecessary and
undignified suffering and where the quality of life is
so impaired as to bring into question the value of
staying alive. Historically, euthanasia has been
prohibited by the strong condemnations of suicide or
murder. Hume's essay On Suicide has passages in which
the situation being discussed is close to that of
voluntary euthanasia as we commonly understand it
today: 'a man...tired of life, and hunted by pain and
misery, bravely overcomes all the natural terrors of
death, and makes his escape from this cruel scene.'^
Doctors only became involved with the dying from late
Elizabethan times onwards, when they were increasingly
required to attend death beds with the purpose of
relieving the suffering of those about to die. Until
that development, from classical times and throughout
the middle ages, doctors avoided terminal cases because
^David Hume, Essays Moral Political and Literary,
1741-42 (1903), p. 589.
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they were beyond cure and consequently the preserve of
7
religious figures. Medical involvement with the dying
took another step forward in the late nineteenth
century with advances in both pathology and
bacteriology. Specifically, a number of terminal
complaints were discovered to have a common pattern and
became known as cancer, an uncurable ailment whose
sufferers required relief as they died.
Simultaneously, there was both a move away from popular
belief in God as the deciding influence in both birth
and death (natural causes being seen as little more
than what they were) and a philanthropic concern to
O
eliminate or reduce suffering wherever possible.
Gerald Gruman has outlined some important changes in
medical philosophies over the same period, which bear
g
on the development of euthanasia. The most
immediately relevant of these theories is the oddly
7 ....
Thomas More presented a vision of an ideal society
which had a system of euthanasia whereby people with
painful and hopeless diseases might be helped to
die. More was well in advance of his time in trying
to give formal expression to the idea of euthanasia
as easing a painful end to life by quickening death.
Utopia, 1516, translated with an introduction by
Paul Turner (1965), p. 102.
O
Hugh Trowell, The Unfinished Debate on Euthanasia
(1973), pp. 12-13.
Q
'Death & Dying: Euthanasia and Sustaining Life, I -
Historical Perspectives', Encyclopedia of Bioethics,
pp. 261-268 (pp. 263-6) .
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named 'obligatory-gift relationship' which developed
in the early twentieth century. According to this
idea, each individual is held to be morally accountable
for ensuring that his lifetime is put to socially
productive and profitable use. In one sense, it might
be understood as a secular version of the notion of
stewardship consequent upon the Christian doctrine of
creation, whereby we are held answerable to God for the
use or abuse we make of creation and our individual
part in it. The outcome is different. The 'obligatory-
gift relationship' connects with euthanasia where the
individual is deemed no longer to be able to contribute
because of terminal illness or disability, for example,
and thus may be freed from the constraint to be cured
and so may die.
Those who have advocated euthanasia have always to
distinguish it from both suicide and murder. Before
going any further, it is important to try to set out
clearly precisely what is meant by euthanasia in the
present debate.
Robin Gill has identified six basic positions which may
be described as euthanasia and which offer a good way
into the complexities of the act and the ethical
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perspectives.10 Gill's six situations are constructed
around the two variables of the doctor's intention and
what the patient may be known to want. In these
situations, the death of the patient may be occasioned
by:
(a) direct treatment by doctor of willing patient
(b) direct treatment by doctor of non-willing
patient
(c) indirect effects of treatment by doctor of
willing patient
(d) indirect effects of treatment by doctor of
non-willing patient
(e) non-treatment by doctor of willing patient
(f) non-treatment by doctor of non-willing
patient
An important distinction is to be made between the un¬
willing and the non-willing patient. Murder might well
be the consequence of whatever course of action was
pursued if the patient may accurately be described as
or is known to be un-willing. A non-willing patient is
taken to be one who, for whatever reason, is not
capable of making a decision. Given this distinction,
then there are three main categories determined by the
doctor's actions. In the first, (a) and (b), the
patient dies directly as a result of the doctor's
action. In the second, (c) and (d), the patient dies
1°A Textbook of Christian Ethics, pp. 420-1.
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possibly as a result of the doctor's action, but death
was not the primary intention of the doctor. He may
have administered a particular course of treatment for
a specific ailment and yet would have known that in
doing so, that is in treating a presenting problem or
symptom, the patient would die as a result. Here the
principle of double effect is evident. The third
category, (e) and (f), involves the doctor withholding
treatment that would prolong a life deemed by the
doctor and/or the patient to be no longer worth living.
The withdrawal, or withholding of such treatment
results in the early death of the patient.
Gill's six situations give practical illustration to
three of the four main ethical areas of discussion
connected with euthanasia and identified by Sissela
11 • •
Bok. The first of these is obviously the tension
between involuntary and voluntary euthanasia: whether
or not the patient can indicate his will in the matter
of choosing death and to what extent free will might
genuinely be operative in this situation. The second
area is that of direct and indirect treatment by the
doctor. This area is sometimes confused in discussion
with the third, that of omission over against that of
11'Death and Dying: Euthanasia and Sustaining Life, II
Ethical Views', Encyclopedia of Bioethics, pp. 268-
277.
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commission, when discussion focuses on euthanasia as
either 'active' or 'passive'. Passive euthanasia is
deemed to be the result of indirect treatment or the
omission of treatment. Active euthanasia is the result
of direct acts of commission.
The fourth area identified by Bok is that of 'ordinary'
versus 'extra-ordinary' means of care or treatment.
Gill does not refer directly to this area and seems to
address his attention to implicitly ordinary patterns
of treatment. It may be that Gill intends the issue of
extra-ordinary treatment to be considered under his
last two categories, those referring to non-treatment,
on the grounds that the debate about the use of extra¬
ordinary means usually focuses on the withdrawal of of
such means.
This description of the aspects of euthanasia, along
with the brief historical outline, clarifies some of
the strands of thinking and the influences that are
operating within the four cases studies in ethical
confusion set out below.
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ii the case of Dr Nigel Cox
Lillian Boyes was a seventy year old widow who suffered
from an unusually severe case of rheumatoid arthritis.
Her medical condition close to her death was described
by a specialist:
By the end, Mrs Boyes weighed less than five
stone, her arms the thickness of two fingers.
Tissue deterioration meant she screamed when
touched: 'Like a dog,' said one nurse. She had
septicaemia and her stomach was bleeding. She had
liver problems, leading to bleeding around her
body.
Mrs Boyes had gangrene problems, her heart was
calcified, and her lungs were malfunctioning. She
had several crushed fractures of the lumbar spine.
Professor Blake said a sacral sore penetrated to
the underlying bone, and into her rectum so faeces
were being passed along it.
Dr Cox had treated Mrs Boyes for thirteen years and had
promised her that he would save her from severe pain at
the end. He had been administering heroin as a pain
killer. Eventually it lost its effect and he resolved
to keep his promise by injecting his patient with twice
1 9
For the background to this case see: The Guardian,
21 September and 18 November 1992 and Ronald
Dworkin, Life's Dominion (1993), pp. 184-188. It is
from these sources that the following account and
quotations are drawn. Specific medical comment can
be found in: Richard Smith, 'Euthanasia: time for a
royal commission', British Medical Journal
[hereafter: BMJ], 305 (26 September 1992), pp. 728-
9; Clare Dyer, 'Rheumatologist convicted of
attempted murder', BMJ, 305 (26 September 1992) p.
731; 'GMC tempers justice with mercy in Cox case',
BMJ, 305 (28 November 1992), p. 1311.
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the lethal dose of undiluted potassium chloride. Mrs
Boyes died within five minutes of that injection on 16
August 1991. Dr Cox entered the injection in her
medical notes. A nurse, 'a devout Catholic from
Ireland', wondered what to do about what she had read
in the notes for five days before informing the medical
authorities. Then the legal process began. Dr Cox was
eventually found guilty of attempted murder and the
judge sentenced him to a year in jail, but suspended
the sentence. The General Medical Council who reviewed
Dr Cox's case a couple of months after the trial
verdict did not strike him from the medical register,
although they did affirm that euthanasia was wrong:
'The deliberate taking of human life is against the law
and we do not believe that law should be changed.'
Wessex Regional Health Authority, the doctor's
employer, then considered the case and agreed that he
could return to his work on condition that he accepted
supervision by a senior medical colleague.
At no point in the proceedings was there any suggestion
that Dr Cox had acted other than from altruistic
motives. The concern was solely with whether or not
the law had been broken. Throughout the case it was
clear that Dr Cox had enjoyed a close professional
relationship with his patient, Mrs Boyes. Her sons
openly supported Dr Cox's action on their mother's
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behalf. Dr Cox is one of only a very few medical
practitioners who have been tried for helping patients
to die and is the only one in this country to have been
found guilty.13 However, as soon as Dr Cox was found
guilty the ambiguity in the attitudes of those required
to condemn him emerged. Found guilty of attempted
murder (the corpse had been cremated so there was not
evidence sufficient to prove murder), he was given a
suspended sentence. The General Medical Council
condemned his action: 'It is wholly outside [the
doctor's] duty to shorten life in order to relieve
suffering.' However they stopped short of barring Dr
Cox from continuing to practise medicine. The
employing health authority required Dr Cox to accept
supervision of his work, but otherwise reinstated him
from his months of suspension, during which he had been
on full pay.
In each response there was a double message. What was
done was not acceptable, but the punishments were so
13 ...
Although unusual in hrs trial, Dr Cox is not alone
in his action. A recent survey among NHS doctors
revealed that more than half of those who responded
to the questionnaire had been asked to hasten a
death and nearly one third of these had complied
with the request. Nearly half the number of
respondents would consider taking steps to effect
the death of a patient if such action was not
illegal. See: B. J. Ward & P. A. Tate, 'Attitudes
among NHS doctors to requests for euthanasia', BMJ,
308 (21 May 1994), pp. 1332-1334.
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light in relation to the crime of which he was found
guilty as to raise a question over the issue of how the
offence was regarded. At this point, a way forward is
to turn to the metaphor of the round table dialogue.
In moving to the round table dialogue here I am not
suggesting that it is the only possible way of
disentangling the confusion in the responses to Dr
Cox's actions. I want to see if the model of dialogue
can help in the task of analysing what is being said
through the response to this case. The ambiguity in
the condemnation of his action noticed above was
accompanied at each stage of the three-fold censure
with effective, if restricted, permission to go on
practising medicine. Whatever messages might be
communicated by the treatment of Dr Cox, one of the
strongest signals given is the confused attitude to
what he did.
The local health authority was required to act against
him once a nurse reported that a lethal dose of a drug
(potassium chloride, which could have no effect other
than to kill the patient) had been administered. The
situation might have been very different had the drug
been one which had pain killing properties. Then,
although the outcome for the patient might have been
the same, the intention of the physician could be
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understood to be the relief of pain and no prosecution
would have followed. Death would be an unintended if
foreseen consequence of the administration of the drug.
As it was the action of Dr Cox was understood legally
in only one light: attempted murder. Potassium
chloride could do nothing other than kill Mrs Boyes and
that accounts for the formal condemnations. If,
however, it is attempted murder that is the issue, why
are the responses so ambivalent? At least part of the
reason stems from the fact that, although the only
possible legal interpretation of events was attempted
murder of a patient by her physician, it was commonly
accepted that Dr Cox was acting out of compassion for
Mrs Boyes in her suffering and honouring a commitment
to relieve her suffering as she died. The ambivalence
stems from the fact that the legally necessary
interpretation is not the accurate one because it does
not accord with the wider facts in the case, in
particular it does not accord with the compassion felt
by Dr Cox for his patient of many years.
A further, more speculative analysis of this case,
suggests another reading of the ambivalent condemnation
of Dr Cox. Had he used a drug that had a known
palliative effect the case would not have arisen. Is
it too far fetched to suggest that there is an element
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in his prosecution which condemns him for not having
used a drug which would have enabled him to achieve the
same end but without drawing attention to the practice?
In this first attempt at understanding ethical
confusion in the light of a model of dialogue, there
has been little conversation to analyse. Rather the
focus of attention has been on the messages conveyed
and the possible reasons for them, given the known
facts of the case as reported. The importance of
influences at the table which are not declared is an
significant aspect of this model of ethical reflection.
In this case I want to point to the role of the
Principle of Double Effect which influenced those who
considered this case. There is not space to explore
this issue further here but the following chapter will
be devoted to a full consideration of the Principle of
Double Effect which still exercises enormous influence
especially in medical responses to euthanasia.
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iii the case of Tony Bland14
The second case has its origins in the chaos of the
Hillsborough soccer stadium in Sheffield in 1989, when
a large number of the crowd were crushed against one of
the perimeter fences. Tony Bland was unconscious from
the day of the disaster, when his lungs were crushed,
until his eventual death after a lengthy legal process
some four years later. As a result of the constriction
of his lungs Tony Bland's brain was denied oxygen and
he went into what is known as a 'persistent vegetative
1 ^
state' (PVS) . Dr James Howe, who cared for Tony
Bland, had been warned by the coroner who supervised
the inquests after the Hillsborough disaster that if he
withdrew treatment he might be liable to a charge of
murder. Therefore, having cared for the patient long
1 4
This account is drawn from The Guardian, 20 November
1992 and 5 February 1993. Further specific medical
comment may be found in: Clare Dyer, 'High Court to
rule on right to die case', BMJ, 305 (26 September
1992), p. 732; 'BMA examines the PVS', BMJ, 305 (10
October 1992), pp. 853-4; 'High Court rules doctors
can stop feeding Tony Bland', BMJ, 305 (28 November
1992), p. 1312; Bryan Jennett, 'Letting vegetative
patients die: ethical and lawful and brings Britain
into line', BMJ, 305 (28 November 1992), pp. 1305-6.
The Hastings Centre Report, February/March 1988,
includes several articles on the medical and ethical
aspects of the problems associated with PVS: Ronald
E. Crawford, 'The PVS: the medical reality (getting
the facts straight)', pp. 27-32; Baruch A. Brody,
'Ethical Questions raised by the PVS Patient', pp.
33-37; Daniel Wikler, 'Not Dead, Not Dying? ethical
categories and the PVS', pp. 41-47.
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enough to establish that the diagnosis of PVS was
correct and with the support of the patient's parents,
the case came before the courts. In the words of the
High Court judge who heard the application by Airedale
NHS Trust to stop the nutrition-hydration treatment of
Tony Bland, his condition was clear:
He has no feeling, no awareness, nor can he
experience anything relating to his surroundings.
To his parents and family he is 'dead'. His
spirit has left him and all that remains is the
shell of his body.
On the basis of this state of things the judge, Sir
Stephen Brown, went on to support the decision of Dr
James Howe to discontinue feeding in the following
terms:
I am satisfied that there is no reasonable
possibility of Anthony Bland ever emerging from
his existing persistent vegetative state to a
cognitive sapient state. I am satisfied that
there is no therapeutic, medical or other benefit
to Anthony Bland in continuing to maintain his
ventilation, nutrition and hydration by artificial
means.
Sir Stephen's ruling gave doctors the permission they
wanted to withdraw the nutrition-hydration treatment
and to wait for death. However no action was taken at
the end of this trial because the Official Solicitor
representing Tony Bland's interests, David Venables,
was given leave to appeal against the decision. His
opposition to the removal of treatment at each stage of
the legal process was to ensure that all the arguments
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were brought before a court. The case then went
before the Court of Appeal, who found in favour of the
original judgement to allow death by withdrawal of the
treatment. The case then went on to the House of
Lords, in February 1993 , where five Law Lords ruled
that it would be lawful for the doctors treating Tony
Bland to remove the nutrition-hydration treatment and
thus to allow him to die. Although the final legal
decision was unanimous it was accompanied by a clear
request that Parliament should draw up a new set of
legislation to take account of the relevant
developments in medical technology and understanding
that would allow such cases in future to be treated
independently of the criminal law and that some
guidelines be provided for future cases.1^
In response to this request, an all party select
committee on medical ethics of the House of Lords
reported in February 1994. The fourteen members,
chaired by Lord Walton, a former member of the General
Medical Council, and including the Archbishop of York
and Baroness Warnock, unanimously rejected calls which
sought the legalisation of euthanasia. The grounds
given were simply that to legalise euthanasia would
expose the elderly and chronic sick to pressure from
House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee on
Medical Ethics (1994), volume 1, p. 8.
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physicians working within very limited health care
resources or relatives constrained by different
pressures which in turn might influence individuals to
request an assisted death. Responding in particular to
the Bland case, the committee indicated that they
thought it should never have come before the
17 ....
courts. The small amount of anti-biotics included m
the nutrition-hydration treatment could have been
withdrawn and death would have followed in a few days.
The committee called on the health care professions to
furnish guidelines that both identified clearly the
condition referred to as PVS and provide for the
18
appropriate treatment for such patients.
As in the case of Dr Cox, Tony Bland's case raises
important issues when considering euthanasia. The
first and most obvious concern is that Tony Bland was
not in any position to make his views known, nor had he
left any indication of what he would have wanted for
himself had he fallen into such a predicament. It was
left up to his parents and Dr Howe to consider what was
in his best interests given his condition. A second
issue is that of the extent to which nutrition-
17
House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee oil
Medical Ethics, volume 1, p. 52.
1 8
Ibid., p. 53. In doing this the committee
effectively returned to the medical profession
precisely the issue they had been asked to consider.
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hydration treatment can be considered 'treatment' in
the normal sense of that term. If it is only food and
water that are being supplied, albeit in the unusual
way of through nasogastric tubes, then to what extent
can that be thought of as something that can be
dispensed with as 'treatment'? Certainly if as is
usual antibiotics are being administered at the same
time to protect against infection, then that may be
described as treatment.
The third issue arising from the lengthy legal and
political consideration of Tony Bland's case and its
effect is similar to that detected in the case of Dr
Cox: an ambivalence among those called upon to consider
the issues. In both cases the ambivalence is connected
with each of two different principles that lie behind
the cases and are part of the ethical consideration of
euthanasia. In Dr Cox's case the issue behind the
public discussions is that of the Principle of Double
Effect, and in the case of Tony Bland the principle at
issue is that of the distinction between ordinary and
extra-ordinary means of treatment. These points will
be discussed in different ways below.
In considering the case of Tony Bland it is easy to see
how it might be represented in terms of a round table
discussion. In contrast to the case of Dr Cox, there
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are several identifiable participants with distinct
motives and possible as well as declared interests in
the outcome. Identifying them here is part of the
process of seeing who is at the table. Bland himself
could not participate because of his condition. He
would be represented by various parties: his parents;
his physician, Dr Jim Howe; Airedale NHS Trust; and by
the Official Solicitor. We know that the Airedale NHS
Trust brought the action to clarify the situation for
Dr Howe, who had been warned that if he removed the
feeding tubes he might be liable for criminal charges.
Dr Howe had the support of the patients's parents.
Each of these parties might however have other
considerations operating as part of their motives in
caring for Bland and in advocating, or opposing, the
withdrawal of the nasogastric feeding tube. The
parents may be worn down by the care they have
continued to give their son in his PVS state and no
longer wish to have the burden of thinking him alive
when he is to all intents and purposes dead. They may
be motivated by their concern for themselves, rather
than making the best decision for their son. The
physician may be concerned for the health of the
parents and the extent to which he thinks they can
reasonably be expected to care for their son. He may
too be concerned about the expenditure of limited
health care resources on a patient with no obvious
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chance of recovery. In this he may find himself
supported by the Airedale NHS Trust who could be
concerned to limit expenditure where possible. The
Official Solicitor is appointed to represent Bland in
the legal proceedings that follow from the Trust's
decision to support the family and the physician in
their application for permission to remove the naso¬
gastric tube, thereby allowing death to take place. It
is his concern to argue for the patient who is
incapable of making his opinion of the proceedings
known. The Official solicitor should be motivated by
the best interests of the patient. However, he might
also be motivated by a concern to see that this
particular case does not turn into a test case which as
a result of a judgement in favour of withdrawing the
tubes, entitles other groups of appropriately
interested parties to successfully petition for the
withdrawal of life support systems.
It should be stressed that although the participants in
the scenario so far described are drawn from the actual
case as reported, the motives attributed to them in
this and following discussions of the case are
hypothetical. They are however developed from
observing and reflecting on similar cases and
arguments. That said, we may now go a stage further
and identify ideas and ethical stances behind the
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positions already outlined.
The Official Solicitor, in challenging the action to
remove the feeding tubes, sought to affirm the
patient's right to life and to treatment to stay alive
in the absence of any instructions from the patient to
the contrary. That argument follows from the point of
view that life is valuable and should be sustained
whenever possible by reasonable means. The Trust,
supporting the physician and the patient's parents,
wanted to remove the feeding tubes and allow death to
follow. The major ethical principle at the centre of
this case is that of whether or not the feeding tubes
and other basic nursing care necessary to sustain Tony
Bland might be described as 'extra-ordinary' treatment.
With the development of medical technology in the
second half of this century it became clear that people
could be kept alive by machinery when they would have
no hope of recovery or improvement and would otherwise
be dead.
This led to the development of the idea that in certain
circumstances physicians, while always obliged to use
ordinary means of treatment to sustain life, were not
obliged to use what were described as 'extra-ordinary'
means. Thus, the case of Tony Bland similarly has
behind it a moral principle, like that of the
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Principle of Double Effect,
is central to untangling
case.19
the understanding of which
the difficulties of the
It is possible to consider both the Cox and Bland cases
directly, in terms of the six principles of dialogue.
In both cases there can be detected a lack of trust.
In Dr Cox's case the hospital authorities could not
assume that he had acted out of care for his patient.
The law required him to be charged with attempted
murder. The law is also a fixed point in the Bland
case when Dr Howe is warned by the coroner that he
may open himself to criminal charges if he withdraws
the nutrition-hydration treatment. In both cases there
is a lack of trust by the legal system of the
motivation of the two physicians and in both cases this
contributed to the way in which each situation
developed.
The positions from which people are operating in both
cases are quite clear and based on obviously examinable
rational premises. Difficulties emerged when the legal
perspective was invoked. This happened in the Cox case
when the nurse informed the hospital administrators of
1 9
For a brief description of this principle and an
introductory bibliography, see: Warren T. Reich's
article, 'Prolongation of Life', A New Dictionary of
Christian Ethics, pp. 351-352.
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the drug which had been administered. The coroner's
warning to Dr Howe is the equivalent point in the Bland
case. This made it very difficult for either case to
develop along lines which bear ready comparison with an
open dialogue. Thus, although there were clear and
rational positions they were not capable of development
through dialogue because of the constraints imposed by
the fixed legal perspective.
The ambivalent responses to Dr Cox's action could be
taken as an indication that there may have been a
limited degree of mutual learning. That the verdicts
were guilty, but the penalties nominal, could be taken
as a recognition that a different understanding of his
action emerged through his trial than that held when he
was charged. The same system which charged him with
and found him guilty of attempted murder is in this
case capable of expressing an opinion in contradiction
of the charge through the relatively lenient penalty
imposed. In the Bland case there appears to be no
mutual learning. This is most obviously indicated by
the fact that the House of Lords' Report did not
provide the guidelines requested and indicated that the
professions involved should develop a code of practice
to deal with such situations. That same committee had
been established to review the need for and possibly
provide precisely those guidelines.
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The fifth principle of dialogue is that of attending to
the context. In euthanasia this is always two-fold:
the case under consideration and then the wider sphere
within which any decision taken in the individual case
must be reviewed. The details of the immediate context
of each decision have been set out clearly above and
were open for public scrutiny in each case. The wider
issue of the context is the same in almost every case
of euthanasia. It is the concern that if a certain
action is condoned in this situation, what are the
wider social implications? If a physician is able to
administer poison to a patient, albeit for
understandable reasons, without any condemnation, what
are the wider consequences? If a physician is able to
withdraw treatment or simply cease caring for a
patient, albeit on compassionate grounds, what might
this do for the general public's confidence in the
medical profession?
A concern to acknowledge the relative nature of
conclusions is the sixth principle of dialogue and that
connects directly with the moral prohibition on
killing, which is always present in debates about
euthanasia. Two distinct moral principles have been
applied to cases of euthanasia which permit, in
specific circumstances, actions which might otherwise
be considered as contradicting the prohibition on
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killing. These are the Principle of Double Effect and
that of ordinary versus extra-ordinary means of
treatment, both mentioned above in relation to each
case. In the Bland case the principle of extra¬
ordinary means would apply directly. In the Cox case I
suggested that the notion of the Principle of Double
Effect lay behind the public consideration of the case.
Dr Cox had offended not so much by what he did but the
manner in which he did it: he administered a drug which
could do nothing other than kill Mrs Boyes. Both of
these principles demonstrate that even in the face of a
moral absolute such as the prohibition on killing there
are ways in which that absolute is made relative by the
particular context. This is true even in cases such as
these two where that relativity is not acknowledged by
the legal system.
These two cases have been practical examples of the
ethical complexity of euthanasia. The two very
different examples which follow further illustrate
some of the difficulties in both debating euthanasia
and in seeking a rational solution to the debate.
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iv Ludovic Kennedy's Consider the End
The broadcaster and writer Ludovic Kennedy is well
2 0
known as an advocate of voluntary euthanasia. On 2
September 1993, Channel Four broadcast a programme in
their Witness series in which he presented his views on
voluntary euthanasia. The programme was a personal
plea to understand euthanasia as an attractive and
reasonable option. It was perfectly clear throughout
that it reflected Kennedy's own position. Points of
view opposed to euthanasia were discussed in
interviews. It is instructive to look briefly at some
of the issues raised and especially at the manner in
which some of the objections to Kennedy's point of view
were presented.
The programme had three main sections. The first
introduced the topic of euthanasia and set the scene by
referring to several cases where euthanasia either was
administered illegally or thought by those involved to
be the most appropriate response to the suffering
encountered but which was not relieved until death.
Kennedy mentions his own mother's suffering before
death and his wish for euthanasia for her, which he did
not feel able to meet then. In the next section
2 0
He has published a plea for euthanasia entitled
Euthanasia: the good death (19 90) .
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Kennedy approached representatives of three
organizations which reject euthanasia: the Roman
Catholic Church, the Hospice movement and the British
Medical Association. Having listened to their
objections and engaged with their representatives up to
a point, Kennedy then looked at the practice in Holland
with a view to showing how what he is arguing for might
21
be achieved. He ended with a personal plea that we
should consider the proposal he and others make as one
worth adopting. Without having mentioned the idea
earlier in the programme, Kennedy finishes by talking
about the need for a change of our attitude towards
death.
How does Kennedy present his argument? That will be
clear already: he is aiming at persuading viewers of
his point of view. This is perfectly legitimate,
especially since the series within which the programme
21
In Holland euthanasia has been practised openly by
physicians for several years. It is not strictly
true to say that euthanasia is legal there but
rather that if physicians follow certain strict
guidelines they will be immune from prosecution. A
review of the Dutch experience to 1991 is given in:
Paul J. van der Maas, et al., 'Euthanasia and other
medical decisions concerning the end of life', The
Lancet, 338 (14 September 1991), pp. 669-674.
Discussion of recent changes in the Dutch law
regarding euthanasia and opposition from the Roman
Catholic Church may be found in: Tony Sheldon,
'Euthanasia law does not end debate in the
Netherlands', BMJ, 307 (11 December 1993), pp. 1511-
2 .
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was broadcast aimed at providing personal testimonies
about particular issues. The programme was not and did
not pretend to be a neutral exploration of the topic.
Also it obviously did not present a dialogue in the
sense of an open discussion. It is however legitimate
to consider Kennedy's argument in terms of the
principles of dialogue because his programme was a
contribution to the present debate with the idea of
persuading others to review their own points of view
and ultimately to adopt his. He is mostly fair to his
opponents, excepting the Roman Catholics, even when he
represents their views in opposition to his own.
However, it is not always clear that he listens to what
they say.
Kennedy's aim is to free those who are restricted and
thus oppressed by the present British legal attitude to
euthanasia. This, which requires cases such as those
of Dr Cox to be tried under the criminal law, he sees
as an expression of an outdated view which is still
actively held by a minority of the population. His
sense of frustration with the status quo goes some way
to explaining his crusading zeal. In that, he is
entitled to put his point vigorously but he also has a
responsibility to present the arguments of those
opposed to him as clearly and as fairly as possible.
This he does not do in his description of the position
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of the Roman Catholic Church. Furthermore, his
apparent confusion in his discussion with Dr Fleur
Fisher of the British Medical Association may have been
a way of expressing indirectly his negative opinion of
the position she was representing on behalf of the
2 2
Association. In the case of both of these groups
representing ideas opposed to euthanasia, Kennedy
displays an apparent or deliberate inability to follow
or sympathise with their arguments: to him they appear
to be either a closed book or the legacy of an outdated
view of things.
The programme does not really succeed in persuading
because it is does not take account of the opinions of
the viewer. Kennedy has overstated his case in
7 7
This passage from the broadcaster's transcript of
Consider the End (p. 9), where Kennedy describes
part of the process of covert fund-raising during
the Roman Catholic campaign in California to oppose
the legalisation of euthanasia, gives sufficient
flavour:
So as to disguise Roman Catholic funding,
congregations, when not practising their
arcane rites, were urged to send their
contributions individually to the NO ON 161
headquarters.
Kennedy's emotive description of the activity of the
Catholic Church in the Californian campaign is
briefly substantiated in another, relatively
neutral, account provided by Ronald Dworkin in
Life's Dominion, p.4. See also: Reginald Rhein,
'California says no to euthanasia', BMJ, 305 (14
November 1992), p. 1175.
2 3
Consider the End, transcript, pp. 14-16.
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assuming something that many still need persuading of.
Maclntyre talked of a 'conceptual incommensurability'^4
in modern moral debate. That is certainly evident in
considerations of euthanasia, and between positions
identified by Kennedy. Kennedy's treatment however
does not attempt to explore any of the underlying
reasons for the conflicts and indeed actually
exacerbates the problem by assuming that his point of
view will win over those who are still opposed. This
is hinted at towards the end of the programme where
Kennedy assembles some medical and lay opinion to
suggest that euthanasia is an idea whose time has come:
Dr Admiraal: 'I think that this movement is world
wide so I expect that in 10, 20, 30 years in
Western Europe, Europe and in America, euthanasia
will be accepted.'
Derek Humphrey: 'Certainly before the end of the
century, I think this will be a done thing....A
few years ago, you couldn't find a single Member
of Parliament in Britain who would say publicly
that they believed in this. Now I believe that
something like 100 Members of Parliament, if not
more, have said openly that they would back
legislation on this.'
There may be a change in the attitude of the public
towards euthanasia. That claim would explain the
double messages in the legal and medical consideration
of Dr Cox's treatment of Lillian Boyes. If however it
is only a swing of opinion rather than an ethical re-
^4After Virtue, p. 8.
Consider the End, transcript, pp. 20-21.
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consideration, then there may be limitations in the new
status quo which mirror those of the old. All that
may have happened is that one idea is in favour while
the old perspective is out of favour: for us to have a
new consensus, something more is needed. Indeed, in
listening to Kennedy's arguments in his programme it is
not clear how fully he has attempted to grasp the full
point of those positions he challenges. His
consideration of the role of the Roman Catholic Church
and his discussions with Dr Fleur Fisher of the British
Medical Association are both indications of his refusal
to give sufficient attention to the weight of arguments
against euthanasia. Kennedy needs to take his
opposition more seriously if he is to engage with it in
such a way as to make progress with his cause.
Reviewing Kennedy's approach briefly in terms of the
six principles of dialogue draws together several
strands of this discussion. The obvious lack of
respect that he has for the traditional Roman Catholic
approach to euthanasia would make it necessary for him
to develop a sense of trust with them as part of the
task of settling to any round table dialogue. Since he
appears not to listen very closely to what others are
saying and is not obviously committed to an open
approach in considering the issue means that it is
difficult for him to benefit from any process of mutual
189
learning. Although Kennedy is good at seeing both the
immediate and wider contexts of the discussion of
euthanasia, through his use of examples drawn from
actual cases, his lack of any sustained presentation or
examination of the rational basis for positions held
means that his ability to use his awareness of the
context of ideas is considerably limited. This same
criticism applies also to his analysis of the relative
nature of conclusions in the euthanasia debate. This
is an area where his argument might have been
strengthened had he attended more closely to the ideas
and influences behind the positions he opposes.
Kennedy's plea for euthanasia is addressed to the
present dilemma over euthanasia in Britain. It did not
persuade because it was not sufficiently attentive to
the other points of view in the debate.
v Ronald Dworkin's Life's Dominion
As with Kennedy's Consider the End, Dworkin, a
professor of law in both Oxford and New York, is
presenting an appeal to his readers to view the issues
about which he is concerned in a particular way. As
Kennedy used a television programme, Dworkin uses a
Life's Dominion: an argument about abortion and
euthanasia (1993).
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means familiar to him and presents his argument in a
persuasive but more formally academic style. Dworkin
addresses the issue of abortion against the
contemporary pressure growing to reverse the US Supreme
Court's decision in the case Roe v. Wade (1973), which
effectively legalised abortion in the United States.
However, because he sees parallels in the arguments, he
also addresses the issue of euthanasia and the argument
he develops in relation to abortion is applied by him
in the debate about euthanasia. Not only does Dworkin
have things to say about euthanasia, but one of his
primary concerns is to find common ground between the
different sides of the argument. Furthermore, he is
actively involved in promoting his views in the
consideration of euthanasia in Britain and these views
were considered by the members of the recent House of
Lords' committee appointed to consider the ethical,
2 7
legal and clinical implications of euthanasia. These
factors mean that Dworkin's work is a valuable further
source through which to examine the euthanasia debate.
2 7
Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics,
volume 1, p. 48:
We gave much thought too to Professor
Dworkin's opinion that, for those without
religious belief, the individual is best able
to decide what manner of death is fitting to
the life which has been lived.
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Dworkin identifies three contexts within which we might
n o
consider the issue of euthanasia. First, the plight
of the conscious and competent individual who can make
a variety of arrangements for their own death. This
group subdivides into two further groups. Those who
can plan their death and act on those plans if and when
the need arises. Suicide is no longer a crime in most
western countries and these individuals may use a
variety of means to determine their end. The second
sub-group is made up of those individuals who are
conscious and competent in Dworkin's sense of being
aware of their predicament and able to decide that they
want to end it, yet unable to take the necessary
action. These people require the assistance of
another. It is still a serious crime in most countries
to assist a suicide. Dr Cox was charged with attempted
murder for precisely this in his care of Lillian Boyes.
Dworkin's second category is that of the unconscious
individual. Tony Bland is an example of someone who
left no clear instructions on how they wished to be
cared for in the event of them falling into a condition
such as the persistent vegetative state. Conscious but
incompetent is Dworkin's third category, the main
example of which is the dreadful plight of those
predominantly elderly people who fall victim to one of
Life's Dominion, pp. 183-190.
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the various forms of dementia. For these people, once
the disease has developed, they have no means of either
ending their lives themselves or of persuading others
to help them. In this instance Dworkin asks how
reasonable it might be for people to leave directives
requesting that they be killed perhaps several years
later if they develop such a disease.
These three categories lead Dworkin to identify three
consequent moral issues which determine our concern in
thinking of euthanasia: autonomy, best interests and
sanctity. It is the last of these which provides the
grounds for his ideas of shared concern in the debates
about euthanasia. He explains the idea of the sanctity
of life:
A sovereign commitment to the sanctity of life
dominates our concerns about life's other edge,
too: it is the fulcrum of our worries and puzzles
about euthanasia. Most people's interests are not
exhausted by a desire for pleasure or enjoyment,
but include, as crucial to their sense of self, a
desire to make a success of living, to make
something valuable of their own lives. Though
very few would put it in this dramatic way, most
people treat living as a sacred responsibility,
and this responsibility seems most intense when
they contemplate death, their own or someone
else's. People who want an early, peaceful death
for themselves or their relatives are not
rejecting or denigrating the sanctity of life; on
the contrary, they believe that a quicker death
shows more respect for life than a protracted one.
Once again both sides in the debate about
euthanasia share a concern for life's sanctity;
they are united by that value, and disagree only
193
p Q
about how best to interpret and respect it.
Dworkin is concerned with the sanctity of life from a
secular point of view and its possible use as a bridge
between conflicting views in the euthanasia debate. In
this definition the sacredness seems to lie in the
sense of value that is attributed to those cumulative
decisions which people make when trying to orientate
their lives according to a sense of value. However
reasonable this may sound, it lacks substance when not
defined or explained in terms of something beyond those
values chosen by the individual themselves. This view
contrasts with religious understandings of life as
sacred which tend to follow from the idea of the given
nature of life (as represented in the Judeo-Christian
traditions by the accounts of the creation of humankind
in the opening chapters of Genesis). Further
discussion of this theme might show that there is less
in common between the two views of the sacred than
initially supposed.
Another key concept in Dworkin's discussion of
euthanasia is the idea of death being in keeping with
the values that have been important or determinative
for the individual in life. Here Dworkin is looking
for meaning in the experience of death that can help in
29Ibid., p. 238.
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determining what might constitute an appropriate death
for a particular individual. The way or form of life
lived may be taken to influence the idea of an
appropriate death. Death takes whatever meaning it is
to have from the life of the person dying. It is a
retrospective view, formed from Dworkin's idea that
death vis the end of everything'.30 This is in
contrast again with the religious and specifically
Christian point of view that death may be understood as
a transition to new life. At this point, while not
doing justice to all of Dworkin's arguments, it is
clear that his suggestion for a reconsideration of
euthanasia is not as obviously open to acceptance by
those who would challenge his views of the themes he
has identified as central: sanctity of life and
attitudes to death are key themes in the euthanasia
debate.
vi euthanasia and the principles of dialogue
Returning to Kennedy's argument, it was not clear why
he had some difficulty understanding ideas which
challenged his own enthusiasm for euthanasia. We may
find a key to this problem in the theme which provides
a connection between his work and that of Dworkin: our
30Ibid., pp. 199 and 213.
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attitude to death.
In terms of the round table dialogue, Dworkin is
immediately off to a good start because of his clear
attempt to find common ground between the opposing
sides in the abortion and euthanasia debates. He
assumes a degree of trust between participants in the
dialogue, which is expressed in this gesture of mutual
respect. As outlined above, he identifies the notion
of the sanctity of life as common to both sides in the
debate. He then offers an account of how that idea of
sanctity might be defined, which is however weak in its
given nature, precisely that area traditionally
important to religious understandings of the idea. In
Dworkin's defence, it could be argued that his point of
view is taking seriously the openness with which
religious points of view are sometimes held. He does
this in positing so general or inclusive a view of the
notion of the sanctity of life. In this one sense,
Kennedy's approach, though lacking tact, does show more
than a little realism in anticipating a negative
response. Kennedy's wider sense of the context of the
debate helped him in this. Kennedy is also honest in
expressing his frustration with the Roman Catholic
Church. Dworkin places a very high value on the role
of the individual's conscience which explains some of
his understanding of the sanctity of life. However,
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unlike Kennedy he does not attend sufficiently to the
wider context where there are constraints upon the
individual's wishes in order to protect those who might
be at risk from the legalisation of euthanasia.
In round table dialogue, the notion of discerning and
establishing common ground is crucial. For it to
provide a sufficiently substantial base for furthering
the dialogue it must involve more than the use of a
term common to both parties. The actual meanings
behind the phrase must coincide sufficiently to allow
some form of substantial agreement. Secondary meanings
or shades of meaning may differ without causing
problems in understanding and indeed may lead to
fruitful further discussion about how the original
ideas might be developed. So, although Dworkin would
undoubtedly get further in the initial phases of
discussion than Kennedy, his views on the sanctity of
life are an area of his approach that would require
further attention. That dialogue might still be
developed, even around his assumptions in this area, is
clear from Dworkin's open attitude. His approach is
implicitly based on the ideas of mutual learning and
mutual clarification, both of which in his work are
part of a commitment to openness in the dialogue.
Although Dworkin is clear about his own lack of a
religious perspective, he has adopted a way of offering
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his point of view so that even if participants cannot
go along with him in the central idea of his work, it
is still possible to assume that he is open to
discussion about how the debate might be taken further.
Dworkin's primary concern is to find a solution to the
ethical disagreement. When that is the priority, it is
possible for the search for common ground to be re¬
negotiated and approached afresh. In doing that it is
reasonable to begin with threads and themes from the
present discussion. An important theme in the
development of Dworkin's ideas about the sanctity of
life is that of our attitudes to our death which was
also a concern for Kennedy. This could be explored
further than space allows here.
The four examples above illustrate different forms of
confusion that can result from the consideration of
euthanasia within a pluralist society. How has this
extended discussion helped our understanding of the six
principles of dialogue that were proposed as a
contribution to ethical reflection? These principles
have been applied in two different areas. In the two
case studies they provided a form of analysis that
enabled us to detect where some of the confusion in
each case lay and why it had been difficult to address
directly. In short, the difficulties arose from poor
communication. Four of the principles, mutual respect,
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clarification and learning along with the necessary-
commitment to an open understanding of the process,
were hindered by the restrictions imposed through
dealing with the legal system. The notion of attending
to the context was useful in both cases and there was
no difficulty in analysing the moral principles
involved directly or implicitly in terms of the idea of
the relative nature of the conclusions.
In the second area of application the connections were
much more direct because it was possible to address
each author's argument as a contribution to the public
debate. In both instances the principles of dialogue
provided useful criteria to assess each contribution in
terms of that debate. Kennedy's openly enthusiastic
approach, while honest about his own views, did not
allow for dialogue because it seemed to assume a
correct answer which in turn meant that other opinions
were wrong. Dworkin was much more sensitive in his
approach and he presented his suggestions in a manner
very similar to that outlined by the principles of
dialogue. Even where he did not appear to have taken
sufficient account of the depth of tradition and
feeling behind some of the positions he wished to
engage with, such as the notion of the sanctity of life
and attitudes to death, he made his proposals in such a
way that implied a commitment to developing his ideas
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in dialogue.
The emphasis in this chapter has been on analysis.
What has not been done is to show how the principles of
dialogue might enable a Christian ethical approach to
engage directly and constructively with the four
presentations offered here. This will be part of the
next chapter where I will show something of the
influence of two themes identified here, attitudes to
death and especially the Principle of Double Effect.
However, the idea of the principles of dialogue
directly helping the Christian engagement in the
dialogue will form the basis of the two chapters
considering ethical aspects of pornography.
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Chapter 6
The Principle of Double Effect
But of course intention was everything in the
question of right and wrong. (George Eliot)
The six principles of dialogue are best suited to
critical analysis of positions which contribute to a
moral debate or which may fairly be construed to
attempt this. In seeking to make connections between
them and a defined moral principle there is a danger of
distorting either the principles or the subject of the
enquiry. Bearing this in mind, I will attempt to
further the discussion of euthanasia through the study
of an influential moral principle which has played an
important part in the present debate.
In the last chapter I suggested that Dr Cox would
almost certainly not have experienced the same
difficulties had he administered a pain-killing drug.
The reason for this is that, in the absence of any
statement from Dr Cox to the contrary, he would be
assumed to have intended to relieve Mrs Boyes of her
pain. Her death would be considered an unintended, if
foreseeable, consequence of his action. I further
^Middlemarch, 1871-72, edited by David Campbell
(1991), i, pp. 246-7.
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suggested that to understand better the influences
operating, albeit implicitly, in the public
consideration of the Cox case it is instructive to look
in detail at the idea of the Principle of Double
Effect. This is idea provides an explanation of the
distinction drawn above in discerning acceptable
patterns of treatment and their consequences.
The Principle of Double Effect (PDE) is an ethical
principle mainly developed within Roman Catholic moral
theology. It commanded more general respect for a
time but is now seriously under question even in the
areas of medical ethics where it has been used to
provide valuable moral distinctions. Any reassessment
of the traditional Christian position on euthanasia
would have to take into account the arguments of the
PDE. Euthanasia is one of two central areas of debate
which have highlighted some of the ambiguity and
confusion in application of the PDE. Abortion is the
other area but that will not be discussed here except
in so far as arguments from the debate about abortion
shed light on the issues involved in euthanasia.
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i the principle
The PDE has four essential or integral conditions, each
of which must be met for the principle to be effective
and consequently for the action under discussion to be
considered moral. Richard A. McCormick described the
conditions as follows:
1. The action from which evil results is good or
indifferent in itself; it is not morally
evil.
2. The intention of the agent is upright - i.e.,
the evil effect is sincerely not intended.
3. The evil effect must be equally immediate
causally with the good effect, for otherwise
it would be a means to the good effect and
would be intended.
4. There must be a proportionately grave reason
for allowing the evil to occur.
In the euthanasia debate the evil is obviously the
death of the patient and the extent to which another
individual has assisted in that process. In exploring
the PDE we must adopt this point of view but we should
also recognise that it is not one held by all writers
on the subject of euthanasia. Some argue that to
assist in the death of another can in certain
circumstances be an act of compassion and morally
2
In A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, p. 162.
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correct . Furthermore others will argue that it is
misleading to think of death as an evil in every
instance.
/
The PDE developed to its present form of four
conditions from a simpler concern on the part of St
Thomas Aquinas to justify killing in self-defence.
Aquinas's concern was to find some way of accommodating
certain natural actions, such as self-defence, with
Saint Paul's condemnation of actions which involve evil
as a means to good ends (Romans 3.8). Scholars cannot
agree on the extent to which Aquinas provides the
essence of the PDE in his writings but they claim with
confidence that: 'he still gave the initial impetus to
its explanation and application in the authors who
4
follow him even to the present'. From the seventeenth
century the PDE is no longer required to provide a
justification of killing in self-defence but begins to
be employed to justify the indirect killing of
innocent people in wartime. According to Mangan, the
PDE does not become a generally accepted principle of
^See, for example, the contributions to Your Ultimate
Choice, edited by the Voluntary Euthanasia Society,
especially chapters 5 & 6, 'Acts of Compassion' and
'The Doctors' Dilemma', pp. 59-98.
4Joseph T. Mangan, 'An Historical Analysis of the
Principle of Double Effect', Theological Studies, 10
(1949), pp. 41-61 (p. 52).
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moral theology until the mid-nineteenth century with
the publication of Gury's Compendium Theologae Moralis
in 1850. Whatever the process of development, it is
clear that the PDE became an accepted principle of
/
moral reasoning with general application. G.R.
Dunstan's recent example of its general usefulness
serves to illustrate the point both of its ready
application and its comprehensiveness:
A ship's captain may, in an emergency, order the
closing of watertight doors. The action is
necessary to save the ship and as many as possible
of her company. If some of the crew are trapped
behind the closed doors, the captain is not
culpable in law or morals for their death - though
he would have delayed as long as possible to
enable them to escape. Their death would be a
secondary and unintended effect of a necessary
act.
ii purposes and virtues
In advance of looking at criticisms and limitations of
the PDE it is important to achieve a clear
understanding of both its purposes and virtues, for
these are significant.
The PDE aims to limit areas of moral ambiguity in hard
^Ibid., pp. 56 , 61.
In Dictionary of Medical Ethics, edited by A.S.
Duncan, G.R. Dunstan & R.B. Welbourn (1977, revised
and enlarged 1981), p. 145.
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or difficult cases by being as specific as possible
about the grounds on which we may cause evil in pursuit
of good. This much is clear from the example used at
the principle's inception, that of killing in self-
/
defence. Thomas Aquinas explores the difficulty of
defending oneself and thereby risking committing an
evil act:
A single act may have two side effects, of which
one alone is intended, whilst the other is
incidental to that intention. But the way a moral
act is to be classified depends on what is
intended, not on what goes beyond such an
intention, since this is merely incidental
thereto, as we have seen already. In the light of
this distinction we can see that an act of self-
defence may have two effects: the saving of one's
own life, and the killing of the attacker. Now
such an act of self-defence is not illegitimate
just because the agent intends to save his own
life, because it is natural for anything to want
to preserve itself in being as far as it can. An
act that is properly motivated may, nevertheless,
become vitiated if it is not proportionate to the
end intended. And this is why somebody who uses
more violence than is necessary to defend himself
will be doing something wrong. On the other hand,
the controlled use of counter-violence constitutes
legitimate self-defence, for according to the law
x it is legitimate to answer force with force
provided it goes no further than due defence
requires'[here Aquinas is quoting from the
Decretals of Gregory] .
It remains nevertheless that it is not legitimate
for a man actually to intend to kill another in
self-defence, since the taking of life is reserved
to the public authorities acting for the common
good, as we have seen
Obviously an extreme situation is envisaged, where an
7
Summa Theologias, II-II, q. 64, a. 7.
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assailant is making a potentially life-threatening
attack on someone. The defender is justified in
killing the assailant if that is the most effective
means of stopping the attack and surviving. If it were
possible to save one's life without taking that of the
assailant then that would be preferable and morally
desirable. If however that were not possible it is
morally acceptable to kill the assailant with the
intention of saving one's own life and only secondarily
killing the attacker. The death of the assailant is
consequent upon the desire or responsibility for self-
preservation .
A second example from the history of the PDE is that of
killing the innocent in time of war. The pursuit of
victory in war, and given the historical context of the
example and that it is being discussed in textbooks of
moral theology we might also assume that it would be a
vjust war' under consideration, necessarily involves
the killing of the enemy combatants. In trying to do
this there are often occasions where it is difficult if
not impossible to avoid risk of injuring or killing
enemy or other civilians who are innocent. Killing the
enemy may involve killing some innocent people. The
PDE allows for the fact that some innocent people may
be killed in the legitimate pursuit of war and seeks to
limit their number. Without the application of the PDE
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in this context more people would die because if there
were no restriction on killing in pursuit of war there
would be little responsibility on those who waged war
to exercise caution in situations where legitimate
enemy targets mingled with innocent people. The good
is the pursuit of victory through war; the necessary
evil - to be permitted in a restricted fashion - is the
killing of innocent people.
A further important aspect of the PDE is illustrated in
the examples above. That is its attempt to allow for
exceptions in areas where there is a hard rule, such as
a prohibition on killing, which requires modification
in certain circumstances. The commandment not to kill
is central to Christian behaviour and although there
have been and are agreed exceptions, such as war and
the death penalty, even these are now under question.
The need for some form of regulation of extreme
situations is acute in certain circumstances to which
the PDE has been applied more recently, such as
abortion and euthanasia. There is a danger that in
either of these areas it might become too convenient to
allow exceptions which would lead to abuse. If there
is a strong emphasis on the commandment not to kill,
then exceptions to that rule require clear and strong
justification in such a way as to uphold the original
prohibition on killing. Exceptions which appeared to
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allow killing would be a threat to the original
commandment. The PDE is seen as affording precisely
this advantage in situations where otherwise killing
might be understood to have been condoned. We will
return to this concern below and consider the extent to
which the PDE still affords such protection when
considered in relation to the specific area of
euthanasia.
A third area where the PDE is seen as having a use
today is in the area of conscience. Whatever
limitations it may have as an ethical theory and as we
shall see these seem to be increasing, it can be seen
to afford a certain amount of comfort to those who have
to make difficult decisions and then act on them in
borderline situations. The prohibition against killing
is very strong in many societies and it goes against
the traditional ethos of all the helping professions.
The distinction the PDE affords between direct and
indirect killing is one which is very helpful in this
context although not without difficulties. This
distinction will be discussed below as part of a
consideration of the moral difference between killing
and letting die.
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iii knowing and intending
There are two main and significant limitations of the
PDE. The first of these is best illustrated through a
series of examples. Dr A has a patient who is
suffering from an ectopic pregnancy. That is, a
fertilised embryo has lodged itself in a fallopian
tube: if it is allowed to remain there the outcome will
be the death of the woman. She acts to save the
woman's life by removing the fallopian tube in which
the embryo is lodged. Dr B is assisting a woman to
give birth and finds himself in the rare situation
nowadays of having to consider a craniotomy. That is,
if he does nothing neither child nor mother will
survive, but if he crushes the baby's skull at least
the mother's life will be saved. If he chooses the
latter option and saves the mother the result of his
work will in effect be the same as that of Dr A whose
patient was also saved. However in terms of the PDE
only Dr A's course of action could be condoned. Dr B
would be censured for opting for the second of the two
alternatives before him. Were he to choose the first
option and do nothing, allowing both mother and baby to
die, he would not be condemned. In terms of the PDE
the distinction lies in what is intended on the part of
the moral agent, in these cases the two doctors. Dr A
intends to save the life of her patient and will do
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this by removing a fallopian tube within which is
lodged a foetus which could not come to full term and
is in effect only a threat to the mother's life. It is
merely a secondary consequence of her action that the
/
foetus will die; it was not what she intended. Dr B on
the other hand, in choosing the craniotomy as the
better of the two options in wishing the same end, that
is the well being of his patient, has chosen a course
of action which means that his method of achieving that
end is highly questionable in terms of the PDE. Dr B
intends the good of his action by means of an evil
action, that is the death of the baby. It does not
matter in terms of the PDE that if he does not perform
the craniotomy both mother and baby will die. Dr B's
action fails on at least the first three conditions of
the PDE. It involves killing; the death of the baby is
sincerely intended as the means to the good effect, and
therefore not allowed; the evil effect clearly precedes
the good effect and the good effect would not be
possible otherwise. In 1884 this specific option was
condemned by Papal decree because it did not meet the
O
conditions of the PDE. On these grounds the PDE
O
Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of
Biomedical Ethics, third edition (1989), p. 129.
However for a contradiction of this reference within
a broader but brief critique of Beauchamp &
Childress's description of the PDE in modern medical
ethics, see: James F. Keenan, 'The function of the
Principle of Double Effect', Theological Studies, 54
(1993), pp. 294-315 (pp. 294-295).
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makes an important distinction between the actions of
the two medical practitioners. That distinction lies
wholly in the area of intent and depends for its
credibility on the ability to make sufficient
distinction between the intention of an agent and what
the same agent might reasonably be expected to foresee
or know of as a possible, albeit secondary, consequence
of his actions.
This introduction to one of the limitations of the PDE
takes us straight into the main problem area of the PDE
as far as any consideration of euthanasia is concerned.
In this area another common example is that of
terminally ill patients who are treated by two
different doctors. Mr X is treated by Dr A with a drug
designed to reduce pain. As the disease tightens its
grip on Mr X the dose is increased to keep pace with
the increase in pain. A known consequence of this form
of medication is that Mr X's system will gradually
loose its ability to resist the disease and the
increased level of the pain killing drug will in fact
shorten his life. Dr B, on the other hand, is treating
another patient, Mr Y, who is suffering from an
identical condition to Mr A. As chance would have it
Dr B is using precisely the same medication in his
treatment of his patient as is Dr A but there the
similarity ends. Dr B knows that his patient is dying
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like Dr A's, however he chooses to act on his knowledge
that the patient does not want to go on living in
unnecessary pain when no recovery is possible. Dr B
therefore chooses to administer the drug in precisely
/
the same doses as Dr A again, coincidentally,
increasing medication as the disease worsens. Dr B
does this with the intention of hastening the death and
therefore the release from suffering of his patient.
The result is that both patients die approximately
the same length of time after the onset of their fatal
diseases and after the same course of treatment by
different doctors. As in the parallel example of the
unfortunate pregnancies there is a difference in how
each medical practitioner's behaviour will be regarded
at least by those who subscribe to the PDE, even though
Q
as in the previous example the outcomes are identical.
Consideration of an example such as this is made the
more confusing because of the attitude taken formally
and quite openly by the Roman Catholic authorities.
The problem is expressed clearly in a North American
statement, published in 1975 and included in the
9
A legal prosecution would be unlikely to result from
an example such as the hypothetical case described
here. Dr Cox, of course, did something similar to
Dr B but it was different in the important and
essential detail mentioned above that the drug Dr
Cox administered had no possible palliative effect.
213
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health
Facilities: 'it is not euthanasia to give a dying
person sedatives and analgesics for the alleviation of
pain, when such a measure is judged necessary, even
though they may deprive the patient of the use of
10
reason, or shorten his life.' This is a more
explicit statement of the principle expounded in the
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's
Declaration on Euthanasia (1980) where following a
discussion referring to Pope Pius XII's view on the use
of pain killers in medical treatment, this statement is
made: 'In this case, of course, death is in no way
intended or sought, even if the risk of it is
reasonably taken; the intention is simply to relieve
pain effectively, using for this purpose painkillers
available to medicine.'11 It is this clear awareness
that death is a more than likely consequence that seems
to undermine any credibility of the PDE as a moral tool
in the area of euthanasia. It is in danger of being
understood as a rather strange basis for assuming that
a particular medical practitioner, in the case of our
example above Dr A, is in some sense morally superior
to other doctors not following her practice because she
10Found in: Beauchamp & Childress, Principles of
Biomedical Ethics, p. 130. My italics.
11Declaration on Euthanasia, English translation, pp.
8-9 .
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is able to block from her consciousness the more than
likely consequence of her action in administering pain
killers.
This second parallel example has shown 'how actions
similar in externals may, by means of the PDE, be
understood and interpreted very differently. The
distinction again lies in what each of the doctors
intended. Dr A sought the relief of pain for her
patient. Any other consequence of her treatment was
unintended and purely secondary. That her patient died
at the same stage as Dr B's, of identical causes and
to some extent hastened by the medication applied to
relieve pain, matters not one bit. Dr A's action is
wholly praiseworthy in terms of the PDE whereas Dr B
would again find his actions condemned. While treating
his patient he intended the relief of pain by hastening
the inevitable death through the administration of
pain-killing drugs. In terms of the PDE, because his
aim knowingly included the death of the patient, Dr B
fails to meet the second condition, that is that his
action sincerely did not intend the evil outcome - the
death of Mr Y.
There is a need to establish a viable distinction
between knowing and intending. Such a distinction is
essential to the PDE and is clearly assumed in
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Aquinas's initial statement quoted above. Aquinas
states that what determines the moral character of an
action is what is intended. Anything which occurs
which is not intended is merely accidental and should
not form part of any moral assessment of the action,
assuming it is proportionate to the end. If a viable
distinction is to be established here it hinges on an
ability to see that any connection between two
consequences of a particular course of action is not
essential. A distinction must be found between what an
agent foresees as being a possible result of a
voluntary action and what he intends. A further element
in this distinction is the point that all means towards
the desired and acknowledged end are attributable, that
is must be taken into account in any moral assessment
of the action. On the other hand consequences of the
action foreseen by the agent but not directly or
indirectly used as a means or as any other form of
assistance to the desired end can be ignored. These
latter are regarded as accidental or unintended and
consequently are exempt from scrutiny in terms of the
PDE. It is on this point in both hypothetical examples
above that Dr A's behaviour was condoned while that of
Dr B was condemned. In the case of the craniotomy the
doctor's specific intention was to kill the child in
process of birth with the specific intention of saving
at least the mother's life, given that had he done
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nothing neither the mother or the child would have
survived. In the second example of Dr B's practice, it
is his specific intention to administer pain killing
drugs as means to both possible ends which separates
his otherwise identical treatment from that of Dr A in
terms of the PDE.
How viable is this distinction? Can it be credibly
asserted that an individual may know certain
consequences of an action to be more than likely and
yet be in no way responsible for any effects ill or
otherwise which will follow from the action, if they
were sincerely not intended? We might understand this
distinction as it has been established through the PDE,
yet it is not clear that we would recognise it as
morally relevant in another context. A stock broker
wanting to get rich quick might use inside information
to which he had access to buy and sell the shares of
others at prices greatly advantageous to himself,
thereby robbing others of profits and betraying his
customers' professional trust in him. Were he then to
maintain that his sole intention was to feather his own
nest by sailing a little too close to the wind, and
further claim exemption from any responsibility for the
losses of other share holders (which were consequent
upon his own illegal activities) on the basis that he
sincerely did not intend that others might loose as he
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gained, would we find ourselves able to exonerate him?
I think not. However there is some danger here of
misunderstanding the purpose of the PDE. It was not
designed to absolve people of responsibility for
actions they have committed. Rather, it was evolved to
determine what evil might be allowed in the pursuit of
good, and to limit that evil as far as possible.
Nevertheless, there remains room for some confusion on
this point.
At this juncture it is relevant to say that in the area
of medical ethics at least, to talk of certain outcomes
of established courses of action as either
'possibilities' or 'probabilities' is somewhat
artificial. So much is now known in medical science
that some outcomes can almost be assumed. For example,
for the physician administering pain killing drugs at
such a level that the patient dies to claim that the
death of the patient was a probable but not a certain
outcome of his action stretches credibility.
iv a wider critique
Despite our discussion so far, this aspect of the PDE -
the distinction between knowing and intending - does
not command widespread respect even in the field of
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medical ethics. Returning to the hypothetical
examples given earlier: to assume that in the cases of
the unfortunate pregnancies Dr B is acting with any
morally significant difference of motive towards his
patient is seen by some as a means of confusing the
issues rather than clarifying them. This distinction
between what an agent knows or foresees and what on the
other hand he sincerely intends, the second condition
of the PDE, matters in the euthanasia debate only to
those who accept that there is a significant moral
difference between on the one hand mercifully killing
someone and on the other letting someone die or killing
them obliquely and indirectly. The result of either
course of action is the same apart from the declared
intentions: the patient dies. As with the second
condition of the PDE, the third condition requires a
particular frame of mind to catch its essence. In
order that this condition be met an action involving a
necessary evil must have that evil occurring
simultaneously with the desired good effect in order
that any evil effects are not means to the desired good
end. Were the evil to occur before the good effect it
might then be considered a means to the end and in
that way be unacceptable. The point here being that it
can never be right to use evil as a means to good. In
12
Raanan Gillon, Philosophical Medical Ethics (1986)
p. 138.
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this condition of the PDE we see a concern to
acknowledge the idea in St Paul that it is never
permissible to cause evil in pursuit of good, which is
behind the establishment of the principle.^ In terms of
our examples, Dr B's hypothetical craniotomy kills the
child in the process of birth as a means to the good of
saving the mother's life. The commandment against
killing must be upheld. It takes precedence in terms
of the PDE over any sense of compassion for the life of
the mother. The greater good is the holding of a firm
line against killing. In fairness to the advocates of
the PDE we must acknowledge at this point that they
themselves admit that this condition has been too
rigorously applied in the past. Two questions arise at
this point. How realistic is the fear behind any
tampering with the commandment against killing, given
that there are and have been several sanctioned
exceptions? Secondly, how realistic a picture of
human motivation or rather how credible a model of
human moral action do we have in the picture implicitly
drawn by this third condition? The first question,
that about the fear of unlawful killing, will be
addressed below while the second is examined now.
There are many instances in common life where we accept
a possible or even a likely or definite evil
consequence in pursuit of a specific or a general
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good. This flies straight in the face of the third
condition of the PDE. There are occasions where we are
prepared to put up with certain known and intended
unfortunate or evil consequences of our actions because
we are sure the intended benefits will outweigh the
problems caused. We are not usually anxious about the
extent to which the evil precedes, follows from or is
simultaneous with the good intended by our action.
Here we may look to a contemporary Roman Catholic
moral theologian who has worked on the relevance of the
PDE from this angle: Peter Knauer. In an article that
is frequently quoted in discussions of the PDE, Knauer
argues for a new understanding of the application of
the PDE which centres on understanding the third
condition in terms of 'proportionate reason'
Crucial to this point of view is a distinction which
Knauer establishes between types of evil: 'physical'
(that is ontic, pre-moral or non-moral) and 'moral'
evil. There is not a problem willing a physical evil
and in fact we do this fairly commonly when for example
we perform an amputation or a sterilisation, so long as
a proportionate reason exists for our action. Good is
being served and so the evil matters little in itself.
13'The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double
Effect', in Readings in Moral Theology No 1, edited
by Charles E. Curran & Richard A. McCormick (New
York 1979) pp. 1-39.
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Whatever has been done has been done specifically in
order to allow some specific good to occur and
consequently is not seen as a 'moral' evil.
The question might be asked: to what extent is this
argument distinct from consequentialism, or can we
judge an action purely by its consequences? If I have
represented Knauer's point of view correctly, then it
becomes difficult to see how his argument might be
employed generally. Any conclusion about what type of
evil was being employed would depend on one's
perspective. It is difficult to see many of the
defenders of the traditional understanding of the PDE
agreeing that sterilisation might be a purely physical
evil, given the position on birth control outlined in
the Papal Encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968) and sustained
consistently since then. Taking these observations
further, it is not clear what role the second condition
of the PDE might have if Knauer's re-definition of the
third condition is accepted. It would seem that an
evil act may be sincerely intended in the pursuit of a
proportionate good. This would seem to render the
second condition redundant, as traditionally
understood.
At this point it is worth looking briefly at the debate
around the PDE itself. It has already been mentioned
222
that it is now challenged in some of its strict
applications in the field of medical ethics. As
reference to Knauer's article suggests, there is some
debate among supporters of the PDE about its strengths
and weaknesses in contemporary applications. Richard
A. McCormick is one of the leading supporters of the
PDE as an ethical tool and one who has consistently
engaged with critics of the principle. With another
North American scholar, the Protestant ethicist Paul
Ramsey, he has edited a volume of criticism and comment
on the PDE: Doing Evil bo Achieve Good: moral choice in
conflict situations (1985). The book opens with an
essay by McCormick, Ambiguity in Moral Choice, setting
out a statement and defence of the PDE. There follows
a series of four articles by leading Catholic and
secular moral philosophers, the latter including
William K. Frankena, commenting on McCormick's essay
and the PDE in general. The book concludes with
McCormick's extended commentary on the commentaries.
The reader of these studies could well be excused some
sense of confusion in trying to follow some of the
arguments and criticisms because misunderstandings and
their polite identification are one of the leitmotifs
of this work.14 The mutual confusion appears to be at
its greatest between McCormick and Frankena but is by
14See for example p. 146 and in response pp. 241-2.
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no means limited to them. One area where there is
agreement, on this occasion between McCormick and Bruno
Schueller, a revisionist critic like Knauer, is on the
fact that with one or two exceptions the PDE has been
vthe exclusive property of Catholic moral 'theology'.1^
However one of these exceptions, a key non-Catholic
moral philosopher they refer to as having used the PDE,
Philippa Foot, has expressed considerable reserve about
her earlier views of the theory in an article first
*1 (~\
published in 1967, and widely reprinted. No mention
is made of her qualified reservations nor is there a
direct reference to Foot's work.
Reading Doing Evil to Achieve Good leaves one with the
impression that the PDE, in spite of what McCormick and
other supporters say, is the product of a very
particular point of view and one that is increasingly
rare nowadays. This is true to the extent that the
theory seems to be of only very limited use indeed if
at all in the specific applications traditionally
reserved for it in the area of medical ethics, such as
abortion and more recently euthanasia. The supporters
15Ibid., pp. 197-8.
1
'The problem of abortion and the principle of the
double effect', found in Moral Problems, edited by
James Rachels, second edition (1975), pp. 59-70; see
especially p.64. The article was originally
published in the Oxford Review, no. 5 (1967) .
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appear to have difficulty agreeing among themselves on
the precise mechanism and application of the theory;
they criticise some of their fellows who are more
successful in forming a revision of the theory,
claiming that Knauer completely redefines the key
17 ... .
terms thus by implication undermining precisely that
which he claims to be affirming; and they acknowledge
that the theory has had and still enjoys little direct
support outside their own specific group.
Having examined the issue of the view of human nature
and action implied by the PDE we have gone further to
look at the specific context of Roman Catholic moral
theology within which it is mainly discussed. Now we
may turn to the second issue identified earlier, the
concern that without the PDE society would be allowing
a dangerous erosion of the commandment against killing.
Would this actually be the case? There are other
sanctioned exceptions to the prohibition on killing
which either were or are maintained without seeming to
weaken the commandment. Killing is allowed in war and
in self-defence, at best circumscribed in both cases
but nevertheless clearly acceptable as an option in
extreme situations. Capital punishment is another area
of debate but also one where a clear exception to the
17
Doing Evil to Achieve Good, pp. 165-166.
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rule against killing has been made. All three of these
instances of exceptions to the commandment prohibiting
killing have been maintained in societies which have
managed to hold a firm line against killing. While all
three have led to abuses, they have not resulted in a
general disregard for the value of human life based on
their erosion of the prohibition against killing. It
does not follow that to disregard the PDE would
automatically lead to a serious watering down of the
commandment. Furthermore, as Philippa Foot has pointed
1R
out, in rejecting the PDE we are not left only with
the size of the proposed or consequent evil caused in
the pursuit of a particular good as the guide to
whether or not we may condone any action. Foot gives
examples of situations where an action which benefitted
several individuals even at the expense of only one
person would still be condemned. It does not follow
that a society which did not directly or implicitly
follow the PDE would be any more prone to allowing
killing or an erosion of the value placed on human
life. The PDE as a general ethical rule has something
to commend it when applied to the sort of very general
situation of the ship's captain faced with the dilemma
of killing some of his crew in order to allow the
majority to survive, as illustrated in Professor
1 R
Foot, vThe problem of abortion and the PDE', pp. 68-
69.
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Dunstan's example above. In such cases there is a
valid distinction to be made between the good of saving
the majority of the crew and the evil of doing that at
the cost of a few who would not otherwise be saved.
/
The PDE affords a way of both understanding how the
captain acted and offering a framework within which we
may commend his courage in taking responsibility for
the death of some of his crew in order that the rest
may have a chance to survive. In less extreme
examples, we are used to the idea that to achieve some
goods we must at times be prepared to cause some harm,
or do something we would not otherwise condone. In
such cases we are guided by a sense of proportion and
with that a sense that even so some goods cannot be
obtained if the price is too high.
v attitudes to death
A further criticism of the PDE in relation to
euthanasia is that it only works if one is prepared to
assume death as the evil identified in the different
conditions of the PDE. Perhaps what has happened here
is that a fear of death and the anxiety about allowing
killing in the face of a commandment condemning it have
become entangled. The connection between the PDE and
the prohibition on killing has been explored. Here I
want to look briefly at the possible influence of a
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fear of death on the development and application of the
19
PDE m the field of medical ethics. My concern here
is to suggest that the PDE allows us to act in a
certain way in relation to patients who are close to
death.
There are a number of tensions in our attitudes to both
our own and others' deaths. At one level we
acknowledge death as something of which we are very
frightened, either because we do not know what lies
beyond it, or we fear what we think might lie beyond or
because it is the end as far as we know of all that
holds meaning for us. When this degree of fear is
operating there is a tendency to actively avoid the
threat: it is so great we cannot bring ourselves to
think directly about the source of the fear and we act
in ways which deny the existence of the threat posed by
death. At another level we may acknowledge the reality
19
There are several explorations of our attitudes to
death: a wide ranging historical perspective is
provided by Philippe Aries in The Hour of our Death,
translated by Helen Weaver (1981); Man's Concern
with Death (1968) by Arnold Toynbee and others
provides some general views of theological and
philosophical concerns; John Bowker's The Meanings
of Death (1991) offers a perspective of different
cultural attitudes; more popular and personal views
are offered in Ronald Blythe's The View in Winter:
reflections on old age (1979) and A Necessary End:
attitudes to death, edited by Julia Neuberger and
John A. White (1991). The theme of denial is
discussed in Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death
(1973) .
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of death, recognising it as something which comes to us
all and that it needs to be faced but still living as
if it is something which we may ignore on a day to day
basis. It is there, but it is not healthy or life
giving to dwell on it because to do so upsets the
patterns and values we set store by in living our
lives. This is a weaker version of the first way of
relating to death. It is worth identifying it
separately here because this second model is probably
the most general and consequently the most influential.
The least common view of death but one which has a long
history within the Christian tradition is that of the
active acceptance of death. Here the individual lives
accepting death as a re-union with God. While the
event may hold some anxieties and even fear, it is
2 0
broadly to be welcomed. These three patterns of
relating to death provide a general background for our
discussion of the PDE in this area. I want to suggest
2 0 ...
An example of precisely this attitude was
illustrated in an obituary in which was quoted a
letter written a year before death at the end of a
long life:
It is very interesting living with death as
probably the next event - sometimes I feel
rather frightened - but mostly rather longing
...God has been so incredibly good to me
that it is silly not to go on trusting.
Quoted by the Rt Revd Oliver Tompkins in an obituary
of Mrs Susan Hodson, The Church Times (3 April
1992), p. 5.
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that the PDE in its application to euthanasia reflects
a general, non-specific fear of death. In terms of the
three models outlined, the PDE would most obviously be
influenced by the first two: the fear of death and its
consequent denial or by the reluctant acceptance of
death and the fact that we then try to ignore it. How
might this work?
Sherwin B. Nuland has given an unusually frank
appraisal of some of the pressures and constraints
physicians find themselves under when caring for
21
patients towards the end of their lives. One of
Nuland's main concerns in writing is his perception of
the physician's struggle with disease, often described
in either a military metaphor or that of a riddle to be
solved, to the point often of obscuring his or her
concern to care for the patient. In several places he
illustrates autobiographically some of the general
points Hauerwas makes about trends in modern medicine
which seem to be driven more by the concerns of the
2 2
physicians than by the needs of the patients. In
particular, Nuland acknowledges critically in both his
own practice as a surgeon and in that of his medical
colleagues, a tendency to treat patients beyond that
We Die (1994) .
See especially Hauerwas's essay, 'Reflections on
suffering, death and medicine', in Suffering
Presence, pp. 23-38.
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point which it is wise or necessary: vthat error should
occur in the treatment of a patient, it must always be
2 -3
on the side of doing more rather than less.' This
tendency stems in part from the habit of calling a
natural process, death, by the name of a disease and
the consequent inability to recognise that ultimately
there is no cure for the process of aging and the
connected physical decline. The physician is highly
motivated to challenge the disease or to solve the
riddle it poses. When that cannot be done, things
change:
As the long siege drags on and one after another
treatment has begun to fail, those enthusiasms
tend to fall by the wayside. Emotionally, doctors
then tend to disappear; physically, too, they
sometimes all but disappear.
In Nuland's eyes the remarkable and benevolent advances
in biotechnology have a distinct drawback when they
mean that physicians prolong lives that might
previously have ended a little earlier but in peace:
How We Die, pp. 221, 249 & 253. Nuland's
autobiographical observations are supported by the
results of a recent survey of American doctors which
specifically indicates that patients may be kept
alive because care givers are in some cases unaware
of the permissible option of withdrawing treatments:
Mildred Z. Solomon, et al., 'Decisions near the end
of life: professional views on life-sustaining
treatments', American Journal of Public Health, 83
(January 1993), pp. 14-23.
24
How We Die, p. 258; see also p. 72.
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The beeping and squealing monitors, the hissing of
respirators and pistoned mattresses, the flashing
multicoloured electronic signals - the whole
technological panoply is background for the
tactics by which we are deprived of the
tranquillity we have every right to hope for, and
separated from those few who would not let us die
alone. By such means, biotechnology created to
provide hope serves actually to take it away, and
to leave our survivors bereft of the unshattered
final memories that rightly belong to those who
sit nearby as our days draw to a close.
Nuland is committed to challenging this trend whereby
medicine protects us from or denies individuals the
chance to address directly the experience of death.
Although his book is not clear about how he intends to
go about this, that he has written and identified so
clearly what is happening is in itself a contribution
to engaging with the problem. In some senses of course




for the patient who cannot be cured. Here it is
necessary to make explicit the parallels and possible
connections I see between the situation as Nuland
describes it and the PDE.
The PDE provides a way of allowing physicians to
administer drugs which have the effect of granting
gentle deaths to terminal patients without legalising
euthanasia. The question arises of whether or not the
PDE is being used as a tacit means of condoning
euthanasia without condoning it, that is without
acknowledging that it has occurred. However, my concern
Originating in the 1960s, this movement has
developed an international concern to provide the
best and most appropriate care for those suffering
terminal diseases, especially cancer. Under the
direction of Dame Cicely Saunders, at St
Christopher's Hospice in London, pioneering studies
in the care and management of dying patients
revealed that more could be done than had been
previously for these patients, especially in the
area of drug therapies. This work developed a new
model of of care for the terminally ill which aimed
to provide treatment which addressed the patient's
needs and their impending death from several points
simultaneously. Account is taken of the social,
psychological and spiritual dimensions as well as
the physical complications presenting in any case.
The aim of the multi-disciplinary care team is to
help the patient and their immediate relatives or
friends to exercise as much control as possible in
coming to terms with the difficulties and
opportunities presented by the approach of death.
For a brief general description of the hospice
movement see: Cicely Saunders, 'Hospice Movement',
in A Dictionary of Pastoral Care, edited by Alastair
V. Campbell (1987), pp. 116-117. For a fuller
discussion see Derek Doyle, editor, Terminal Care
(1979) .
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is to explore the idea that the PDE in its implicit
assumption that to hasten death is an evil act, enables
a degree of collusion with the denial of death. The
idea of the hastening of death being an evil act stems
in part from our strong and necessary social
prohibition on killing. It is also an indication of a
fear of death and as long as there is a social fear of
death we will have difficulty in facing death directly.
If there was no fear of death, or even if it could be
faced directly, then we would be more able to either
openly acknowledge a direct responsibility for
assisting those close to it to die or we could devise a
model of care that actively embraced euthanasia as a
compassionate act.
This discussion makes clear the idea that there is a
relative nature to the prohibition on killing in
medicine. In spite of appearing to confirm the
prohibition on killing the PDE in fact allows it under
very restricted circumstances and in that way
circumvents the apparent moral absolute of the
prohibition on killing.
These observations are suggestions about ways in which
the PDE may influence and in turn be influenced by the
context within which it is applied. There seems to be
a distinct and discernible, although perhaps not
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consciously intended, shift in the way the PDE is
understood in its application within the sphere of
medical ethics. Those who first applied the principle
to the different bioethical issues that it has been
used to address would not recognise or approve of the
loose sense in which it may now be commonly understood.
The original and essential emphasis on the intention of
the physician, which although it might always be open
to question, was assumed to intend only the good of the
patient in the relief of pain. Now, the action of
administering a deliberately high dose of a pain-
killing drug is assumed to be covered by the formal
good intention not to harm the patient, but what that
good intention amounts to has changed. Whereas before
it assumed the intention to remove pain, now it may
apply to the intention to end suffering by ending life
9 7
but only so long as certain strict criteria are met.
2 7
See, for example the following use:
Some people also use the term passive
euthanasia to describe the act of a doctor or
other person who prescribes or administers
pain-killers or other (e.g. sedative) drugs
necessary for the relief of a patient's pain
or severe distress, but in the knowledge that
a probable consequence of the prescription is
a shortening of the patient's life. Again we
think that usage is incorrect. We speak
instead of the double effect.
From: House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee
on Medical Ethics, volume 1. pp. 10-11. My italics.
See also pp. 20-21 & 49-50.
Kennedy and Dworkin referred in different ways to the
influence of our attitudes to death on the issue of
euthanasia. I have shown how some of these attitudes
might be connected with the PDE and the way it is
/
understood and applied in medical ethics. If there is
a need for a shift in our understandings of death
within medical practice, then might one ask if the
circumstances have changed sufficiently to allow for a
wider view of death? While recognising that living is
still predominantly a good, something to be enjoyed and
affirmed even in adversity, we can now also envisage
situations in which death becomes a good. Medical
technology has greatly improved the general standard of
health care in western countries and as a result people
live longer. However there remain some diseases
resistant to cure and the aging process eventually
defeats medical prowess. At the end of life some
people find themselves in situations where they see
death as a release from pointless and unremitting
suffering as a terminal disease enters its later
phases. Medicine has traditionally resisted death as
the greatest threat to the health and well-being of the
patient. A danger of continuing so to view death in
the circumstances outlined above is that we commit
ourselves to keeping alive those who might prefer to
die because of a social fear of death. Along with the
fear of death there is perhaps an anxiety about taking
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responsibility in this area for another exception to
the prohibition on killing.
Discussion of the PDE has led into a review of
/
criticisms of it and on into more general consideration
about the overall context both in which the idea
developed and that in which it now finds itself
employed. In looking at the PDE it is clear that it is
a useful general moral guideline but that it is limited
in its contemporary application to euthanasia.
However, it is also clear that the issue of euthanasia
and its associated areas of concern, such as views of
death and the concern about unlawful killing, are much
wider than the PDE was designed to address.
While the PDE cannot be appraised directly in terms of
the six principles of dialogue, there are clear
connections with three of the principles. The second
principle of dialogue involves a commitment to
exploring the rational bases of any positions held or
ideas offered to the process of ethical reflection.
This description and critical discussion of the PDE has
been conducted along such lines. It has been done with
a view to exploring and identifying for critical
discussion themes in and influences upon the PDE and in
turn the influence the PDE might be assumed to exert
within medical ethics in relation to euthanasia.
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The historical development of the principle as it has
been outlined here is more than a review of the
rational basis of the principle. It is equally
important as part of the understanding of the context
of the idea, which is the fifth principle of dialogue.
How the PDE has emerged and from what framework of
thought is as important to any consideration of context
as is how the idea is presently employed.
This chapter has also provided an application of the
sixth principle of dialogue, that of a need to
recognise the relative nature of conclusions. The PDE
is drawn from the Roman Catholic moral tradition, which
places great emphasis on authoritative guidelines
derived from or relating to moral absolutes, many of
which (such as the prohibition on killing) are shared
by other Christian traditions of moral reflection.
The discussion of the PDE has attempted to show that
while it appeared to be a fixed point within that moral
system it has changed and developed in its application
and in the way in which it is understood. There was a
further speculation on the extent to which the PDE
might have provided an unacknowledged and perhaps
unconscious means of relativising the prohibition on
killing.
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These two chapters have not attempted a comprehensive
review of the ethics of euthanasia but they have
through selected analyses and a sustained investigation
shown how the principles of dialogue may be used as
tools for analysing ethical confusion.' What is
obviously not addressed here is the role they might
play in helping to construct an approach with which to
engage an issue and the wider debate within which it is
being considered. The next section of two chapters on
the ethical issues connected with pornography will
encompass such an attempt.
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Chapter 7
The Ethics of Pornography
I feel very much the futility of describing sexual
emotions without describing the sexual act; I
should like to give as much detail as I have of
the meals, to the two coitions - with his wife and
Julia. It would be no more or less obscene than
to leave them to the reader's imagination, which
in this case cannot be as acute as mine. There is
a gap in which the reader will insert his own
sexual habits instead of those of my characters.
(Evelyn Waugh, on Brideshead Revisited)
In contrast with the discussion of euthanasia, the
pornography debate is not so clearly defined. The
arguments engage a range of differing criteria in
addressing the subject. These vary from considerations
of rights to the issue of freedom and the concern to
assess pornography on the basis of the harm it causes.
Unlike euthanasia and partly because it is not debated
along Judeo-Christian ethical lines, the discussions of
pornography do not directly draw on substantial
traditional arguments. These reasons alone make
1
From Waugh's Diaries, 9 May, 1944. Found in:
Evelyn Waugh, Brideshead Revisited, 1945, with an
introduction by Frank Kermode (1993), p. xiv.
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pornography an interesting if difficult area of study.
The issues raised in the ethics of pornography will be
considered in the light of the principles of round
table dialogue with a view to contributing to the
dialogue. The chapter following this will draw
together some suggestions on how a Christian approach
might be developed in dialogue. This chapter will
explore the issue of pornography under two broad
headings. The first section will give some indication
of the range of material that is encompassed by the
term pornography and the wider factors which bear on
the contemporary pornography debate. The second
section will look at the debate as it has evolved over
the last thirty years with particular emphasis on the
*3
present concerns and ways of arguing.
2
A particular difficulty m discussing pornography
is that of referring to examples for discussion.
Most pornography is available as photographs and
videos. However some films that can be used to
illustrate points are sufficiently well known to be
recognised from their title and a brief
description. There are also sociological studies
of material contained in pornographic magazines and
they in turn will be used for quotation and direct
reference.
3
This discussion will be limited to developments
within the United Kingdom, except where it is
necessary to make wider reference to follow
specific initiatives or influences.
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i what is pornography?
Pornography is evident in the high street at newsagents
and video shops. There are also those videos, books
and magazines which may be sold in licensed sex shops.
In addition, there is the illegal material which
attracts periodic attention from the police and may be
purchased covertly in this country through some sex
4
shops or privately. In attempting an understanding of
pornography that does justice to the complexities of
the topic, I propose to look at a sample of commonly
4
Catherine Itzm provides several graphic examples
of such unpleasant material in support of her
arguments against pornography. A description of
material she was shown at Scotland Yard in April
1990 gives a sufficient and clear indication of
what is involved:
1. Fist-fucking - one woman with different men's
arms up to the elbow in her vagina and anus at the
same time.
2. Fist-fucking - a man pounding his arm up to the
elbow repeatedly in the anus of another male.
3. Women being penetrated by a dog, a donkey and a
pig (while she kisses the pig's snout).
4. A man putting a cigarette out on a woman's
breast.
5. A close-up shot of a woman emptying her bowels
into the mouth of a man who was chewing and
swallowing her excrement.
6. A woman having her labia nailed to the top of a
table.
7. A man urinating into the open mouth of women.
8. Women hung by their breasts from meat hooks.
9. A woman being eviscerated and sexually murdered.
Found in: Pornography: women, violence and civil
liberties, edited by Catherine Itzin (1992,
reprinted with corrections 1993), [hereafter cited
as Pornography] pp. 50-51.
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available men's magazines discussed jointly by a
sociologist and a journalist and at the size and nature
of the pornography industry as far as it can be
accurately determined.
In 1989 Catherine Itzin and Corinne Sweet bought
seventy-three different titles of pornographic
magazines at a cost of nearly £200 from newsagents on
Clapham High Street in south London.^ The magazines
included well-known and long-running titles such as
Penthouse, Mayfair and Men Only, along with various
exotic or 'specialist' magazines.
Itzin and Sweet described the material according to
content and three main specialist themes were
identified: paedophilia, sexual violence and bondage.
As child pornography is illegal in Britain, this
category was dealt with by using young women posed to
look like little girls, sometimes with distinctive
attire and with their pubic hair shaved. A common
theme in the depiction of both sexual violence and
bondage is that the female victims come to enjoy what
is being done to them, even if they resist initially.
The investigators were surprised to discover that even
5
Catherxne Itzin, '"Entertainment for men": what it
is and what it means', in Pornography, pp. 27-53
(pp. 40-42) .
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the well-known titles carried clear depictions of the
same three themes. They were not necessarily more
subtle in their treatment of the themes. The most
common material in the well-known magazines was pages
of close-up photographs of womens' vaginas and anuses,
usually held open, inviting access for penetration.
These were accompanied by stories in which women were
described as being constantly sexually available,
insatiable and voracious. The survey shows that this
material is commonly available in Britain and does not
need to be specially ordered.
In 1990 in Britain these magazines, vtop shelf soft
porn', were estimated to have sold over twenty million
copies and be read by about five million people, mostly
men. Another estimate puts the figure twenty-five per
cent higher, but it is not possible to gauge the sales
accurately because some of the companies do not publish
their distribution figures.^ It is clear from these
figures alone that there is a considerable industry
behind the production of this material.
The British pornography industry is well integrated
into the mainstream of national business and




pornography have been around twenty-three million and
pornography makes up two per cent of the profits of the
publishing industry. The industry has been able to
expand by using traditional distribution channels and
to protect itself from any sudden fall in profits by
diversifying into other publishing and business
enterprises. Further, advertising in British
pornographic magazines, as in Playboy in North America,
is bought by many respectable businesses. A
significant feature of the British industry is its
ability to flourish within the normal business network.
An example of this which indicates of versatility of
the industry is the development of the 0898 telephone
numbers which are widely advertised. Some but not all
of these numbers are owned by the same companies which
publish the magazines. These telephone lines offer
taped recordings of popular and pornographic stars
'talking dirty' along with some explicitly violent
material. In 1987 forty-five million calls were made
to these telephone lines. The profit of this for
pornographers is estimated at thirty-five million
pounds for that year. British Telecom opened the 0898
lines in 1894 with an initial gross annual revenue of
two million pounds. This has risen to three billion
pounds in 1992. Pornography in Britain, which in
contrast with some other European countries such as
Holland, has restrictive laws and attitudes to
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pornography, is nevertheless a lucrative business.
Pornography is very difficult to define. Even within
one culture there are differences of perception
stemming from individual preferences. It seems
unlikely that this will change yet societies need some
satisfactory criteria by which to assess pornographic
material. In 1977, with the acquittal of the publisher
of Inside Linda Lovelace, attempts to prosecute the
O
written word were abandoned. Attempts at both
definition and legislation since then have not been
particularly successful and the new technologies
already pose problems in the policing pornography.
Kenneth Clark, the art historian and writer, offered a
definition designed to help distinguish between true
art and pornography. It was based on the effect which
the material either has or is designed to have on the
viewer:
To my mind art exists in the realm of
contemplation, and is bound by some sort of
7
A detailed discussion of the connections between
British pornographers and business may be found in:
'Pornography and Capitalism: the UK pornography
industry', Pornography, pp. 76-87.
O
For a discussion of the factors leading to this
situation, see Geoffrey Robertson's foreword to The
Trial of Lady Chatterley, edited by C. H. Rolph
(1961, reissued with a foreword by Geoffrey
Robertson, 1990), pp. xix-xxi.
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imaginative transposition. The moment art becomes
an incentive to action it loses its true
character. This is my objection to painting with
a communist programme, and it would also apply to
pornography.
This definition from an experienced critic illustrates
the difficulties: personal preference is all. Many
art forms are intended to move the viewer, especially
religious art and those commemorating military
triumphs. The scene depicted may evoke strong feelings
and serve a clear function of encouraging others to
self-sacrificial acts of charity or bravery. Even in
the field of pornography, it is not clear that all
1 o
pornography incites to action.
Recently very specific definitions of pornography have
been offered. A legal definition which has been
applied in the USA, influencing the formulation of new
legislation, contains two parts. Firstly, pornography
is defined as that which is graphic, sexually explicit
and subordinates women (it must contain all three of
9
Testimony to the Longford Committee on pornography,
found in: Lynda Nead, 'The Female Nude:
pornography, art and sexuality', Sex Exposed:
sexuality and the pornography debate (1992), edited
by Lynne Segal and Mary Mcintosh [hereafter cited
as Sex Exposed] , pp. 280-294 (p. 280) .
10 The possible effects of pornography will be
discussed below, but some studies of the reactions
of viewers of non-violent pornography indicate that
the material has a calming effect: Bill Thompson
Soft Core (1994), p. 118. [Hereafter this book will
be cited simply as Soft Core.]
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these characteristics). Secondly, it must also contain
one or more specific conditions of harm in the form of
sexual objectification or sexual violence.
Specifically this includes women presented as:
1. dehumanised as sexual objects, things or
commodities; or
2. as sexual objects who enjoy humiliation or
pain; or
3. as sexual objects experiencing sexual
pleasure in rape, incest or other sexual
assault; or
4. as sexual objects tied up or cut up or
mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or
5. in postures or positions of sexual
submission, servility, or display; or
6. as body parts - including but not limited to
vaginas, breasts or buttocks and anuses
exhibited such that women are reduced to
those parts; or
7. being penetrated by animals; or
8. in scenarios of degradation, humiliation,
injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior,
bleeding, bruised or hurt in a context that
makes these conditions sexual.
This definition addresses the problem of abuse and has
the advantage that it does not include sexually
explicit material premised on equality, or genuine sex
education and forensic materials (neither of which are
11 While clearly based on a model of the subordination
of women, the same definition may equally
effectively be applied to the situation of men and
children: Pornography, pp. 435-436.
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contested in the pornography debate). The distinction
between erotica (or 'sexual representations that aim to
be sexually arousing, but that are non-abusive and non-
12
sexist' ) and pornography has always been difficult to
12 • ...
establish. Sometimes distinctions are made between
types of pornography, using the terms 'soft core' and
'hard core'. Given the difficulties in defining
pornography it is not surprising that this further
distinction is often so confusing as to be virtually
Diana E. H. Russell, Pornography, p. 317.
Gordon Hawkins and Franklin E. Zimring compare the
definitions of key terms used in three government
commissions investigating pornography: the US
Johnson Commission (1970) and Meese Commission
(1986) and the UK Williams Report (1979) . Hawkins
and Zimring show how the authors of the reports
have used terms in a vague and interchangeable
fashion, made especially clear in their Tower of
Babel diagramme. Pornography in a Free Society,
chapter 2, 'On Definitions', pp. 20-29 (p. 26).
There is an obvious extent to which pornography and
erotica must be considered to be culturally
determined. Not only will what is acceptable to
one generation change from that of the generation
before, but different cultures will find different
levels of nudity and sexual activity acceptable.
While not providing a contemporary analysis of this
theme, the opening chapters of Peter Webb's The
Erotic Arts (1975, second edition 1983) illustrate
this point through his survey of the erotic in
primitive, ancient, oriental and early western art:
see especially pp. 10-174.
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useless.14 In this study only the word pornography
will be used to describe the material under discussion.
Distinctions will be evident from my description of
what is being discussed.
14
Thompson, m Soft Core, p. 2, attempts a
distinction which illustrates my point:
For all intents and purposes...British soft
core consists of pin-up style pictures of
semi-naked or naked women and men, close -up
pictures of female genitalia, and couples or
groups simulating sexual contact....British
soft core videos consist of women posing
around in underwear and taking their clothes
off.... Consequently the British tend to call
magazines and videos which show men and women
having sex in various positions and
combinations...hard core. Americans and
Europeans, however, often use the term soft
core to describe oral and genital sex, up to
and including ejaculation; hence the
description 'suck and fuck' movies. Hard core
is reserved to describe minority sexual
practices, once known as 'perversions', such
as anal sex or drinking ejaculate.
When I use the phrase soft core in this book I
will follow the American convention, and add
the prefix 'British' to refer to our top-shelf
magazines and videos. 'Hard core' will be
reserved for images which show more than
vaginal and oral sex, and all other minority
interest material will be designated by
specific type.
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ii what are the arguments?
This section will focus on the contemporary arguments
about pornography after a brief review of their
immediate antecedents. These earlier discussions
enable us to notice how consideration of the issues has
developed.
The debate in Britain today has its origins in the
Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film
Censorship (known as the Williams Report, after its
chairman Bernard Williams), published in 1979.15 It
was specifically set up to review 'the laws concerning
obscenity, indecency and violence in publications,
displays and entertainments... and to review the
arrangements for film censorship... and to make
recommendations.'(p. 1) It acknowledged the confusion
now caused by the old test of obscenity, derived from a
phrase coined in a judgment of 1868, as something with
the 'tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall.'(p. 9) The
difficulties in prosecuting literature in the nineteen
seventies contributed significantly to a recognition of
15
Hereafter cited as: Williams Report. In the
discussion which follows all references will appear
parenthetically in the text.
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the need for reform.
The Williams Committee, having consulted widely for
*1 (■^
both evidence and views,. came up with the general
conclusion that it is better to avoid the need to
censor by restricting access:
The evidence put to us showed a remarkable balance
of opinion in favour of the idea that the
principal way of controlling pornography should be
to restrict its availability.... the right way to
deal with a lot of sexually explicit material at
least, was to confine it to those who wanted it
and prevent its offending everyone else. (p. 112)
The principal objective of the law should be to
prevent offence to the public at large and to
protect young people from exposure to unsuitable
material, (p. 130)
While there was consideration of the possible harm
caused by pornography, it was conceived of more as a
public nuisance caused by inappropriate display. The
authors rejected any indication that there was evidence
to suggest a link between media violence and violence
The Committee received little evidence from women
or women's groups and attempted to remedy that with




in society. In the general sense of harm the
Williams Report is clear in dismissing any demonstrable
causal negative influence of pornography:
To regard pornography as having a crucial or even
a significant effect on essential social values,
is to get the problem of pornography out of
proportion with many other problems that face our
society today, (p. 95)
The Committee nevertheless did acknowledge that:
We were totally unprepared for the sadistic
material that some film makers are prepared to
produce. We are not here referring to the
explicit portrayal of sexual activity or to
anything which simply attracts the charge of
offensiveness. Films that exploit a taste for
torture and sadistic violence do raise further,
and disturbing, questions, (p. 144)
The Williams Committee did not explore those questions.
The Williams Report has been influential in the sense
that government policy in the 1980s attempted to limit
and restrict pornographic material along the lines of
the Report's recommendations. However, it is clear
from both the proliferation of forms of pornographic
17
There was however an acknowledgement that even some
of those who denied the existence of such a link,
Dr Guy Cumberbatch for example, did think that
there should be restrictions on the portrayal of
violence.(p. 144) The harm that was acknowledged
and considered by the Williams Committee was harm
done to those involved in making the pornographic
material, especially children. The evidence
relating to harm of performers was thought to be
less than conclusive. See pp. 65-68 & 131-133.
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material and the debate that has developed since the
committee reported, that there were inadequacies in the
Report's approach and recommendations. Some of these
are evident from reading the Report and stem from
18
obvious flaws in the arguments.
The Report does not provide any sustained analysis of
the main ethical issues, although it does try to
address the inadequacies of the old legislation in
recognising that they are no longer fit tools to
address the concerns. The Report is informed by two
concerns: a liberal notion of the right of the
individual to follow their own preferences where that
right does not impinge upon the freedom of others; and
a sense of the offence caused by the public display of
much pornographic material. It attempts to address
both of these concerns in its recommendations that
harmful material should be banned and that all other
pornographic material should be sold from limited and
clearly marked outlets. This approach has several
consequences. There is no distinction drawn between
those types of pornography deemed acceptable after the
unacceptable material has been banned altogether.
18
See: Anthony Skillen, 'Offences Ranked: the
Williams Report on obscenity' , Philosophy, 57
(1982), pp. 237-245; and Ronald Dworkin, 'Do we
have a right to pornography?', in A Matter of
Principle (1985), pp. 335-372.
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Following from this, there is no recognition that
different forms of pornography might have differing
effects on or in society. The approach of banning all
pornography is in danger of creating a distinct ghetto
attitude towards a subject, sexuality, which needs
constructive attention if society is to grow in self-
awareness in this area. Thirdly, as a result of its
reliance on the principle of what is found to offend
the public, the Report blurs, and thus makes it even
more difficult to manage, any viable distinctions
between art, erotica and pornography.
A further limitation of the Report, although not one
that bears directly on the issue of pornography as the
committee identified it, is the complete absence of
reflection on the use of sexual or pornographic imagery
in advertising or general non-pornographic films. Not
to consider these areas is to ignore the power of
visual images. The cost and effectiveness of
advertising in particular, and the influence of
political cartoons both testify to their potency. Some
consideration of advertising as a very influential area
of the media is conspicuously lacking in many studies
of pornography, not just the Report. The authors may
well have been influenced in ignoring this area through
the false distinction they established between written
and visual material, because of the failure to bring
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successful prosecutions against written material in the
19
raid-seventies.
These observations are about the consequences of the
Report's approach. There are still two significant
flaws in the reasoning which have limited the use of
the Report. The first is that by assuming that people
should have access to pornography, so long as others
are not harmed or offended, the Report has not troubled
to look at any reason why people should enjoy such
access. This point stems from the assumption that they
may enjoy or use pornography, but is it clear that
people should have such an option? Hand in hand with
this problem goes that of identifying clearly the
grounds for restricting access to pornography. A more
substantial basis for argument is required than that of
public offence or the narrow view of harm as allowed by
the Report. These shortcomings in the Williams Report
have combined with some of the difficulties that it was
set up to engage with, such as the inability of the
courts to contain the spread of pornography and the
19
Were it reporting now, m the aftermath of the
James Bulger case and the assumed influence of
'video nasties', the Williams Committee would take
much more account of the power of visual imagery.
This is now a contentious subject and one which has
evoked very strong reactions in Parliament, the
press and the community of academic psychologists.
For press coverage of the issues, see: The Daily-
Telegraph, 1 & 2 April 1994; The Guardian, 2 & 13
April 1994; The Scotsman, 14 July 1994.
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expansion of the pornography industry, to make the
issue of pornography even more complicated to discuss.
It has already been noticed that the Williams Report
was limited in its understandings of possible harms:
this is a significant weakness.
Since the publication of the Williams Report much more
attention is now paid to the issue of the possible
harmful effects of pornography. Between 1985 and 1989
government commissions in the United States, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand investigating pornography and
related concerns, reported that there was a link
between pornography and harm, particularly towards
women. In 1990 the British Home Office published a
report which it had commissioned specifically to
investigate such links. In contrast to the overseas
reports, the British one found that no causal links
could be established between pornography and sexual
violence.^
In describing the contemporary debate in Britain, I
will use three recent texts all of which have been
referred to in the first section above where they
2 0
Dennis Howitt & Guy Cumberbatch Pornography:
impacts and influences, A review of the available
research evidence on the effects of pornography
(1990), pp. 83-85.
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provided some of the material used in describing the
issues under discussion. The first, edited by Dr
Catherine Itzin, Pornography: women, violence and civil
liberties (1992), is described unequivocally on its own
cover as 'an attack on the multi-billion pound
pornography industry.' Itzin, an academic sociologist
with an active involvement in civil liberties,
maintains that:
Pornography plays an important part in
contributing to sexual violence against women and
to sex discrimination and sexual inequality.
The collection of essays she has edited presents the
arguments against pornography at several levels.
Although informed by feminist thought, the anthology is
not limited to that perspective and includes articles
and appendices on censorship and a chronology of all
anti-pornography initiatives in Britain.
Itzin's argument against pornography is threefold and
takes issue strongly with the conclusions of the
Williams Report. She and her co-writers present a
cogent case that pornography is, firstly and most
significantly, degrading and damaging to women. It is
also addictive and therefore is capable of creating and




of choice of those individuals who buy and use
pornographic material. Thirdly, the developing
pornography industry can be accused of a degree of
economic exploitation of both victims (actors and
actresses in this case) and also viewers, through the
cost of the addictive material. Estimations of the
nature and extent of this harm to various groups are
taken as the main indicator of the acceptability or
otherwise of pornography. In Itzin's words, what
pornography does 'must matter at least as much as men's
pleasure, as much as art and literature, more than the
2 2
profrts of the pornography industry.'
Bill Thompson's Soft Core: moral crusades against
pornography in Britain and America (1994) takes the
opposite point of view. Thompson, a criminologist at
Reading University, describes the various groups that
have opposed pornography and speculates less
2 3
convincingly about their motives. In presenting a




Although much of Thompson's narrative is clear and
he provides a full bibliography with suggestions
for further reading, his style lacks precision.
For example, in a discussion of the destruction of
1000 copies of D.H. Lawrence's The Rainbow,
Thompson (Soft Core, p. 17) comments:
All in all, this was probably a good thing, as
Lawrence was a prat who claimed he could
detect a difference between pornography and
his art when there is none.
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issue with the arguments of those opposed to
pornography and questions both their premises and
conclusions. In questioning the evidence and
conclusions derived from the harm studies, Thompson
wants to prevent too much weight being placed on
debatable material. He is concerned that the
opportunities to enjoy pornography which exist at
present in Britain should not be further eroded by a
campaign in which feminists and fundamentalist
Christians have allied to limit the freedoms of others.
The third text is a further collection of essays, Sex
exposed: sexuality and the pornography debate (1992),
edited by Lynne Segal and Mary Mcintosh. Like Itzin's
collection, this book is written mainly by feminists
but has a quite different slant. Segal and Mcintosh
are members of Feminists Against Censorship and their
essays reflect this concern in the debate. These
three books address the same issues and lend themselves
to fruitful comparison in a way that provides insight
into the current debate in Britain.
All three texts address the issue of harm caused by
pornography: Itzin under that title, while Thompson
considers the same material under the more neutral
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title of Pornography Effects Studies.24 Segal and
Mcintosh have a different approach and while they do
refer to the same material, the importance accorded to
it in their essays is considerably less. They consider
the issue of harm to be a product of a certain feminist
2 5
perspective about which they have reservations.
Given that the contemporary debate now focuses mainly
on the issue of the harm caused by pornography, these
important differences in perspective will be discussed
below, in the section following that on the possible
harms of pornography, where the wider arguments used in
all three texts will be analysed.
The most obvious difficulty when considering the
results of the different harm surveys is that they are
contested. Itzin and her co-writers take them to be
clear evidence that pornography causes harm but
acknowledging that in several areas more research needs
to be done. Thompson on the other hand finds no clear
link. He questions the value of the evidence and makes
some credible criticisms of their limitation as
evidence. He points out that it is impossible to
reliably compare the results of the different surveys
24
Pornography, pp. 201-397; Thompson, Soft Core, pp.
116-151.
2 5 •
See for example Elizabeth Wilson's 'Feminist
Fundamentalism: the shifting politics of sex and
censorship', Sex Exposed, pp. 15-28.
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involving responses to pornographic stimuli because the
reports of the research usually describe the methods
and type of material used but do not say which specific
books, films or pictures were shown to the subjects.
Thompson comments on the same studies as discussed in
Itzin's Pornography but concludes:
The real problem is not the contradictory results
but the manipulation of the experiments by the
researchers. Until a rigorous and uniform
standard is imposed so that the discoveries of the
past are utilized whatever is being tested, we
cannot transcend these self-imposed problems.
Until researchers agree on a common standard, the
claim that there is accumulating evidence of a
porn-aggression link is merely a testimony to
prej udice.
There appears to be no obvious way of resolving this
disagreement over the evidence from different
sociological studies. Despite the lack of agreement
on how these studies should be interpreted it it is
nonetheless useful to consider the issue of harm in
relation to pornography.
Harm may be done through pornography to a variety of
individuals. The victims range from those who are
harmed by those who have been influenced by the
material, through to those who are involved in making
the pornography and to those who buy and use it. In
26 Soft Core, p.149.
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the first instance the victims are the women who are
the wives and partners of those men who draw from
pornography, consciously or unconsciously, a particular
image of women and their sexuality which limits, and at
worst may humiliate and degrade their partners. This
influence in turn extends to all women through the
pervasive iconography of pornography where female
models are displayed in humiliating and degrading
poses, presenting them primarily in terms of their
2 7
sexual attractiveness and ready availability. In 1990
in Britain a magazine survey sought to establish
women's experience of and ideas about pornography.
Over four thousand readers of the women's magazine
Cosmopolitan responded to questionnaires. One
particular aspect of the returns had not been
anticipated by the authors of the survey and
consequently no questions addressed the issue directly.
Nevertheless, it emerged that it was claimed that
pornography had been used in a considerable number of
cases of sexual abuse, harassment and rape. While such
a survey is not conclusive, it illustrates another area
of concern and one which was corroborated by a Granada
2 7 ■ •
It was this idea among others which was behind
Clare Short and Dawn Primarollo's attempts as
Members of Parliament to move private member's
bills challenging some tabloid newspapers'
depiction of topless models on page three as well
as the prevalence of pornographic magazines in high
street newsagents. Pornography, pp. 590-594;
Thompson Soft Core, pp. 233-235.
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Television survey also conducted in 1990.
Children are a special area of concern when considering
the possible harm of pornography. This is
uncontestedly the case where they have been used as
models in the manufacture of photographs and films,
usually but not always of a very explicit nature.
Thompson does not condone child pornography and
2 9
specifically laments its existence. That no-one
defends child pornography does not mean that it is not
a problem - although the size of the problem is debated
by both Itzin and Thompson. Children may further be
harmed by pornography through viewing it or as the
result of receiving attention from or being assaulted
by an adult who may have been influenced by it to
assault them.
The third area in which pornography may cause harm is
to those directly involved in producing it. Here
concern focuses specifically on the actresses and
actors. While no specific study has been done in this
area it is possible, using one's imagination and some
of the anecdotal evidence that exists, to recognise
2 8
See: Catherine Itzin & Corinne Sweet, 'Women's
Experience of Pornography: UK magazine survey
evidence', Pornography, pp. 222-235.
Soft Core, p. 27.
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something of the nature of the problem. Just as young
women may be lured or driven into prostitution through
a combination of unfortunate domestic circumstances and
a need for money, the same can be true of reasons for
entering the pornography industry. Even though
participants in such enterprises may be adults it does
not mean that they are necessarily free agents. Linda
Lovelace, the star of Deep Throat (1973) a well known
film about oral sex, claimed to have been drugged and
hypnotised in order to perform in the film. She
further claimed that she performed under threat of
death.^ ®
Finally, there is concern that pornography may harm
those (predominantly if not exclusively men) who buy
and use it. Although the viewer sees himself as in
control of the material he watches or uses, it has a
powerful influence over him which in time distorts his
view of others, particularly women, and damages his
Thompson, Soft Core, pp. 194 & 207; Pornography,
p. 311; Webb, The Erotic Arts, p. 296. Robert J.
Stoller, in Porn: myths for the twentieth century
(1991), provides an insight into the industry
through a number of interviews with actors and
directors of sex films. Stoller is a
psychotherapist and presents the interviews
verbatim, with only limited commentary and
analysis. The most common patterns in the
interviews are those of feelings of insecurity or
past experience of sexual abuse contributing to the
individual's present occupation.
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ability to relate to them in ways that will lead to
mutually satisfying long term relationships. The
strong and often welcome feelings which users may
experience on viewing or using pornography are ones
that the individual may seek to repeat when in search
of comfort or consolation. This analysis compares
the power of pornography over some individuals to that
of an addiction. The addiction theory has been given
prominence and credibility by the confession of some
serial sex killers, such as Ted Bundy, who claim that
they were led to their acts through their addiction to
John Berger, in Ways of Seeing (1972), p. 57,
observed that nineteenth century public academic
art, which was full of figures of nude women,
played precisely this role:
Men of state, of business, discussed under
[such] paintings....When one of them felt he
had been outwitted, he looked up for




increasingly violent pornographic material. Given
the cost of pornography the addiction may also be
financially damaging for those who buy it. If this
argument is accepted, the users of pornography may be
economically exploited along with those who find
themselves driven through economic necessity to work in
the pornography industry.
One model of the possible harm caused by pornography
which connects with some of the effects studies is that
of the 'rape myth'. This is the view of aggressive
sexual behaviour towards women presented in much
pornography and the model includes the likely
2 2 •
On the eve of his execution Bundy explained how his
addiction to pornography operated:
It happened in stages, gradually, it didn't
necessarily... happen overnight. My experience
with pornography generally, but with
pornography that deals on a violent level with
sexuality, is once you become addicted to it,
and I look at this as a kind of addiction like
other kinds of addiction, I would keep looking
for more potent, more explicit, more graphic
kinds of material. Like an addiction, you
keep craving something that is harder, harder,
something which gives you a greater sense of
excitement. Until you reach a point where the
pornography only goes so far, you reach that
jumping off point where you begin to wonder if
maybe actually doing it would give you that
which is just beyond readinq it or looking at
it.
Found in: Corinne Sweet, 'Pornography and
Addiction: a political issue', Pornography, pp.
179-200 (pp. 191-192). This article gives a clear
presentation of the addiction theory.
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consequences of this in influencing behaviour.33 In
its simplest form the rape myth has four identifiable
elements. The first posits that even if a woman does
not initiate the sexual encounter, and further when she
clearly shows that she does not welcome it, such an
encounter is actually what she wants. No is in effect
taken to mean yes. Depictions of such encounters in
pornographic material commonly show the woman turning
from anxious or even terrified resistance to becoming a
willing participant. This in turn leads to the third
stage, in which the woman is shown coming to orgasm,
sometimes multiple orgasm, and ending by being grateful
to the aggressor. In the fourth and final stage, the
whole experience is presented as the liberation of the
woman's repressed sexual self.
Such depictions of rape obviously lead to several
identifiable problems. The trauma of rape is
considerably reduced by presenting the rape as
something the woman may ultimately both apparently
enjoy as well as benefit from. Rape is depicted in a
way which bears no resemblance to the experience for
the victim and which gives a false account of the
consequences of the act. Thus erroneous impressions
3 3
Diana E.H. Russell provides a useful theoretical
and diagrammatic way of understanding pornography
as a cause of rape in her 'Pornography and rape: a
causal model', Pornography, pp. 310-349.
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are given. Most potent among these are: that women may
actually want or are at least occasionally capable of
enjoying rape and the kind of sexual relationship that
it implies; that rape is not the serious crime it has
been made out to be and consequently that those who
commit it are not really so bad.
Evidence of the harm of pornography may in time be
established or it may remain elusive. How crucial are
arguments about the quality of evidence or the nature
of the connection? Will it actually be possible to
establish a direct causal link between pornographic
images and violent sexual crime and sexual
discrimination towards women? It matters, of course,
that what is claimed can be substantiated. Statistics
may show a correlation between sets of evidence, but
given human nature nothing more than probabilities can
be claimed. It is worth trying to step back from the
discussion about possible harms caused by pornography
and asking, independently of the contested evidence,
whether or not we would suspect a connection and on
what grounds. Further, it may be possible to decide
that if there is even a risk of harm caused by or
closely connected with pornography, then that risk may
be assumed to be a basis for action. We will return to
this issue in the next chapter.
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At this point it is helpful to look at the case made by
the feminists opposed to censorship, in particular
their view which questions the importance of the harm
caused by pornography. In understanding the point of
view which they put forward on this issue, it is
necessary to consider their perspective as a whole:
Censorship may cut short women's own search for
ways of understanding and expressing the
complexities of their sexual lives, and the
possibilities for increasing their sense of sexual
agency and empowerment.
They are concerned that the forms of censorship sought
by those opposed to pornography may limit the freedom
necessary to further explore all human sexuality. The
contributors to Sex Exposed want to relocate the
pornography debate within the larger debate about
sexuality in general, from which they argue it should
not be separated. The pornography debate is part of
the wider issue of the need to discover a new and equal
understanding of human sexuality within the gender
confusions and inequalities which concern all
feminists. A significant part of this search is the
exploration through various media of gay and lesbian
sexuality. These two homosexual groups have until the
last couple of decades been denied the opportunity for
self-expression which now exists. As part of finding a
3 4
Sex Exposed, pp 2-3.
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balanced view of what matters to them in the area of
sexuality they have produced or acquired various erotic
materials which may still be regarded as pornographic
and are, in some instances, prohibited in both Britain
and the United States. ^
There is therefore a significant division within the
feminist lobby over the issue of pornography, which in
turn stems from differing answers to the question posed
for feminists by the pornography debate. Here it is
put by Segal:
Is it, or is it not, possible for women to
conceive of, and enjoy, an active pleasurable
engagement in sex with men? Is it, or is it not,
possible to see women as empowered agents of
heterosexual desire?
Some radical feminist writers hold the view that all
heterosexual sex is in essence about domination of the
female by males. From this perspective sex is a mild
form of rape and as rape is primarily an act of
aggression, then all such sex is aggressive towards
women in varying degree. This line of argument helps to
clarify in part the understanding of those who argue
for seeing pornography as harmful and makes clear the
3 5
In Sex Exposed see: Kobena Mercer, 'Just looking
for trouble: Robert Mapplethorpe and fantasies of
race', pp. 92-110; Gillian Rodgerson, 'Lesbian
Erotic Explorations', pp. 275-279.
Sex Exposed, p. 79.
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need to see the pornography debate as part of a larger
discussion of views of human sexuality. The idea of
exploring pornography within the wider debate of our
thinking about sexuality is extremely important. It
will be one of the main areas considered in the next
chapter in the development of an appropriate Christian
contribution to the pornography debate.
Two further areas of reflection on pornography remain
to be considered here: the use of ideas from the debate
about free speech and the issue of the rights of the
various parties involved in pornography.
The principle of freedom of speech is invoked in the
pornography debate by those who wish to defend the
production, distribution and consumption of
pornography. The influence of this important principle
is apparent at many levels. It led the Williams Report
to allow pornography to continue to circulate, albeit
not openly. Thompson assumes it in his concern to
challenge those who seek stricter censorship. It has
been invoked in discussions of both literature and art
when they have been subject to or at risk of censorship
for obscenity. Free speech has been held to be of value
in society on two grounds. What people may say, even
if it is unpopular or misunderstood, can be important
as a corrective to a particular trend, attitude or
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pattern of behaviour in society. Secondly, there is a
distinct threat to the well being of a society that
does not allow the free consideration of ideas. A
regime may develop a position of power that is beyond
criticism and which prohibits freedom of speech to
ensure it may rule without criticism.
Therefore the question is, can those who defend
pornography show on these grounds that it makes a
worthwhile contribution to society and that without it
we should be worse off? Certainly, it can. The
representations of the gay and lesbian lobbies referred
to above from Sex Exposed are quite clear that
pornography has value for them in being a means of
allowing them as previously persecuted minorities a way
of exploring their sexuality and of developing an
accepted iconography of desire. There is a similar
argument for the exploration and development of
heterosexual sexual expression, although I do not think
it can make so strong a case, given the history of
accepted heterosexual erotic themes in almost all art.
While accepting that as a result of past censorship
there may be a benefit from allowing a degree of erotic
self-expression, it may be asked if this, arguably the
best expression of and reason for pornography, is
something which can sincerely be considered on a level
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with those ideas that the principle of the freedom of
speech seeks to protect? Itzin argues that the case
for claiming freedom of speech is weakened further when
the nature of the pornography industry is considered.
While those who defend pornography may legitimately
claim some material has an educative value, it is not
clear that this is a main concern of those who fund,
administer and profit from the industry. Another issue
which connects directly with the second area to be
considered (the rights of various parties in the
debate), is that of the restriction of the freedom of
those who claim to or are seen to suffer from the
freedom of others to produce pornography. As with the
rights issue, this concern connects with the harm
debate. If we accept Itzin's argument that pornography
causes harm to women in the form of encouraging sexual
violence and discriminatory practices, then the
restriction of freedom consequent upon that harm has to
be balanced with whatever benevolent effects the
freedom to produce and enjoy pornography may have.
The problem of assessing the extent of this harm and
the weight it should be accorded in considering the
conflicting claims to freedom, applies equally in the
closely connected area of rights. The claim by some
producers and consumers of pornography to a right of
access to a particular source of interest or pleasure
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again needs to be considered alongside whatever harm
may be caused by the use of pornography. It is
customary in discussions of rights to identify the
corresponding duties attached to a particular right.
It is not clear what these duties might be in this
area. Further, as with the idea of freedom of speech,
it is not clear precisely what benefits, beyond that
mentioned of erotic self-expression, might be gained
for individuals or society as a whole by a right to
pornography or in reverse lost were that right not to
be recognised.
The legal philosopher, Ronald Dworkin, whose work on
euthanasia was considered in chapter five, has proposed
the idea of a 'right to moral independence' within a
discussion of the ideas influencing the writing of the
Williams Report. He acknowledges that such a right is
difficult to sustain because it takes no account of the
obvious problem of competing rights. He made this
suggestion in trying to discover a philosophical basis
for the proposals of the Williams Committee. Such a
right could explain the idea of people having access to
37.
Dworkin, 'Do we have a right to pornography?', pp.
335-372 (pp. 353-359) . For an extended critical
discussion of this proposal on its own merits and
within the rest of Dworkin's thoughts on rights,
see: Rae Langton, 'Whose Right?: Ronald Dworkin,
women and pornographers', Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 19 (1990), pp. 311-359.
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material deemed by others to be offensive but it is
incompatible with the commonly accepted bases of social
order and responsibility if any of the claims about the
harm of pornography can be sustained. While we might
allow someone to do something that may be detrimental
to their own well-being, such as viewing pornography,
we cannot condone that as a right where harm to others,
in this case usually women, may be an outcome. Thus,
it is clear that the arguments employing terms from the
debates about freedom of speech and rights have similar
concerns and consequent limitations.
One approach which has been used in the United States
as part of the pornography debate has been informed by
the civil rights campaign, particularly in the area of
racial discrimination. Britain's laws in the areas
of restricting racial and sexual discrimination are not
as effective or as highly developed as those in
America. One area where this approach has been
identified as having a possible application in Britain
is in connection with the prohibition of incitement to
racial hatred in the Race Relations and Public Order
"3 O
Acts. For this to apply to pornographic material it
would have to be shown to encourage viewers to act upon
3 8
Mandy Merck, 'From Minneapolis to Westminster', in
Sex Exposed, p. 55.
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what they have seen in a negative way towards women,
either in terms of sexual discrimination or sexual
violence.
* * *
This review illustrates several difficulties in
discerning the nature of pornography and with the
ethical reflection upon it. Pornography cannot be
easily or even satisfactorily defined. The inability
to agree on a definition stems in part from the diverse
nature of the material but mainly from the fact that
those who engage in the debate about the extent to
which it should be permitted all approach the issue
from different perspectives and with different outcomes
in view. Seeing the same material as representing
different things and conveying different messages makes
agreement difficult.
This same point, the positions from which participants
in the debate are arguing and their intended outcomes,
is an important factor in the limited use or clarity
afforded by the traditional ethical arguments that are
employed in debates about pornography. Some
discrepancy is apparent in the appeal to ideas like
rights or the freedom of speech, when it is not at ail
clear that either individuals or society benefit from
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pornography. The failure of the Williams Report to
either engage constructively with the issue of the
possible harm caused by pornography or to offer a
philosophical or moral framework within which to
address the pornography debate, led to further
confusion and polarization of the discussion in
Britain. The lack of clarity in assessing the possible
harms caused by pornography further confuses the
debate.
If the debate as it has been outlined here is
understood as a round table dialogue, analysis of what
has happened is not difficult. Itzin and Thompson are
both committed to their respective and almost mutually
exclusive points of view. Thompson in particular
expresses his argument in a frustrated, dismissive and
confrontational style. His approach will need some
modification before he and Itzin would be likely to
agree to participate together in a dialogue formed
around principles of mutual respect, clarification,
learning and a commitment to openness. Both writers
challenge the position of those with whom they disagree
with implicit claims that they do not honestly
represent the material under discussion. Thompson
accuses the feminists in favour of censorship of an
over scrupulous concern and of exaggerating the
possible harm. Itzin is concerned that those who argue
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for the freedom to enjoy pornography either do not
understand the harm it may cause or do not care.
The feminists against censorship introduced the
possibility for a reappraisal of this confrontation.
Both Itzin and Thompson share different common ground
with this third group. That said, the bond of
differing feminist perspectives between this group and
that represented by Itzin does not appear to be as
strong as that of concern over too much censorship.
The concern for freedom in both Thompson and Segal and
Mcintosh is sufficient to lead them both to challenge
or set aside the clear claims of harm made by Itzin.
Therefore the dialogue which might have developed is
still hindered by clear allegiances to either the
concern over harm or the importance of particular
freedoms. The most difficult aspect of this argument
is the strong commitment of the main participants,
Itzin and Thompson, to points of view which seem to
1 9
virtually exclude dialogue.
This points to the need to find a new way of
approaching the issue of pornography. As mentioned
above, some of the feminists opposed to censorship
3 9
Thompson's concluding remark unambiguously ends
dialogue: xMe? I'm going to learn Dutch, and get
the first plane over there.' Soft Core, p. 285.
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writing in Sex Exposed argued for pornography to be
dealt with as part of the wider debate on human
sexuality. However, they have not engaged in any
sustained exploration of this avenue. Moving the
debate about pornography into the wider context of
human sexuality, could provide precisely the broader
perspective necessary to understand, challenge and
perhaps overcome some of the confusion.
In the next chapter there will be an attempt to provide
precisely this perspective, through the development of
a Christian ethical critique of pornography. As with
the discussion of the debate on euthanasia, this study
of pornography is attempting to show how the issue
itself both challenges and may in turn be understood or
challenged in turn by the perspectives of Christian
ethics within the framework of round table dialogue.
Where the second chapter in the case study of
euthanasia focused on an important issue that informs
most discussions of the subject, this second part of
the case study on pornography will look at the
development of the contribution that Christian ethical
reflection might make in the debate. This will require
an acknowledgement of the historical limitations of
some Christian thought in this area as a necessary
preliminary to participation in the dialogue.
280
Chapter 8
Christian Responses to Pornography in Dialogue
I went to the Garden of Love.
And saw what I had never seen:
A Chapel was built in the midst,
Where I used to play on the green.
And the gates of this Chapel were shut,
And Thou shalt not, writ over the door;
So I turn'd to the garden of Love,
That so many sweet flowers bore,
And I saw it was filled with graves,
And tomb-stones where flowers should be:
And Priests in black gowns, were walking their
rounds,
And binding with briars, my joys & desires.
(William Blake1)
The dialogue in the last chapter has not been fruitful.
Segal and Mcintosh suggested broadening the debate to
include views of human sexuality. Their proposal to
change the context of this discussion of pornography
provides an opportunity to open the dialogue to a new
participant: a liberal Christian perspective.
Thompson, if he can be persuaded to delay his departure
for Holland, may not welcome this development. He has
decided opinions on the contribution of fundamentalist
Christians and their unequivocal condemnation of all
1
'The Garden of Love', Songs of Innocence and
Experience, 1789-1794, with an introduction and
commentary by Geoffrey Keynes (1970), plate 44.
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forms of pornography. The other participants may also
need persuading of the value of engaging with Christian
perspectives as a distinct fourth partner in this
dialogue. Two further factors might contribute to a
reluctance about having Christians join the dialogue.
First, such a contribution could be an unknown
quantity. The views of the main Christian churches
appears either no longer to be offered or sought in
discussions of pornography, in contrast to euthanasia.4
Secondly, all three participants might well be aware of
the Christian churches' tradition of predominantly
? ....
For an example of the approach which he criticises,
see: John H. Court, Pornography: a Christian
critique (1980) .
^ The recent Manila Declaration on Pornography
(produced in January 1995 and included here as
Appendix 2) would not change the dialogue as it
stood at the end of the last chapter. That
document, produced at the end of an international
conference on pornography (convened by the broadly
based North American Religious Alliance Against
Pornography) by participants drawn from a wide
range of faith groups, calls for a concerted effort
to recognise the harms of pornography, especially
as it affects women and children. In emphasis the
document reflects Itzin's concerns and does not
engage in theological analysis.
4
Where there is a contribution, it is sometimes
difficult to discern. The Williams Report did have
E.J. Tinsley, then Bishop of Bristol, as a member
of the committee but his ecclesiastical position is
not acknowledged in the report. The position is
quite different in North America, where there has
been considerable formal church activity since the
mid 1970s: see Mary Pellauer, 'Pornography: an
agenda for the churches', The Christian Century,
29 July-5 August 1987, pp. 651-655 (p. 652) .
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negative attitudes in this area.
As long ago as the trial of D. H. Lawrence's novel Lady
Chatterley's Lover, in October 1960, it was possible to
challenge the general relevance of a Christian
perspective in this area. The Bishop of Woolwich, Dr
John Robinson, was called for the defence and
questioned aggressively by the prosecution on the
grounds of his ability to be an expert witness. Other
clergy were present, but were not challenged because
they had directly relevant experience in either
broadcasting, education or youth work.^ What is
interesting is that the prosecution did not consider a
bishop of the Church of England sufficiently qualified
to give evidence in the area of pornography on the
basis of his position, responsibility and general
theological training alone.
It is, however, possible to imagine the hypothetical
Christian participant putting together a case in
seeking admission to the dialogue. Responding to
these and other concerns raised by the present
participants would be part of the dialogical process.
It is necessary to address three particular questions
^ The Trial of Lady Chatterley, pp. 68-73.
6 Ibid., pp. 89-91; 145-147; 159-165.
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before going on to consider how the perspectives of
Christian ethics might engage with the contemporary
debate about pornography. Firstly, why has this state
of affairs arisen, where Christian ethics either does
not have or is perceived not to have a contribution to
make to the discussion? The second question is why is
there very little apparent and active concern among
Christian ethicists today over the issue of
pornography? Thirdly, it is reasonable for the present
participants in the dialogue to ask the prospective
participant on what basis they intend to contribute.
Each of these issues must be considered as preliminary
to articulating an ethical response to pornography
along Christian lines. A necessary part of preparing
to join the discussion is an awareness of weaknesses
and limitations in one's own position and at the same
7
time a sense of its emphases and concerns.
7
In the following two sections it is necessary to
cover enormous areas of scholarship in a very brief
fashion and there is danger of over simplification
on at least two levels. First, that the summaries
do not do justice to the complexities of the issues
discussed. Secondly, that in attempting to draw
connections and inferences in areas where there are
few maps or previously demonstrated connections
there is the temptation to make more of some points
of view or theories than the evidence might
reasonably be expected to bear. What follows,
especially in the second section on possible
reasons for the contemporary Church's lack of
involvement in the pornography debate, should be
taken as informed speculation.
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i Christian attitudes to sexuality
The Christian attitude to sex in general has been
almost entirely negative until this century and the
consequent approach to sexual ethics may be caricatured
as a concern to recommend that the right organ is
O
placed in the right orifice of the right person. Most
negative expressions have the same root in a
combination of the traditional interpretations of the
creation and fall from Genesis and more generally in
the patriarchal tradition which has dominated scripture
and the thinking and interpretations of the Christian
community (which will be considered below when thinking
about the lack of effective engagement with
pornography).
These two themes combined to influence several
attitudes which developed within the western Christian
tradition. These are the renunciation of the flesh
with the connected idea of the elevation of the
® Elizabeth Templeton, in 'Sexuality in the '90s:
thinking theologically', in her The Strangeness of
God, pp. 103-119 (p. 112), has put this more
gracefully, when talking of the Roman Catholic
natural law tradition:
Sex at the wrong time in the wrong place with
the wrong person or the wrong bit of the body
(and that, notoriously, has sometimes meant
everything except missionary-position
penetration by a monogamous heterosexual
couple) is redefined as 'unnatural'.
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celibate state as one of the highest vocations, and the
role of sex within marriage as being almost entirely
confined to procreation. The idea of renouncing the
pleasures of the flesh grew from the notion that our
physical response was beyond the control of reason and
in this sense part of our primitive and unredeemed
9
nature. Spiritual development necessitated the
triumph of the will over the body. An individual who
dedicated himself to developing such control and could
eventually claim immunity to natural feelings, whether
sexual or otherwise, was moving closer to communion
with God.1® In this context, it clear to see how
celibacy developed as a popular vocation. The idea of
renouncing sexual relations was seen as removing the
9
There is a famous, influential and much quoted
passage from St Augustine, describing the Fall,
where Adam's erection is seen as the sign of the
will's inability to control the body. Peter Brown,
The Body and Society (1988), pp. 416-7.
1(®
For a series of amusing and bizarre incidents by
individuals who adopted this purpose in life see
John Saward's Perfect Fools: folly for Christ's
sake in Catholic and Orthodox spirituality (1980),
pp. 12-21. St Simeon Salos (d. ?590) sought to
express his passionlessness through a several
incidents including once running into a bath house
for women. In imagery that would not have confused
Freud, he said:
Believe me, my son, as wood is with other
pieces of wood, so I was then. I felt neither
that I had a body, nor that I had entered a
place where there were bodies. My whole soul
was taken up with the Lord's work, and I did
not desist from it.
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risks posed by indulging in the temptations of the
flesh and as freeing the individual to give themselves
more fully to spiritual works, either in prayer or in
serving the Christian community.1
Not everyone, as St Paul recognised, was capable of
such renunciation and for them marriage was allowed.
The tradition of marriage did not encourage
unrestricted sexual relations between husband and wife.
Procreation was the primary purpose of sexual
intercourse. Forms of sexual expression or
gratification that would not directly result in
conception were discouraged. Only recently has there
been a liturgical acknowledgement that sexual relations
1 2
might have virtue beyond the begetting of children.
This antipathy to sex has so coloured the Christian
response to broad issues of sexuality that in the
The text on this topic is Peter Brown's The Body
and Society: men, women and sexual renunciation in
early Christianity.
12
The different prefaces to the marriage services in
the Book of Common Prayer and its sequels make the
point quite clearly. In Cranmer's preface to the
service in 1662, the first purpose of marriage is
procreation, the second is the containment of sin
and the third mutual comfort. In the proposed
revision of 1928, these emphases were affirmed
through being repeated in that order. In the
Alternative Service Book 1980 mutual comfort and
physical delight are placed ahead of the possibility
of having children.
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second half of this century a major review has been
necessary to enable the Churches to engage with the
emergent issues of both homosexuality and feminism.
ii reasons for the contemporary lack of effective
engagemen t
The above review gives an indication why Christian
ethicists might have trouble making constructive
contributions to a debate considering topics such as
sexuality in general and pornography in particular. An
important contribution to confusions in the area of
sexuality is the way in which women have been viewed
11
within the Christian tradition.
Particularly important in understanding the confusion
of Christian attitudes to sexuality, the body and
especially the female body, is the contrast between the
development of the cult of the Virgin Mary and the
negative attitude towards women in general. As the
mother of Christ, Mary was celebrated in tradition as
the new Eve, the woman through whose obedience and
purity the mistakes of the first woman would be
13
A good general survey of the place and role of
women from biblical times to the present is given
in Ruth B. Edward's The Case for Women's Ministry
(1989), which addresses wider issues than the title
suggests.
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redressed. No praise was too high for her and from the
central middle ages her cult grew until she was
venerated throughout Christendom.14 A significant fact
about Mary in popular and theological opinion was that
she gave birth without intercourse. Thus, she was
free from the inevitable taint of sinful lust that
accompanied all acts of intercourse.15 In contrast to
Mary's position, from the earliest Christian centuries
there was a strong and unequivocal strand of plain
hatred of women. Eve was seen as the prototype of all
women, who in Eden had though her own selfishness, lack
of will and disobedience, brought about the fall of
humankind. Woman remained the temptress, who through
her sensual, uncontrolled and virtually uncontrollable
charms might bring destruction upon the unprepared
individual.
14 Marina Warner's Alone of All Her Sex: the myth and
cult of the Virgin Mary (1976), provides a wide
ranging discussion of this topic.
16 ■ ...
The doctrines of both the Perpetual Virginity of
Mary and that of the Immaculate Conception,
illustrate the desire to think of Mary, and thus
the perfect woman, as removed from the normal
processes of procreation that are part of the
experience of all women. Ibid., pp. 64-65 & 236-
254. The idea of Mary's perpetual virginity was
first asserted in the time of the Fathers, in the
apocryphal Book of James. The doctrine of the
Immaculate Conception was only promulgated in 1854,
but had been debated in the west since the central
middle ages. The cultural historian Peter Gay
notes the damaging effects of this teaching on
attitudes to sexuality: The Bourgeois Experience:
Victoria to Freud (1986), volume 2, pp. 48-50.
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The cult of the Virgin Mary is remarkable as an
illustration of ambivalence within a patriarchal
tradition, which from the time of the Fathers at least
1 G
has also shown a strand of misogynism. This is an
area worth trying to explore a little further in an
attempt to understand the surprising silence of
Christian ethicists in the area of pornography.
Margaret Miles has addressed the theme of female nudity
17
m the western Christian tradition. Through her work
it is possible to identify two particular areas of
Christian imagery and reflection which are
distressingly close in their themes to those of
pornography. These are accounts and later depictions
of the trials of early Christian female martyrs and
secondly, the depiction in art of various biblical
scenes. The most vivid and obviously problematic is the
former, the accounts and depictions of female martyrs.
Here the problem is two-fold and it should be
acknowledged that the events described and later
1G
On patriarchal influences in biblical material, see
by way of summary and introduction Daphne Hampson's
Theology and Feminism (1990), especially pp 81-92.
For the attitudes of the Fathers, see Edwards, The
Case for Women's Ministry, pp. 89-101. For the
influence of misogyny, see John Shelby Spong,
"Misogyny: a pattern as ancient as life', and other
relevant essays in the second section of his Into
The Whirlwind (1983), pp. 66ff.
17 Carnal Knowing: female nakedness and religious
meaning in the Christian west (1992) .
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depicted were done by those persecuting the martyrs.
Having occurred, these events were recorded within the
Christian tradition', which at different times in its
history drew strength from the recounting of
adversities faced by those called to be witnesses to
their faith in Christ. Miles wants to draw attention
to the manner of the recalling, first in the written
accounts of the martyrdoms and then in the later
pictorial representations. Her point is that there is
not equal treatment of male and female martyrs:
Martyrdom...was an occasion on which women were
often stripped of their clothing before crowds in
late Roman colosseums. The regularity with which
the female body and female nakedness were featured
in acta and popular novels indicates that their
readers expected such details, though they seldom
note male martyrs' nakedness.
Martyrdom literature, though it reveals women's
attitudes to their bodies, also indicates that
Christian authors and audiences shared the
interest of late-classical crowds in female
nakedness. In many martyrdom accounts, respect
and esteem for women martyrs vies with textual
interest in their bodies or concern to establish
the inferiority of their sex, disclosing male
confusion and conflict over heroic Christian
women.
Later, in the Renaissance, interest in the details of
female martyrdoms was fostered by the publication of
18
Carnal Knowing, pp. 56-57. Miles's discussion of
this point of view with examples can be found on
pp. 53-63.
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accounts, often accompanied by illustrations.19 At
much the same time there came to be an interest in the
depiction of certain biblical scenes which again may be
interpreted in several ways. Miles discusses those of
the nude Eve and the story of Susanna and the elders.
She makes the point that there is possibly another
reading of the images beyond those of straightforward
depiction of the individuals. Along with images of Eve
and Susanna as sinner and sinned against respectively,
there are themes represented by the nudity of the
figures. Where in male figures nudity may be read as a
sign of spiritual struggle and integrity, there is no
such tradition behind the depiction of the female nude,
which is primarily associated with male desire: va
naked woman is necessarily too erotic to portray heroic
2 0
spiritual struggle'. The female nude is
predominantly associated with sin and temptation in the
Christian tradition. That this point holds true beyond
19
Miles describes such works as 'religious
pornography', Carnal Knowing, p. 156. Another art
historian, Edward Lucie-Smith in Sexuality in
Western Art (originally published as Eroticism in
Western Art, 1972, revised 1991), who acknowledges
the voyeuristic theme in depictions of some
biblical scenes (pp. 36-38), does however make the
point that:
Curiously enough...it is representations of
male saints which offer more abundant material
for the study of sadistic imagery in painting
than representations of female ones. (p. 216)
2 0
Carnal Knowing, p. 144.
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a particular period in Christian history is made by the
following contemporary example.
Edwina Sandys' Christa (1983) is a sculptural
representation of a nude female figure in cruciform
shape. This image hung for some time in the Cathedral
of St John the Divine, New York, where it was seen as
offering a vivid and theologically interesting
interpretation of the sufferings of woman. However it
too is obviously open to other readings, especially in
a culture which through pornography celebrates the
humiliation of women through suffering:
The naked and tortured female body has been
appropriated by a media culture and cannot
therefore be arbitrarily assigned religious
meaning. The Christa cannot communicate religious
meaning in twentieth-century Western culture any
more than sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
paintings of Susanna and the Elders could
effectively communicate Susanna's innocence in
societies for which, for centuries, female flesh
had symbolized sin, sex, and the fall of the human
race.
Miles does not claim that Christianity is hindered in
challenging pornography but it is a reasonable
deduction from what she has argued. She makes a case
for a heightened awareness when viewing aspects of the
21
Carnal Knowing, p. 177. For a wider discussion of
this event and some themes in feminist theology and
sexuality associated with it, see: Carter Heyward's
Touching our Strength: the erotic as power and the
love of God (1989), pp. 114-118.
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Christian tradition in art, especially in relation to
the depiction of women. If there is either a covert
enthusiasm for the themes of pornography in the
tradition, or more likely an unconscious collusion with
aspects of a tradition that condones the humiliation of
women, then that same tradition will not find it easy
to either identify the issues of pornography or
credibly challenge them when they have been identified.
We must now address the third question asked of the
potential participants as they seek to join the round
table dialogue, having offered a critical review of
their tradition. This question divides into two
connected parts. On what basis might Christian ethics
participate in the wider discussion and secondly what
may Christian ethics contribute to the dialogue?
Two particular issues in the area of human sexuality
have concerned the churches in recent decades:
homosexuality and the growth of feminism. Feminism has
been evident in the churches as in society but has also
taken the particular form of the long and continuing
debate over the issue of the ordination of women to the
priesthood, especially in the Roman Catholic and
Anglican Churches. Both of these factors have resulted
in a gradual but profound rethinking of many of the
traditional Christian views in the area of sexual
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2 2
ethics. The need for the churches to reconsider
their views and the consequent reflection by Christian
ethicists has taken place against a wider background of
important factors influencing social change. Four such
have been identified in reviewing specific changes in
Christian views: the developments in contraceptive
methods; the influence of co-education, especially at
residential tertiary level; 'the re-emergence of
feminism'; and the increasing medical recognition of an
involuntary element in determining individual sexual
23
orientation.
These factors have combined to produce a view of human
sexuality within Christian perspectives which is wholly
positive. The following quotation illustrates this
2 2
Issues in Human Sexuality, a statement by the House
of Bishops of the Church of England (1991), for
example, is a response to the call of the 1988
Lambeth Conference for a 'deep and dispassionate
study of the issue of homosexuality' (p. vii),
which provides its now infamously flawed response
as part of a study of biblical and Christian views
of sexuality. See Michael Banner's 'Five Churches
in search of sexual ethics: a short commentary on a
statement from the House of Bishops and some other
recent reports', Theology, XCVI (1993), pp. 276-
289. A less well-known but worthy contribution to
increasing an awareness among the churches about
human sexuality is Robin Smith's Living in Covenant
with God and with One Another: a guide to the study
of sexuality and human relations using statements
from member churches of the World council of
Churches (1990) .
23 Elizabeth Templeton, 'Sexuality in the '90s:
thinking theologically', The Strangeness of God,
pp. 103-119 (p. 104).
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clearly and is drawn from the foreword to a collection
of essays by twenty-eight contributors, mainly from
North America, which aims to provide a resource for
further Christian thinking in this area:
Sexuality embraces our way of being in the world
as persons embodied with biological femaleness or
maleness and with internalized understandings of
what these genders mean. Sexuality includes our
erotic orientations - our attractions to the other
sex, to the same sex or to both. Sexuality
includes the range of feelings, interpretations,
and behaviours through which we express our
capacities for sensuous relationships with
ourselves, with others, and with the world. While
sexuality is always rooted in our bodily
realities, it is much larger than these, always
involving our minds, our feelings, our wills our
memories, indeed our self-understandings and
powers as embodied persons.
Theologically, we believe that human sexuality,
while including God's gift of the procreative
capacity, is most fundamentally the divine
invitation to find our destinies not in loneliness
but in deep connection. To the degree that it is
free from the distortions of unjust and abusive
power relations, we experience our sexuality as
the basic eros of our humanness that urges,
invites, and lures us out of our loneliness into
innate communication and communion with God and
the world.
With this positive view of human sexuality and sexual
expression in both human relations and those with God,
there is a new appreciation of the importance of the
24
Sexuality and the Sacred: sources for theological
reflection, edited by James B. Nelson and Sandra P.
Longfellow (1994), p. xiv.
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2 5
sexual m our spiritual development. For centuries
the language of sexual desire has been used
figuratively by some Christian mystics to describe both
their longing for God and their experience of mystical
union with him. However, it is now possible to find
descriptions of sexual intercourse which are paralleled
with participation in the eucharist:
Sexual union is eucharistic, a liturgy that may
heal and restore loving partners to a spiritual
centredness. In this liturgy, union is capable of
performing something with a deep meaning. Those
who freely unite themselves with another come to
know themselves at the same time as profoundly
self-possessed, rather than invaded or stolen.
ie "k ie
2 S
See for example Urban T. Holmes's Spirituality for
Ministry (1982), chapter 6, 'Sexuality and
Holiness', pp. 95-112. The first British writer to
make a substantial claim for the importance of
understanding our sexuality in relation to our
spiritual development was Alan Ecclestone in res to
God (1975); see especially chapter 6, 'Spirituality
and Sexual Love', pp. 87-103.
Philip Sheldrake, Befriending our Desires (1994) p.
66. See also Adrian Thatcher's Liberating Sex: a
Christian sexual theology (1993), pp. 41-44. This
is in marked contrast to the earlier strict
separation of these two activities. Bede's A
History of the English Church and People,
translated with an introduction by Leo Sherley-
Price (1955, revised 1968), records a
correspondence between Pope Gregory and St
Augustine, active in England 597-c.604/5, in which
they discuss the concern about men receiving
communion after intercourse and if, a priest, the
concern about celebrating the eucharist after
'impurities in dreams', pp. 76-83.
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In the first part of this chapter we have reviewed both
negative attitudes to sexuality within the Christian
tradition and a possible ambivalence within that same
tradition which may account in part for the unusual
silence around the issue of pornography. Feminism
along with the issue of the ordination of women and the
growing tolerance of homosexuality have each
contributed to a wide review and reformulation of
traditional Christian attitudes to issues of sexuality.
It is possible to show a consistently clear and
positive appraisal of the sexual aspects of human
experience within Christian thinking. Thus, Christian
ethicists may contribute to the dialogue on pornography
from a position that has an affirmative view of
sexuality and its general importance along with a
specific valuing of the human body in its own right and
as an arena of the sacred.
In terms of the round table dialogue on pornography, we
may now understand how it is that the Christian
perspective is not directly represented in public
debates. The brief surveys above have a two-fold
purpose in terms of the argument of this chapter. They
demonstrate how what has been said before may influence
a new discussion. They also serve as an important
first stage in seeking re-admission to the current
debate by stating how the present participants stand in
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relation to what has gone before. In order to take up
a place at the table Christian ethicists need to make
clear (for their own sake as well as that of the other
participants) where they stand in relation to the
tradition of reflection in the area under discussion.
This the above survey does, demonstrating both past
confusions and present commitments. Christian
participation in the wider debate needs to begin with
an acknowledgement that all was not for the best in the
past and that the task of revision is not complete, or
as Gareth Moore has put it succinctly: vThe church
2 7
needs to do more thinking about sex.' The chance to
participate in a dialogue about pornography is a
welcome opportunity occurring as a result of having
begun to reformulate Christian views of sexuality and
at the same time it provides a welcome stimulus to
necessary further thinking.
7 7
The Body in Context: sex and Catholicism (1992), p.
213.
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Hi dialogue around the table
In discussions of pornography among Christian
ethicists, who all consider it within the context of
human sexuality, three dominant concerns may be
9 p
identified. First, an attempt to discern the
meanings of pornography and secondly, a concern about
the consequences for human relationships influenced by
pornography. Thirdly, there is a desire to assess the
issue in terms of love. There is also an attempt to
move away from the caricatured traditional concerns of
Christian ethics. Further, all Christian perspectives
pay clear attention to the given nature of our bodies
and our capacity for sexual pleasure. Theologically
this is understood in terms of God's creation of
humankind and our essential relationship with him that
embraces all aspects of life: 'God is the creator of
9 8
In the following discussion I will mainly be
drawing on four writers who have commented directly
on pornography: James B. Nelson Embodiment: an
approach to sexuality and Christian theology
(1979), pp. 163-168 [hereafter referred to as
Embodiment], L. William Countryman, Dirt, Greed &
Sex: sexual ethics in the New Testament and their
implications for today (1989) , pp. 243 & 245-6;
Adrian Thatcher, Liberating Sex, pp. 187-190; Mary
Pellauer, 'Pornography: an agenda for the
churches', The Christian Century, 29 July-5 August
1987, pp. 651-655, [hereafter referred to as
Pellauer, 'Pornography']. This article is also
reprinted in the anthology Sexuality and the




the body and its enormous potential for pleasure.'
This will be an important aspect of the Christian
contribution to the dialogue but it will not
necessarily be overt. To talk of something as given or
as a gift implies a giver and to recognise something in
this way affects our attitude towards it. There is
something special, or set apart, about our bodies,
which comes from the way Christians believe them to be
given and which in turn may determine how we use them.
Dr Mary Pellauer, writing specifically on pornography
as a feminist theologian, mentions a further concern.
There is an initial reluctance to confront pornography
in public debate within Christian circles for fear of
provoking a tirade against sexuality in general.
Although there has been a review within Christian
thinking of attitudes to sexuality, not all parts of
the Christian community have followed the new
Thatcher, Liberating Sex, p. 39
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thinking.3®
Concern about the meanings of pornography focuses on
issues such as who is using it, in what context and the
important issue of what might be being communicated
through the images portrayed. There is common
agreement that the predominant though not exclusive
users of pornography are men. There are a range of
possible situations in which pornographic material is
being used. Adolescents may use it to gain an
awareness of the sexual facts of life31 and to gain
release of sexual tension where that is not open to
them through regular sexual relationships. Where
pornography is used by prisoners, widowers and other
individuals in isolated situations where they are
3 0
Pellauer, 'Pornography', p. 651. She indicates two
areas where participation can make individuals
vulnerable from some quarters:
Whatever we say about porn may reveal things
about us we would rather keep concealed. In
some circles, for a woman even to look at
pornography, let alone to observe and analyse
it, raises suspicions about her morality.
Though I see the need to confront pornography
as a Christian, I fear touching off a backlash
against sexuality and against women in the
churches. I often feel tongue-tied in the
face of these issues.
31
More than half of a sample of boys under fourteen
claimed that pornography was their main source of
information about sex. Adrian Thatcher, Liberating
Sex, p. 188, quoting from a TV broadcast on 5
November 1992.
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unable to find other outlets for their sexual energy,
might it be viewed differently from the same use by an
individual within an established physical relationship?
It would depend on what is portrayed. In the latter
situation there is more than one person involved. The
second partner in the relationship may have different
views about pornography from those of the individual
using it and furthermore may find that the pornography
influences the sexual preferences of their partner in
3 "3
ways that they do not find acceptable. It is
possible that the pornography may provide a means of
broadening and enriching the sex life of the couple.
In following this issue it is necessary to consider
what may be communicated by pornography.
The last chapter gave a clear idea of what is contained
in and may be communicated by much popular pornographic
material. Nelson sees an essential distinction in
considering material that may be sexually explicit but
not exploitative. What matters is the manner in which
the sexual action is portrayed:
3 2
Masturbation was traditionally condemned in
Christian morality. For a contemporary view see:
Jack Dominion & Hugh Montetiore, God, Sex & Love
(1989) , pp. 27-29 .
3 3
See Catherine Itzm and Cormne Sweet, 'Women's
Experience of Pornography: UK magazine survey
evidence', Pornography, pp. 222-235; see also Sex
Exposed, p. 86.
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If it is non-exploitative and if it adequately
portrays human sexual expression in both its
goodness and its human complexity, that is one
thing. But if its promises are false, if it is
exploitative of persons and if it rests on the very
dualisms from which we seek healing, that is quite
another.
Where pornographic images affirm patterns of physical or
emotional abuse and offer such as models for relating,
rather than as critical reflections of the complexity of
human loving, then they are to be condemned. Where
images affirm a patriarchal and abusive view of women
and a consequently distorted idea of sexuality they
likewise cannot be accepted. Pellauer makes the further
and valuable point that in Christian discussions of
pornography there is a clear need to distinguish between
objections to material on the grounds that it is sexual
and that it may combine sex and violence. The historic
Christian condemnation of sexual activity has led to an
ignoring of the violence in the acts condemned and some
right wing Church groups may still be focusing on the
sex rather than on the violence which may for them
determine the pornographic nature of the material being
3 5discussed. In assessing the consequences for




Pellauer, 'Pornography', p. 653. In support of her
criticism of the tradition in confusing sex and
violence, she cites St Augustine on rape in The
City of God, Book I, chapters 17-30.
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issue of a causal link between pornography and harm,
but are unanimous in seeing a connection between
pornography and a threat to the establishment of lasting
and equal relationships based on mutual love and
respect.
The third aspect of Christian comment on the issue of
pornography and one that is absent from the wider debate
is the role of love. Love not just as what is conveyed
in some sexual activity but love as the context within
which to attempt an understanding of the whole debate.
Gareth Moore reviews Roman Catholic attitudes to
sexuality and sexual ethics and argues for love as the
dominant criteria for assessing action in this area:
Much of what we do may not particularly concern or
affect others, but in so far as it does the
questions we are to ask are: Is what I am doing
just or unjust? Is it generous rather than mean?
Is it an attempt to dominate? And so on. In short:
is this a loving action, or a habit of a loving
action?
Moore's perspective is not unique but is valuable when
applied in the area of sexual ethics which, in
Catholicism in particular, has traditionally been
determined by law rather than love. Moore's criteria,
in the form of the question, 'is this a loving action,
n r
For contrasting views see: Nelson, Embodiment, pp.
163-167, and Thatcher, Liberating Sex, p. 188.
The Body In Context, p.3.
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or the habit of a loving action?' may usefully
contribute to the dialogue about pornography.
In summary, it is possible to find Christian thinkers
who have made assessments of pornography and whose
concerns reflect those already present in the wider
debate: such as the portrayal of women and human
sexuality in a degrading and confusing fashion; the
possible connection between harm and pornography; and
the possible benefit of the portrayal of sexual
activity if it is within the context of rendering a
true and honest picture of the human condition. In
this last area particularly, the idea of the
determining role of love has some application as it may
do within the wider debate, even where it is not
conspicuously present as a significant factor or moral
principle. The other positions in the pornography
dialogue, identified in the previous chapter, have
varying perspectives on these issues. In order that
the dialogue may develop, it is now necessary to
identify a specific perspective in the light of what
has been said above.
— *0 0
Mary Pellauer's article, in spite of its brevity,




addresses directly the issue of pornography as a
concern for the Churches. In this dialogue she speaks
not only as an individual but as a person with a
particular perspective within a group who are
attempting to review, renew and restate a positive
Christian position in the area of sexuality and
pornography. Pellauer is clear that she is not
prepared to condone pornography, but in reaching that
conclusion she covers much ground that is helpful in
both presenting a Christian position and for engaging
in the wider dialogue. From her article it is possible
to imagine that her argument could be developed further
and that her points of view as both a Christian thinker
and as a feminist have something to contribute to the
dialogue. She writes from a perspective of having
studied both pornography and the religious dimensions
3 9
of violence against women. She is aware of the
limitations in the Christian tradition in the area of
sexuality and the treatment of women and wants to
affirm the importance of a right understanding of the
goodness of sexuality:
For me, pornography is problematic not because it
is sexually explicit, but because it portrays
violence and domination in a sexual context. I
3 9
At the time this article was written, she was co¬
ordinator for research and study at the Commission
for Women of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America. Pellauer, 'Pornography', p. 651;
Sexuality and the Sacred, p. xii.
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have no desire to return to Victorian prudery, to
the earlier condemnations of sex as a special
source of sin, or even to the lesser silences
about sex in our own century. But because I
cherish my whole sensual self and believe that
good theology calls us to celebrate healthy human
sexuality, I find pornography abhorrent.
Christians do not have to agree on everything
about pornography. Our experiences of life, our
priorities, our spiritual depths and our
conceptual tools differ greatly.... if we in the
churches are concerned that porn provides serious
misinformation about about sexuality and sexual
violence, then I believe we must also take very
serious steps to provide accurate and sensitive
alternatives - that we support rape centres, sex
education, and genuine artists who may depict sex
in their work.
Though its primary harms may be to women and
children, pornography affects all of us, for it
makes serious statements about our world and human
life....1 believe that good theology can be
helpful in clarifying what is at stake in porn.
It may be due to the limits of my imagination or
my theology, but I believe that no one who
celebrates healthy sexuality among the many goods
of God's creation can affirm pornography.
Although her call is to the Churches to address the
issue of 'the multiple layers of meaning in
pornography, and to the connections it has to the rest
of life',4^ the quest she calls them to is not one that
that is exclusive but rather one that will benefit from
the participation of all parties interested in
furthering the dialogue. The idea of love is
implicitly present as part of the motivation in
appealing to the Churches to engage with pornography.
4 0




As a way of opening this next stage, we will turn to
three films: Nicholas Roeg's Don't Look Now (1973),
Jonathan Kaplan's The Accused (1988) and Dino De
Laurentiis and Uli Edel's Body of Evidence (1993) . All
three films are well known and available. The Accused
and Body of Evidence, as recent films, can be bought or
rented as videos. Don't Look Now is shown from time to
time on television. All three films have scenes
showing sexual intercourse, however the treatment of
sex in each film is widely divergent.
Don't Look Now, based on a story by Rebecca West, is
the tale of how a couple come to terms with the death
of a child. He is an architect restoring old churches
in Venice and she accompanies him on an extended trip
to the city, where the bulk of the film is set.
Before the film ends in tragedy, the couple find
themselves rebuilding their relationship after the
child's death. Part of the credible depiction of this
process is the one scene of love-making in the film.
The British censors have allowed the scene from its
first release because, although innovative, it was seen
as integral to the story.The director has inter-cut
the scenes of love-making with those of the couple
dressing to go out to dinner, placing the sex clearly
43
Tom Dewe Matthews, Censored: the story of film
censorship in Britain (1994), p. 215.
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in context. The love-making is shown as tender and
mutually affirming. It could illustrate the reference
to sexual union from the marriage service:
It is given, that with delight and tenderness they
may know each other in love, and, through the joy
of their bodily union, may strengthen the union of
their hearts and lives.
The Accused is about a waitress who is gang-raped in a
roadside restaurant in America. Although the culprits
are caught, a legal deal means they are imprisoned but
not convicted of a rape charge. The victim is dismayed
at this and persuades the lawyer to effectively re-open
the case by charging some of the bystanders who cheered
with the crime of 'criminal solicitation', that is
inciting others to an illegal act. The film is
structured in such a way that the audience only sees
the rape at the end of the film and by that stage it
has a very powerful impact that is not exploitative.
It is shown in a way that increases the viewers'
sympathy with the victim.
Body of Evidence is a different film. Elements in the
plot illustrate the main actress's, Madonna's, publicly
professed enthusiasm for sado-masochism. She is
accused of the murder of a lover and becomes involved
44
The Alternative Service Book 1980, p. 288.
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in a passionate sexual affair with her defence lawyer.
The sex scenes are not part of the development or the
expression of a mutual and loving relationship. There
is a degree of exploitation and exhibitionism in their
presentation. Self-gratification and abuse, albeit
consensual, of the sexual partner are clear themes in
these scenes.
Thompson would have no difficulty in finding all three
films acceptable and allowing their general release.
Catherine Itzin, on her clear rejection of all material
that shows non-consensual or exploitative sexual
relations, would take an opposite point of view in
relation to Body of Evidence and possibly to The
Accused. Body of Evidence shows sado-masochistic sex
in an adulterous and exploitative relationship. That
it is the woman who is doing the exploiting and
initiating the violent sex is not especially relevant.
Itzin's attitude to The Accused is less easy to
identify. Although the film is not exploitative there
is a danger that the rape depicted might lead to
imitative behaviour and exploitative treatment of
women. The other participants could argue that the
risk is offset in this case by the obvious condemnation
of the rape, within a film that is a thoughtful
reflection on attitudes to rape. I suspect that
Catherine Itzin might condone The Accused on the
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grounds that it is seeking common ground with some of
the problems she and her colleagues identify and are
trying to redress.
Segal and Mcintosh along with Pellauer would I expect
find The Accused acceptable on the same grounds. It
would match their categories of non-exploitative
material with a discernible integrity. If there were
reservations, they would match those of Itzin, focusing
on the violence. Segal and Mcintosh might also share
common ground with Thompson, Itzin and Pellauer, when
it came to considering Don't Look Now.
The question is not so clear when it comes to Body of
Evidence. Segal and Mcintosh make a persuasive case
for allowing material which gives expression to
homosexual preferences and minority sexual practices,
such as sado-masochism. Would they find Body of
Evidence to be a film that was attempting, however
badly, to make a case for minority preferences?
Pellauer would I think reject the film on the grounds
of the exploitation involved in the central
relationship, which also has no redeeming qualities.
This review of hypothetical responses to three films
has shown something of how the different perspectives
might view actual examples but has not overcome the
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divide between the concern for the freedom to enjoy
pornography and that about the harm it may cause. The
other participants might ask Pellauer on what basis she
makes her assessments, showing a need for Pellauer's
position to be expanded. When Pellauer outlined her
position it was clear that in condemning pornography
she still wants to affirm 'genuine artists who may
4 R
depict sex xn their work.' On this basis I have
assumed that she with others, such as Nelson, would
support the good representation of sexual relations in
Don't Look Now and would do the same for different
reasons when considering the rape scenes in The
Accused. This choice needs to be explained.
At this point, Pellauer might avail herself of Gareth
Moore's emphasis on loving action in thinking of issues
in sexual ethics. This provides a model on which to
base a constructive ethic of pornography and a means of
assessing pornographic material. Pellauer could argue
that there is a need to portray honestly what Nelson
calls the 'human complexity' of sexuality, occasions on
which our basically good sexual energy and its
expression is corrupted or diverted into unfruitful and
possibly destructive patterns. Thus there is a
commitment to affirm good and thoughtful depictions of
4 5
Pellauer, 'Pornography', p. 655.
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constructively expressed non-genital and genital sexual
activity.similarly, the constructive exploration of
the compulsive and ultimately destructive power of
sexual activity should be encouraged. The Accused is a
good example of this, making it clear what message the
material is actually conveying. The brutal rape shown
there is unlikely to provoke imitative behaviour or
other possible consequences of such depictions
4 7
identified by Diana Russell. This necessary care in
both what is actually shown and how these scenes may
best be presented applies equally to the former
category of good depictions of constructive sexual
activity. It is contrary to the spirit of our adopted
principle of the criteria of loving action to set
strict guidelines on what may or may not be shown.
However, in both making the suggestion and in seeking
approval for it in the context of this dialogue it is
46, •
Given that nearly all relating is now understood to
have a potential sexual dimension to it, it is
further recognised that it is possible to have
intimate relationships which give expression to the
sexuality of the participants without any genital
activity. Obviously, there remain those sexual
relationships which seek genital expression. For
one Christian's view of intimacy as here described,
see: Philip Sheldrake, Befriending our Desires, pp.
61-66. When talking of those latter in this
context, it is not the intention to encourage the
depiction of explicit genital activity in material





necessary to be as specific as possible. Thompson and
Itzin, from different perspectives, would be very
interested to know precisely what is being proposed.
What limits might there be? Obviously nudity and the
depiction of simulated sexual activity would be
acceptable. Both may well be necessary in depicting
positive and negative aspects of human sexual
relations. There are sufficient examples in the
contemporary cinema (such as Don't Look Now and The
Accused) of the ability to depict moving, passionate,
intense and constructive and destructive sexual
activity without showing explicit genital activity.
Such a recommendation is consistent with a Christian
position which argues for a special and loving
intimacy, even an aspect of the sacred, being
associated with genital activity. Asking or
encouraging actors to engage in such activity separate
from its intended purpose may contradict or undermine
this perspective.
While it matters that it is possible to depict
exploitative relationships, it matters equally that
these are not represented in a way that is itself
exploitative of either the individual actors or of
either sex in general, particularly women given that
they have traditionally been victims in this area.
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Where exploitative or abusive relationships need to be
illustrated it is essential that they are presented in
a way that is honest and makes it clear that they fall
short of what is meant for human fulfilment in the area
of sexuality.
Pellauer could argue for male and female homosexual
activity to be included in all aspects of this
4 8
suggestion. In this she would have the support of
Segal and Mcintosh. Several of the contributors to the
collection of essays published as Sex Exposed make the
point that homosexual pornography has a value in
providing both gay and lesbian people with images which
help them in their task of self-definition.However,
when moving on to consider the portrayal of sexual
activities which may be out of the ordinary or minority
interests Pellauer would find some concerned interest
from Itzin.
4 8
The importance of this point is made in Vicky
Cosstick's review of the film Priest (The Tablet, 4
March 1995, p. 296), where she comments:
The gay sex in the film is fairly explicit
and necessary, I think, to force us to face
the reality of the relationship between Greg
and Graham.
4 9
See the following articles in Sex Exposed: Kobena
Mercer, 'Just Looking for trouble: Robert
Mapplethorpe and fantasies of race', pp. 92-110;
Linda Williams, 'Pornographies on/scene, or
diff'rent strokes for diff'rent folks', pp. 233-
265; Gillian Rodgerson, 'Lesbian Erotic
Explorations', pp. 275-279.
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There are people who find encouragement for minority-
practices, such as sado-masochism through
c o
pornography. Segal And Mcintosh would argue, with
Thompson, that this behaviour may be consensual and the
activity can be part of a mutually acceptable sex life
within a permanent stable relationship. The depiction
of some minority practices, especially sado-masochism
and bondage, raises considerable concern for Itzin.
This is a particularly so where the activity is one
that has been associated in traditional pornographic
material with humiliation and abuse, especially that of
women. Pellauer would support Itzin in arguing that in
these cases it is not at all clear that the needs of
individuals for such material should take precedence
over the threat such material may pose to the wellbeing
of either the wider population or identifiable groups
such as women.
Here the dialogue connects at two levels with the
difficult and unresolved concern about harm. Pellauer
has allied with Itzin in rejecting depictions of even
5 0
See for example the story of the housewife and
active member of her parish church, who to enjoy
sex with her husband requests that she is subjected
to ritual acts of humiliation: in Loretta Loach,
'Bad Girls: women who use pornography', Sex
Exposed, pp. 266-274 (pp. 267-8). For a radical
Christian feminist perspective which challenges the
notion that sado-masochistic behaviour is
ultimately acceptable, see Carter Heyward, Touching
our Strength, pp. 105-110.
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consensual sado-masochistic behaviour because of their
possible negative influence. Those arguing for such
depictions allow that they do influence those who view
them, but positively. Once influence is acknowledged,
be it positive or negative, then it is difficult to
resist the argument that some forms of pornography have
a distinct negative influence. If we assume a
positive influence of pornography, is it not also
reasonable to assume a negative one? Itzin claims that
there is evidence to suggest a link between the
depiction of violent and abusive sex while Thompson
with Segal & Mcintosh are sceptical about the extent to
which this is the case. Here Pellauer is helpful:
It has by no means been proven that pornography
causes sexual violence. Indeed, since widespread
sexual violence predated widespread pornography,
it would be difficult to prove this hypothesis.
...But the fact that there are no obvious
connections between porn and sexual violence dbes
not mean that there are no connections at all.
She is clear that the risk is sufficiently high and
51
Pellauer, 'Pornography', p. 652. Edward Lucie-Smith
echoes this point from a different perspective in
his Sexuality in Western Art, pp. 190 & 192:
The most striking thing...about most
representations of sexual congress in European
art is their violence - the violence offered
by the male to the female.
Rape scenes of all kinds are common in
European art of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries and also later;...
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should be addressed even though a causal link cannot be
demonstrated nor can the evidence be found to support
the claim of such an effect that would meet legal
requirements for evidence. The remarkable thing here
is not that we recognise the potential influence of
pornography but rather that, in a culture dominated by
powerful and effective media images, we should need
persuading that the messages of pornography may
influence our attitudes and actions. The concern is
whether or not it can be shown to influence us in an
adverse fashion over which we have little control.
At this point in the dialogue, Pellauer needs to draw
on some form of structure within which to give her
concerns practical expression. In wanting to affirm
some depictions and reject others she could draw on the
work of Margaret Miles. Miles, working within the
Christian tradition with a feminist perspective, has
identified three criteria by which a new and more
balanced picture may emerge in the representation of
females in Christian and western art. These criteria
may be applied to the issue of pornography:
that the adequate representation of women must
be self-representation,-
this work of self-representation must occur in
public, that is in those arenas in which the
discourse that both reflects and shapes society
takes place,-
- there must be an attempt to develop a collective
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voice in this process.
These suggestions match in some degree what is already
happening. There are women involved in both writing
pornography and in producing films, both for
heterosexual and homosexual women, which is seen to be
S3
an improving influence on what is available. The
particular value of these criteria lies in the fact
that they help the Christian position to affirm good
emphases and images in this confused area, and in that
acknowledge the importance of women's voices within an
52 Miles, Carnal Knowing, pp. 169-172.
5 3
Lynne Segal {Sex Exposed, p. 85) describes the work
of one woman in this area:
Candida Royalle... after five years acting in
sex films, decided to set up her own Femme
Productions. Her films, which carry many of
the traditional pornographic numbers (close-
ups of heterosexual and lesbian sex, including
bondage - since this is high on the list of
women's fantasies) emphasize sex in the
context of feelings and relationships:
sensuality, foreplay and 'after-play'. [Linda
Williams] suggests that now more women are
seeing, discussing, buying, and - just a few -
producing it, pornography has been changing
along the lines of distinguishing between good
(consensual and safe) and bad (coercive) sex.
See also Gillian Robertson's 'Lesbian Erotic
Explorations', Sex Exposed, pp. 275- 279.
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emerging collective enterprise. They would
challenge Thompson's view of Christianity always being
a negative voice in this debate and they would provide
Segal and Mcintosh, with Itzin, with a clear indication
of what Pellauer wants to work towards. There is
still a concern about how effective this approach,
outlined here in dialogue, might be in challenging
those activities and points of view which threaten the
development of constructive views of human sexual
relations.
At this point, Itzin could make a strong case for
thinking more about the harm caused by pornography.
She could remind Pellauer of the misunderstandings that
led to the eventual withdrawal of Edwina Sandy's
sculpture, Christa, even though that met at least two
S4
Pellauer could draw further support from some
valuable theological attempts to rehabilitate the
idea of the erotic as a powerful force in life and
one consistent with the ideas of constructive human
sexual relationships as outlined here. See: Paul
Avis, Eros and the Sacred (1989), especially pp.
81-94; and Philip Sheldrake, Befriending our
Desires, pp. 19-35 & 52-72. However, the term is
still contaminated by old assumptions. The
Christian tradition has tended to spiritualise
human love, and to contrast eros negatively with
agape. This was most recently evident in Anders
Nygren's influential study Agape and Eros (1953).
Confusion about the idea of eros in some twentieth
century theological writing is discussed by Gene
Outka, Agape: an ethical analysis (1972), pp. 222-
229 & 287-288.
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of Miles's criteria. It was a work by a woman and
presented in the public sphere. Further, she could
point to the wider context within which any decision
must apply. Two factors determine any long-term
consideration of the pornography debate. The
technology used for distributing pornography and for
providing pornographers with a communications network
that is difficult to police, mean that it will be hard
to control the further expansion of pornography,
c cr
especially through satellite and computer networks.
Secondly, there is a large market for the pornography
already produced. However determined any group may be,
it is not likely that they will be able to change these
factors except over a long period of time.
Itzin could also make it clear that her concern is not
to challenge Pellauer's position but to restate the
risk in adopting a liberal attitude to pornography in
the present social climate. Itzin might point to that
part of her definition of pornography which accepts
'sexually explicit material premised on equality',
claiming that she would support Pellauer's position
were it not for the threat it poses to the victims.
This threat will remain until there is a more equal




relationship between the sexes and the authorities
recognise and engage with the problems posed by extreme
pornographic material that all four participants
rej ect.
Given Pellauer's concern about harm and her
acknowledgement of the influence of pornography, she
may accept Itzin's argument. It is less likely that
Segal and Mcintosh would follow because it requires
more restrictions on pornographic material than they
are happy with and they were already unhappy at
Pellauer's rejection of the depiction of sado¬
masochistic material. Thompson is almost certain to
oppose Itzin suggestion as adopted by Pellauer.
However, it is just possible that Segal and Mcintosh
and even Thompson might be persuaded to think again
about the possible harm of pornography. If Pellauer,
who they see as being sympathetic to their essential
concern to allow pornographic depictions, has
reservations in this area and offers grounds for these
independent of Itzin (albeit prompted by her), then
they may reconsider. Neither wishes for the harm which
Itzin claims for pornography. The freedom which
Thompson and Segal and Mcintosh want is only deferred.
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iv concluding observations
This hypothetical dialogue has been constructed around
four identifiable positions, three of which were set
out in the last chapter. In this chapter most
attention has been paid to the Christian position, for
the two-fold reason that it needed most development
within the dialogue and that the process of identifying
limitations and challenges in relation to that position
is one of the particular concerns of this thesis. The
four points of view set out around the table each
originated in published writings and there is a
reasonable hope that the exercise developed in this
dialogue might provide a good basis for further
reflection.
Of the three perspectives with which the dialogue
opened, Segal 5c Mcintosh presented a valuable middle
way in the area of degrees of censorship between the
two extreme positions of Itzin (so much censorship that
it is either impractical or undesirable) and Thompson
(virtually no censorship). Their argument developed
that of Thompson and put it on less individualistic
grounds. He argued for freedom from censorship on the
basis of an individual's right to pleasure, where Segal
5c Mcintosh argue for the same consideration but on the
grounds that some pornography has value in helping
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individuals come to a sense of sexual self-identity.
This may apply equally in the case of homosexuals and
in that of minority sexual practices. However, this
perspective came up against the important issue of the
extent to which pornography may cause harm. This is
where we left the dialogue at the end of the last
chapter.
Pellauer suggested a way round the problem which Itzin
and Thompson appeared to have no way of resolving. She
acknowledged that a clear causal link would likely
always elude us and at the same time accepted that
there is a real risk of harm. Pellauer was required
to be specific about the basis of her contribution to
the dialogue. A practical application of Moore's
principle from the field of sexual ethics was offered,
focusing on the extent to which an action is either
loving, or the habit of a loving action. Applied to
the pornography debate, this idea provided a means of
assessing what is depicted and the manner of its
depiction. It became a determining feature of the
dialogue, providing support for constructive and honest
depictions of human sexual activity.
It was Pellauer's support of such depictions which
meant, when she opted with Itzin for interim
censorship, that Segal and Mcintosh and possibly
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Thompson might have been persuaded of the importance of
the harm argument in relation to a wider range of
material than they had previously allowed. This
concluding position took seriously the initial concerns
of each participant.
I hope to have demonstrated that the idea of dialogue
provides both a way of entering, understanding and
developing our perception of the issues involved in
considering pornography. Furthermore I have shown how
a Christian presence in round table dialogue may offer
a positive contribution within the wider debate. While
theological and ethical ideas have been implicitly
present in Pellauer's contribution they have not been
overt, except in the case of the general idea of loving
action. The dialogue did not develop in such a way that
it would have been helpful to refer explicitly to
theological principles without risking losing the other
participants. Pellauer's developed position is an
attempt to offer a constructive view in this area, as
called for by the practical theologian James A. Whyte:
There is need for an enlightened Christian
judgement to distinguish the trivial, the shoddy,
the debasing from the authentic, the genuine, the
human - not only in the field of pornography, for
the corrupting influences of our society are by no




The proposal allows individuals to affirm what they see
as good, honest and constructive in the depiction of
human sexuality and may thus gradually contribute to
the improvement of an area of debate and concern that
will not go away or readily reform itself of its own
accord. Sheldrake adds a further dimension to this
concern:
Many Christians are also convinced that the wider
world needs to hear a new word about sexuality and
its potential spiritual depths to counteract the
superficiality of much media presentation.
5 7 •
'On Censorship', m A New Dictionary of Christian
Ethics, p.82.
co




I have attempted to show that round table dialogue
offers Christian ethics a way of engaging with and
moving beyond some of the confusion that characterises
contemporary moral discourse. I opened with a review
of how that confusion is differently understood. This
indicated that in the conflicting understandings of the
problem of communication between different traditions
of moral discourse, there was still the possibility of
communication. Hence, a model of round table dialogue
was suggested as a method of ethical reflection. The
idea for this came from a television discussion
programme with a number of participants representing
different views on euthanasia which illustrated
precisely the problems my proposal sought to address.
This programme gave rise to a central concern in my
initial investigation, which was the danger that the
perspectives and skills of moral reflection developed
within the Christian tradition might become excluded
from or unavailable to contemporary moral discourse.
The reasons for this fear are two-fold but are
consequences of the declining influence of the
Christian churches within western societies. Firstly
there has been a diminishing interest in the points of
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view of the churches in discussions of moral issues.
Connected with this is an increasing inability on the
part of the churches and their representatives to make
contributions to moral debates in a manner in which
they can be heard and applied. If Christians are to
participate in moral discourse they have a
responsibility to present their arguments, points of
view and concerns in a fashion which can be understood
and responded to by the other participants. The
proposal of round table dialogue as defined here in
terms of the six points attempts to address these two
connected problems.
The metaphor of the round table discussion is essential
to an understanding of the application of the six
points of dialogue. These were identified from my own
general reflections on what was important for good
communication and then refined after consideration of
other sources on negotiation and dialogue. These
explorations in the second chapter each confirmed or
developed some point of my original proposal of five
of the six points and helped to shape them further.
The necessary elements in a round table dialogue which
might enable it to be fruitful are a sense of mutual
respect, leading to trust; a commitment to the task of
mutual clarification, which must be conducted on the
basis of examining the rational grounds for each point
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and perspective; a further commitment to reciprocity,
which enables mutual learning. The fourth point is
that there should be an equal commitment on the part of
participants to being open-minded, both in relation to
the process and to conclusions. The context of each
discussion is also important in understanding the
possible influence of factors outside the round table
dialogue on what is being said and communicated. While
these five points each still needed further refinement
through application within dialogue on specific
issues, the sixth point required more attention.
The idea that conclusions reached might be relative
stems from the perception of reality as contingent.
This point is particularly important because so many
ethical traditions, especially those with a religious
basis, derive their moral authority from absolute
points which commonly translate into moral absolutes.
Any system which seeks to find a way beyond the
apparent incompatibility of conflicting moral
traditions needs a way of addressing the issue of moral
absolutes. In the third chapter this issue was
explored initially through the idea of objectivity as
it is understood by historians. This led into the
more complicated and ultimately more rewarding work of
Gadamer and Habermas. Particularly valuable was the
debate in which they explored their ideas about 'the
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unsolved problem of the origin of values.'1 If it is
accepted that we can be bound by our past and present
perceptions and at the same time driven by such an urge
towards freedom, which means that although we are
constrained we are not ultimately denied freedom of
vision or action, then we may find a way forward when
considering moral absolutes. They are expressions of
the constraints we live under and like them must be
acknowledged and engaged with but are not beyond
rational examination and criticism.
This discussion led into a consideration of how what
had been learnt and developed so far about round table
dialogue might be applied within Christian ethics. In
chapter four various approaches to Christian ethical
reflection were considered and my concern about the
danger of Christian ethicists increasingly
communicating only with one another was evident in some
writings. This perception strengthened the need to
develop a means of communicating the resources of
Christian moral reflection within the wider debate. Of
the six points of round table dialogue, two were
identified as likely to give concern in the field of
Christian ethics. One was the issue of the relative
"^Paul Ricoeur, 'Ethics and Culture: Habermas and
Gadamer in dialogue', Philosophy Today, 17 (1973),
pp. 153-165 (p. 155).
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nature of conclusions and the other was the extent to
which Christians might honestly be committed to the
principle of openness in dialogue. The first of these
two concerns had been explored in the preceding chapter
and was left to be addressed directly in the two case
studies which would follow. The concern about openness
was discussed in terms of the Christian ethicist's
declared allegiance. This was something which would be
evident and thus open to discussion and which need not
be an obstacle to round table dialogue in itself.
Having established the initial parameters of the
thesis, in terms of the six points of round table
dialogue, the next stage was to apply them in ethical
discussion. Euthanasia and pornography were chosen as
two contrasting areas of ethical reflection. Each
called for different applications of the principles of
dialogue and presented opportunities to further develop
and refine the proposal.
In considering euthanasia, the principles of round
table dialogue proved useful as a way of analysing some
of the confusion which surrounds that topic. The
principles were applied to three different aspects of
the euthanasia debate. Firstly, to two specific and
recent cases; then to two arguments which had been
formulated as contributions to the present public
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discussion of euthanasia; and thirdly, in a sustained
analysis of an influential moral principle, the PDE,
which is often invoked in discussions of euthanasia.
The principles of dialogue were most readily applied to
the two arguments and in each case provided a means of
assessing what was being proposed and the manner in
which the evidence was offered in the argument.
Further, the extent to which each proposal engaged
critically and constructively with its perceived
adversaries was crucial in assessing the ability of the
author to contribute positively within the context of
round table dialogue.
The two case studies stretched the proposal more
obviously than did either of the two arguments.
Neither case study was straight forward. In that they
provided an accurate contemporary background against
which to apply the principles of dialogue. Here, I
attempted to analyse each case as a conversation
between the different participants. The point of this
exercise was to find a way of understanding the
perspectives which might have motivated each
contributor and with those factors also the constraints
upon their positions and points of view. What was
apparent from this application was the difficulty of
applying the principles of dialogue when one
participant is the legal system. It is possible to
speculate in a credible fashion about an individual's
motives and intentions. It is virtually impossible to
do this for something as inanimate as a system of
legislation. That said, to acknowledge that a
determining factor in any dialogue is the given
constraints of public legislation means that the
participants may be clear where they stand in relation
to the difficulties of the situation. An obstacle has
been identified and might then be addressed directly.
If they wish to take the dialogue further it involves
them in thinking how to engage with reforming the legal
system and applying their skills of dialogue in
conversation with those who have the power to reform
the legal system.
The third area of analysis within the discussion of
euthanasia provided the most sustained opportunity to
apply the principles of round table dialogue. In
examining the PDE, a moral theory, obviously again
there cannot be a direct analysis as if it were a
participant in a dialogue. It was possible to assess
the PDE in terms of its compatibility with the practice
of dialogue and at the same time to apply some of the
principles in analysing the development and
contemporary application of the PDE. The PDE could be
appreciated in terms of both the changing contexts of
its own development as a moral theory and in its
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present application. Further it is obviously open to
a sustained critical and rational analysis of its
strengths and weaknesses. In addition to the
application of these two principles of dialogue, the
PDE also lent itself to examination in terms of the
idea of the relative nature of conclusions. This
involved a rather speculative series of reflections on
the influence on the application of the PDE in the
light of implicit negative views of death. The
negative view of death which may inform those who
employ the PDE was appropriate to the context of self-
defence, in which St Thomas Aquinas originally
developed the theory. It may still have been relevant
in the second half of the nineteenth century when the
PDE came to be applied in the field of medical ethics.
It is questionable if it is now desirable to see death
as an evil in aspects of bioethical thought which
relate to care of the terminally ill. This reservation
is strengthened when such a view colludes with an
undesirable emphasis within contemporary medical
practice.
Turning now to the examination of the ethics of
pornography, the method of applying the principles is
different. In contrast to the consideration of
euthanasia where the two chapters were used to analyse
aspects of the argument in different sections, here the
argument was developed through both chapters. In
reviewing the ethics of pornography and developing an
approach on the basis of Christian ethics, I have tried
to imagine how a round table dialogue might develop.
Prior to dialogue, there is a need to be clear about
what is meant when discussing pornography. The opening
part of the second section reviewed the debate about
pornography in the United Kingdom, from the Williams
Report to the present. Three positions were identified
around the table in opening the dialogue: one
representing the lobby which favours virtually no
censorship, another which from a feminist perspective
is also concerned not to restrict further the freedoms
of individuals in this area and a third perspective,
also feminist, which argues strongly for greater
restrictions on what is shown and is available in
Britain. The dialogue between these positions led to
an impasse. Various concerns were addressed:
particularly the issue of harm and the freedom or right
of the individual to view what they choose. There was
no resolution. The debate needed to be widened and
pursued within a discussion of human sexuality. At
this point it was possible to think of trying to
introduce a Christian perspective to the dialogue.
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The are two reasons for leaving the introduction of any
specifically Christian participation to the dialogue to
this point. First, it broadly reflects the fact that
there is very little Christian comment specifically on
pornography that would have been able to make a
contribution to the dialogue; and secondly, in the
debate to this point it might have been possible for an
individual Christian to participate without needing to
declare their faith affiliation. If the dialogue was
to develop there needed to be a change in the frame of
reference which would involve declaring or developing a
specifically Christian perspective.
Before the introduction of a Christian perspective,
initially from the point of view of Mary Pellauer's
article, it was necessary to undertake a considerable
review of the Christian tradition of moral reflection
in the whole area of human sexuality. Although this
may have seemed as if it was going against the spirit
of the thesis in focusing too much attention on the
Christian tradition, in fact such a reappraisal of the
tradition may often be necessary in seeking a place at
the table for dialogue. In the area of sexuality,
Christianity has a confused and confusing record of
attitudes, actions and pronouncements. It is
understandable that those with whom Christian ethicists
might seek to participate in dialogue could look to
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those ethicists to clarify where they stand now in
relation to what their tradition has held in the past.
This process of clearing the ground led to a
recognition by the other participants that there had
been considerable rethinking within the Christian
ethical tradition in the area of sexuality. There
were parallel concerns which provided common ground for
dialogue. The discussion of films enabled the
participants to understand one another's positions
better but did not help overcome the disagreement
between the freedom to enjoy pornography and the harm
it causes. Pellauer was called upon to explain further
the bases of her opinions about the films. This led to
the suggestion of the importance of both honesty and
loving action as a way of assessing what might be
acceptable. Pellauer commented upon various criteria
as part of a general statement affirming some forms of
pornography. This position was redefined after further
consideration of the threat of harm. A possible
conclusion, taking seriously the concerns of each
participant but not meeting them all, emerged in the
idea that a degree of censorship is necessary for the
present.
This account of how the principles of round table
dialogue have been presented, leads into a
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consideration of how they might be further developed.
The second half of this conclusion provides an analysis
of the strengths of the individual points and an
appraisal of the connections between them in the light
of what has been learned in the two case studies. It
ends with a recommendation that the principles be
adopted and developed further within an actual
dialogue.
There are clear connections between all six points.
While some relate closely to others, each makes a
valuable and distinct contribution to the process. The
order of some of the points in relation to others is
important. The notion of mutual respect and trust, for
example, is a crucial opening point but has obvious
enabling implications for the tasks of mutual
clarification and mutual learning. It is also an
essential precursor of the willingness to be open-
minded .
Acknowledging the artificiality of the dialogues as
developed here, they nevertheless give a fairly
accurate indication of both the possibilities and
likely difficulties of actual dialogues. In looking at
the difficulties apparent at this stage three main
areas are obvious. Following discussion of them, there
will be observations relating to other aspects of the
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applications of the principles. The first is the
difficulty of facilitating dialogue when an influential
factor in the case being considered is the role of the
legal system.
In both the Cox and Bland cases the legal system
exercised a determining influence on the dialogue. It
provided a fixed point in each case: in Dr Cox's case
it required him to be tried for attempted murder and in
the Bland case it prevented Dr Howe from acting in the
best interests of his patient as he and his patient's
parents considered it. In my analysis of both cases,
while I regarded the legal system as in some sense a
participant in the dialogue in that it played a
distinct role in the proceedings, this is a view which
cannot be sustained beyond these individual examples.
Inevitably in other dialogues there will be similar
constraints and these should clearly be treated as part
of the context within which the discussion is held. In
the dialogue on pornography differing perspectives on
appropriate legislation were also mentioned but these
concerns were considerably removed from the main
discussion within any text. Even the Williams Report,
which had as one of its objectives a responsibility to
review legislation, was concerned to keep its
recommendations in that area to a minimum.
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The principle of open-mindedness is the second area of
concern. In identifying this idea as a specific
requirement of round table dialogue my intention was to
encourage as fresh an approach as possible to each
moral issue under discussion. This was to consist
ideally of an openness in the individual participant's
mind both as to the method of reaching any conclusion
and also to the nature of what would constitute a
conclusion. The aim being to limit where possible the
practice of coming to the table with a preconceived
notion of how the problem might be solved and with
stratagems by which others might be persuaded of that
opinion.
This idea is still valuable but probably more
appropriate to members of a committee called together
to review a problem than to the form of ethical
dialogue I have attempted to construct here. Each of
the voices I have drawn to the two discussions of
euthanasia and pornography have been those of
individuals or groups who have had particular
perspectives to offer the discussion. The holding of
an opinion or being persuaded of a particular point of
view does not preclude being of an open mind.
Nevertheless, the manner in which the opinions are held
does determine the extent to which an individual
participant is likely to be able to play a full part in
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the proposed round table dialogue. My participants
have been clear exponents of a particular perspective
in relation to the issue they were discussing and I
have had to emphasise their concerns in describing
their participation at the table. In an actual
dialogue this is something that would reveal itself
gradually as the discussion developed through the
exchange of ideas and perspectives.
That said, there is a third concern which is closely
related to this one of openness. In both dialogues it
was clear that some of the participants had ideas which
challenged others in the same discussion. Ludovic
Kennedy's view of some of the arguments of the Roman
Catholic Church are one example, while another are the
disagreements between Catherine Itzin and Bill Thompson
on, among other things, the value of the 'pornography
effect studies.' I am not sure in practice how well
the scheme I propose would hold such disagreements. My
proposal of a necessary degree of mutual respect,
leading to trust, and of commitments to both mutual
clarification and learning, stemming from respectively
a concern to debate in terms only of rational criteria
and a degree of reciprocity, sounds idealistic in the
face of such overt differences of opinion.
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In response I would claim that even those individuals
who have identified themselves with particular
perspectives on the issues under discussion have also a
commitment to persuading others both of the seriousness
of the issue as they perceive it and of the value of
their particular point of view as a contribution
towards finding a solution. With these points in mind
it is realistic to think that they might welcome an
opportunity for dialogue. Cobb, one of the
contributors to the theory of inter-faith dialogue,
mentions with approval the connected ideas that
confrontation may play a positive role in dialogue and
also that it is legitimate to acknowledge the role and
importance of persuasion. There is virtue in being
sufficiently committed to a point of view to the extent
of trying to persuade others of its merits. A degree
of confrontation may follow from such commitment but it
need not be so much as to endanger the process of
dialogue. The readiness to challenge a position is a
consequence of trust.
This connects with a fourth concern that has emerged
through applying the principles. The idea of mutual
respect leading to trust needs clarification. It is
possible to understand the mutual respect as being for
the positions represented around the table. This is a
necessary preliminary to the development of a sense of
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trust in the process of dialogue as a whole. There is
also the issue of the extent to which participants come
to feel a sense of mutual respect for and ideally trust
in one another. This personal regard need only be
limited to the participants' role in the round table
dialogue. There is a further concern to explore ways
of developing a sense of mutual respect relative to
participants' positions where an antagonism may be
evident before the dialogue opens.
In both case studies it was clear that the contexts of
each discussion were important. It is now obvious that
the principle of the context of dialogue must refer to
more than the wider environment of whatever issue or
case is being discussed. It has a secondary importance
in the sense that it refers to the framework of the
discussion. In the discussion of the ethics of
pornography the move to the wider context of a
discussion of pornography within the realm of human
sexuality enabled a new start to a dialogue that had
reached a stalemate. There was no change in the
external context of the dialogue.
The proposed principles of round table dialogue have
been developed as a method of engaging with ethical
issues. They do this primarily by providing a way
beyond any possible impasse through exploring the
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dynamics of any disagreement as if it were a dialogue
and by examining the rational bases of the positions in
the debate. It is not part of the scope of this study
to identify what would constitute a conclusion to any
dialogue, especially those centering around either
euthanasia or pornography. It is reasonable to assume
that any conclusions which might be reached should
accord with the principles of dialogue. The process of
dialogue might well not reconcile the conflicting
points of view but should leave all participants better
informed about the nature of their disagreements.
Understanding where the differences and difficulties
lie means that there is considerably less likelihood of
feelings of frustration emerging where an obvious
solution eludes the participants. The diminishment of
such feelings would leave the participants or their
successors more ready to re-engage in a constructive
and open fashion should the dialogue resume.
At the beginning of chapter five, I mentioned that one
of the rejected possibilities for pursuing an analysis
of euthanasia was to invite a group of people to
discuss the topic and then to reflect on their
deliberations. That idea was not appropriate then
because it was not clear that what emerged would be
useful and the criteria by which the discussion would
be assessed were not as clear as they are now. The
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obvious way of seeing whether the six principles of
round table dialogue will facilitate moral reflection
is now to consider such a dialogue. Such a proposal
would benefit from considering what might be learnt
from work in areas of theology, such as the work of
liberation theologians, which connect with the concerns
and methods of this thesis. Furthermore there would be
benefit in attempting to engage with areas of moral
discourse that naturally involve discussion of ethical
issues across cultural barriers.
Beyond such a suggestion, I conclude by recommending
the six points of dialogue, identified and developed
here, as being a useful framework within which to





The 'dialogical man' is critical and knows that
although it is within the power of men to create
and transform in a concrete situation of
alienation men may be impaired in the use of that
power.
Here Freire is making a valuable point which needs to
be explicitly considered in any application of dialogue
where it is possible that some of the participants may
be in positions of weakness in relation to other
members of the dialogical process. Although the notion
of round table dialogue assumes an ideal
equality between participants, this is seldom likely to
be the case even in the implicitly academic model which
has been set out here. Furthermore, if the model is to
be applied to wider cultural and social contexts, those
who convene the process of dialogue must acknowledge a
responsibility to enable the presence of and
contribution from individuals or groups who are
involved but might be overlooked because their
perceived status normally denies them the power of
contributing to dialogue. All participants will need
to be sensitive to those who may feel constrained by
their status within the process of dialogue
Paulo Freire, Padagogy of the Oppressed, translated
by Myra Bergman Ramos (Harmondsworth, 1972), p. 63.
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particularly in the initial and essential establishment
of mutual trust. Flexibility of perspective and a will
to accommodate social as well as ideological
differences will be necessary. An example from one of
the two case studies in this thesis would be if in the
dialogue on pornography a victim wished to contribute.
Then other participants would need to recognize that
engagement in dialogue could be particularly difficult
and costly for that person. If such a contribution




The Manila Declaration on Pornography
What follows, including the endnote, is the complete
text of the Manila Declaration issued at the end of the
Conference
Recognizing a tragedy occurring on a global basis, we
have gathered together to confront the problem of
pornography. We join together out of a broad diversity
of faith traditions, believing that unity in action is
imperative if we are to protect our children's future -
action that offers an increased measure of protection
for those harmed by the evil of pornography throughout.
We invite all persons of faith and of good will to join
us in this great and good effort - that all persons,
especially children, may live the lives for which they
were created. Therefore, as religious leaders,
together with all persons of faith and good will
representing a broad cross-section of the world's faith
communities:
I WE BELIEVE:
1. Sexuality is a gift from God, to be enjoyed as a
positive and fulfilling part of human experience
within the boundaries designed by God. It is
unique among God's gifts, enabling spouses to give
themselves totally to one another in self-
transcending love.
2. Pornography tragically distorts that gift.
Although pornography is defined differently in
different cultures and faith traditions,
participants are unanimous in conviction that
sexually explicit material which abuses, degrades
or exploits another has destructive consequences
for those who consume it or are implicated in its
production and distribution. It destroys
relationships and communities through sexual
violence against women and men, child
victimization, child prostitution, sexually
transmitted diseases, addiction among men, and the
harmful attitudes and the negative values it
teaches toward women and children.
3. Pornography is born of attitudes of greed,
selfishness, commercialism and exploitation.
These attitudes are reflections of the broken
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human spirit, which calls for a spiritual
response.
4. No longer strictly an issue of private morality,
pornography has become a major economic force with
vast communal ethical implications.
5. The important values of freedom of speech and
increased international communication are not
compromised by ensuring that children, women and
men are protected from sexual exploitation.
6. Individual cultures have the right to protection
from international commercial enterprises which
erode culture through the distribution of
degrading, violent and destructive pornography.
7. We have too long been silent toward the scourge of
pornography, offering little in preventative
measures and counselling, reluctant to acknowledge
the problem within our own communities of faith.
II WE ACKNOWLEDGE:
1. Today the availability of pornography grows at
unprecedented pace. Pornography has become a
multi-billion dollar, international enterprise,
with outlets in the broadcast and print media; in
video, film, telephone, computers and television.
Through advanced technology such as interactive
CD-ROMs the formerly passive viewer of
exploitation and abuse now becomes an active
participant in the abuse of another. Exposure and
involvement of children, in particular, has taken
on unprecedented global dimensions; sex-related
crime is now a global problem.
2. The content of pornographic material available
throughout the world is increasingly explicit and
abusive. Large quantities of pornographic
material graphically depicts domination,
exploitation, and sex and violence as appropriate
accompaniments to human intimacy. Child
pornography, itself the pictorial record of child
abuse, portrays children as appropriate partners
for sex, leaving lasting physical and emotional
damage.
3. Government regulation is often inadequate,
antiquated and seldom enforced in many countries.
Differences in legislation mean that no global and
few national strategies for change have been
coherently developed. Too often, prosecution is a
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low governmental priority and pornography offences
are falsely perceived as 'victimless crimes.'
Consequently punishment is often minimal.
4. International computer networks are increasingly
becoming unlimited outlets for the worst and most
dangerous forms of pornography. These networks
are used as a market place by paedophiles to
contact children for abuse and to quickly trade
pictures of those already abused.
5. Sex tourism is a new growth industry, with a
subsequent increase in the spread of pornography
which records the painful encounters for future
use.
6. Increasingly, pornography export and distribution
economically exploit people, especially the poor
in developing nations.
7. Pornography distribution is often enmeshed in a
larger web of criminal activity. Organized
criminal networks in many parts of the world play
a significant role in the creation and
dissemination of this material, making the problem
more pervasive in its reach and more difficult to
eliminate.
Ill WE PLEDGE ACTION THROUGH:
1. Pleading with those who actively participate in
the pornography industry by production,
distribution or consumption of its products to
acknowledge the degradation of pornography and its
offensive consequences for individuals, as well as
human communities.
2. Prayer for those who exploit and those who are
exploited through pornography.
- Redoubling our efforts to improve the quality of
intervention and care initiatives for pornography
victims and addicts.
3. Sober reflection and reform within each faith
community to:
rigorously apply the due processes of law when
dealing with offenders within the religious
community;
develop appropriate religious and ethical
education;
educate for change by increasing awareness of
pornography's effects;
empower women, men and children to resist
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pornography's impact;
- continue researching the effects of pornography
and its links with violent crime and the
exploitation of women and children.
4. A concerted approach to the existing national and
international bodies of which we are respectively
a part to enlist their:
- spiritual, human and financial resources;
- moral authority within our diverse cultures;
- vast infrastructures;
capacity to educate and their multi-million
member constituencies for action.
5. Charging this vast and diverse inter-religious
coalition to make common cause, both nationally
and internationally with other organisations
devoted to the well being of the world's people
and communities, including:
- law enforcement authorities;
- child welfare organisations;
- other coalitions active in the campaign against
pornography and sexual exploitation;
- women's organisations;
- governmental departments responsible for welfare
of children;
(internationally such organisations include, for
example, UNICEF, ECPAT, World Health Organization,
Interpol, International Catholic Child Bureau,
European Union, etc.)
IV WE URGENTLY NEED:
1. A new religious initiative.
We call upon the governing body of each faith
group to make the protection of children and
adults from sexual abuse and exploitation linked
to pornography a priority - in their educational
and social concern efforts.
We advocate the establishment of national
religious coalitions to combat pornography in
every nation.
2. New and stronger legislation.
- We call for every nation to prohibit all aspects
of child pornography, including criminalizing its
production, distribution and possession.
- We call for every nation to outlaw abusive adult
pornography, for instance, those materials
depicting prurient sexual violence.
We call for every nation to criminalize child
sex tourism and to hold its nationals responsible
for sexual conduct abroad involving children.
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3. Coordinated international action against the use
of new technologies for pornography distribution
and consumption.
We call for international regulation and
increased law enforcement against those who would
use new channels of communication to exploit and
abuse children, women and men through pornography.
We call on the creators and suppliers of these
technologies to address the use of their products
and services to market pornography, violence and
sexual exploitation.
4. Recognition by governments of the seriousness of
this problem.
We call for those countries that export
pornography to devote special resources and
attention to the destructiveness of their trade
and attempts to stop it.
We call on governments to devote a ministry,
department, secretariat or unit to conduct
research to measure the problem, and secure the
rights of children to a safe environment, by
enforcement of laws and regulation of pornographic
media within each nation.
We call on judiciary branches of government to
examine the adequacy of their policies and
practices of sentencing and rehabilitating of
those who commit sex offences, especially against
minors.
5. Increased cooperative international law
enforcement efforts.
We call on law enforcement agencies to
reallocate human and financial resources to units
assigned to child exploitation and pornography
offences so that adequate finances and experienced
personnel might address enforcement concerns.
Many, we know, will doubt the viability and feasibility
of our ambitious plans and question the capacity and
energy of faith communities to pursue them. Yet, we
recall that it has been just such efforts that have
prevailed on a world scale in the past. the abolition
of child labour, while not universal, has been globally
embraced, in large measure with leadership from faith
communities. Many other such examples might be cited.
Others will scoff that such matters, while distasteful
to some, have little serious or widespread consequence.
So too did cynics once disparage environmental, drunk
driving and anti-smoking campaigns. despite disdain,
each of these has proven its case, asserted its moral
claim, captured public opinion and resulted in concrete
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change to the betterment of all. So too will the
battle against pornography and sexual exploitation be
won.
To sustain and expand this effort we will look toward a
'world congress to end pornography' that will usher in
an era of change. With faith groups and others, this
congress will provide a venue and resource to bring to
resolution a campaign now undertaken.
Our confidence derives not from ourselves, but our
faith conviction in the power of moral right and the
persuasiveness of enlightened self-interest. So, too,
is it founded in our traditions of faith that have
brought us to this day.
MANILA, 20 January 1995
•k'kie'k'k'kie'k'k
More than 160 religious leaders from 37 countries and
over 40 faith groups have just ended a three-day
conference on the problem of pornography, 'Protecting
Our Children's Future', held in Manila, the
Philippines. Organized by the broadly based Religious
Alliance Against Pornography, it was attended by
worldwide participants from the Roman Catholic Church,
the Salvation Army, the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, as well as from churches in
membership in the World Council of Churches, the
World Evangelical Fellowship, the World Pentecostal
Conference, and from many other organisations and faith
groups concerned about pornography's growing number of
victims - men, women and children. Experts from
Christian, Sikh and the Muslim communities addressed
the delegates. 'The Manila Declaration on Pornography'
was issued by the conferees at the meetings conclusion.
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